The Syrian crisis did not need the Arab League's decision to adopt the path leading toward the United Nations, considering that since day one, the crisis entered the arena of regional and international conflict. Also since day one, the regime relied – as it still is – on the Russian and Chinese political and diplomatic support. It and begged – while still doing so – for help, advice and aid from the Iranian ally in a direct way, and from Lebanon and Iraq indirectly. And since day one, Turkey embraced the figures and various components of the opposition and was the first to side with the popular action. In the meantime, it would be useless to recall the positions of the United States and Europe, whether at the level of their policies or sanctions, or to recall Damascus' response to Washington via a letter sent to the Security Council, accusing it of being “directly involved in the violence seen in Syria.” The League's decision was consensual, without counting Lebanon's opposing stand since it reflects Syria's stand. Indeed, is what is being witnessed on the common border between the two countries and the pursuit of the oppositionists in Beirut among other locations not enough? Is Hezbollah's Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's repetition of President Bashar al-Assad's threats to detonate the region not enough? As for Yemen's objection, it is that of a regime nearing its end. Consequently, there is an Arab consensus against the stay of the regime in Damascus, although this consensus did not rise up to the level of publicly demanding Al-Assad's departure as it is being done by the Western capitals. In this context, the League does not enjoy the mechanisms to carry out its decisions - as it is the case with the United Nations and its organizations - which is why it is always accused of impotence during critical and historical stages. However, its decision last Saturday features a moral value and important meanings, while its repercussions will definitely lead the Syrian crisis toward a new phase in which the noose will be tightened around the regime's neck. It marked a clear stand against this regime and an undeniable bias in favor of its opponents. As for the League's call upon the opposition factions to meet and agree over a unified vision for the next transitional phase, it not only unifies this opposition, but also responds to Western questions surrounding the possible alternative for the existing regime, its political identity and positions toward the numerous files linked to the Syrian crisis domestically and abroad. This ought to reassure the international community in regard to the future and direction of the desired change. And while the League's decision will prompt the regime to go farther in its security option, it will grant the youth who are engaged in the action more momentum to show steadfastness, defiance and confrontation will. Moreover, the call made upon the army to stop deterring the demonstrators will encourage new rebellion and dissent in the ranks of the military institution. The ball is not in the regime's court to implement the League's initiative in two or three days, as this regime immediately went back to its previous course and accused the League of carrying out “a Western and American agenda.” Had it truly been ready for the implementation, it would not have missed the two-week opportunity granted to it. Furthermore, it would not have upheld the policy of arrogance and the outsmarting attempts, or rather the policy of downplaying people's intelligence while trying to dupe them! Can the League believe the content of the letter it received on the eve of its meetings, regarding the fact that the regime has implemented most of the clauses featured in its initiative?! This is similar to the tale regarding the confrontation of “armed terrorist gangs” in the context of this wide action seen throughout the country! But now that the Arab cover was lifted off Damascus, the question is: How will this affect the action on the domestic arena? Will the League's decision tilt the balance in favor of the opposition? Will it provide the international community with the required cover to actively react as it did in Libya? So far, it has been clear that a balance of powers has been governing the internal equation, to the point where it became impossible – throughout the last eight months - to settle the conflict in favor of one side at the expense of the other. Indeed, the crowds never became tired, bored or despaired, as Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi's miserable fate gave them hope, and what President Ali Abdullah Saleh is about to confront will increase their determination and drive. As for the Arab League's recent decision, it will push them to show more obstinacy and block the way before any dialogue with the regime, just as it will embarrass many – domestically and abroad – who are still providing this regime with political and non-political help. On the other hand, the regime's threats issued from time to time regarding the settlement of the conflict, without it ever being able to achieve that goal, clearly reveal its impotence and inability to reach such an end. Nonetheless, this regime was not affected by the lethal political dissidence seen in Tripoli, and no city rebelled against it as Benghazi did. As for the military mutiny within the military and security institution, it failed to reach the point of threatening these two institutions, although the number of dissidents reached a few thousands. In the meantime, the neutralization of the country's two main capitals, i.e. Damascus and Aleppo, has so far constituted a point of strength in favor of the regime due to known reasons. As for the Kurds, they did not place their weight in these protests, as it was expected and hoped by the Homs, Hama and Daraa populations among others, due to considerations related to their caution and fears after what they had suffered following the rebellion that erupted in the Syrian east upon the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and their disregard, even total abandonment at the time, by their partners in the country! In the meantime, President Al-Assad's threat was followed by Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's threat to detonate the region in order to uphold the regime in Damascus. They both constitute signs of weakness rather than signs of strength, and to the predicament faced by both the president and the secretary general. Prior to them, Hosni Mubarak issued a series of similar warnings, and was then followed by Colonel Gaddafi. However, this did not discontinue the support earned by the action in Libya and Egypt, as the issue surpasses the fears and positions of the international and regional communities. The matter is in the hands of the youth on the squares who came to realize they had nothing to lose by proceeding with their action, and that their loss in case they were to retreat would be much greater than what they were offering every day. But what will follow the League's decision on the foreign arena? The Arab decision paved the way toward the United Nations, although throughout the last eight months the international community did not show eagerness to repeat the Libyan experience. Indeed, neither can the Security Council secure the necessary consensus in favor of a decision to assign a side to protect the civilians militarily, nor are the United States and Europe showing any willingness to carry out a unilateral intervention. At this level, one does not need to go over the reasons, seeing how the economic crisis sweeping the entire West from Greece to Wall Street is enough, along with the complicated intertwinement between numerous files and the Syrian crisis. By comparison, the interference in Libya was a picnic! On the other hand, the Arab decision is not enough to prompt Russia and China to change their positions, as the issue requires a trade-off between the superpowers. Hence, will Moscow settle for a final resolution of the Georgia issue that would keep this country in the Russian space? Will it settle for a stable pied-a-terre in the Mediterranean Sea? Will it settle for the discontinuation of the Western campaigns tackling human rights, the restriction of freedom and the absence of democracy during the year of the presidential elections and in light of the distribution of the roles between the Putin-Medvedev duo, or for full membership at the WTO? As for Beijing, will it settle for the discontinuation of the pressures on its currency and its authorization to move freely in Africa and Southeast Asia? On the other hand, the reliance on Turkey might be misplaced, as Ankara is not showing any willingness to be led into a confrontation with Tehran on the Syrian arena, knowing that the latter capital is not showing any sympathy toward the opposition and has even addressed harsh warnings to Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This is true despite the fact that the Islamic Republic will nowadays have a limited margin of maneuver – as it has been the case during the past months – due to its preoccupation with the handling of the repercussions of the International Atomic Energy Agency's report, the preparations to respond to the Israeli and non-Israeli threats to stage a military action to stop its nuclear program and the widening internal conflicts in the conservatives' ranks. Amid these considerations, the opposition is not calling for foreign intervention. It is merely calling for an Arab-international initiative to stop the killing since the only proposed option is the protection of the civilians as it was stated by Borhan Ghalioun who was speaking on behalf of the National Council. Nonetheless, this protection is remaining a slogan without an implementation mechanism. Indeed, following the river of blood, the massive destruction and the arrest and torture campaigns, it is impossible to convince the regime to show mercy toward its citizens or to see a meeting between the two sides. The opposition rightfully considers that the regime is over on the political level both domestically and abroad, but its tools and apparatuses are still operating efficiently and ensuring its survival in parallel to the regional and international circumstances surrounding the crisis. So, will Damascus' opponents settle for sponsoring the Free Syrian Army and for providing it with save havens in this or that country to allow it to act and confront the regime's machine? This would constitute the fastest way toward civil war whose beginnings are currently seen in Homs among others. In the meantime, the use of arms might be the best way for the regime to achieve what it wants through the unleashing of its military machine without any restrictions. But at this point, will it be useful to see the opposition carrying out a wide-scale civil disobedience to block the way before the militarization of the peaceful action? Or will the Arab economic sanctions following the international ones inflict pain upon those who have so far remained silent and push them to act and tilt the balance?
