The action in Syria is encountering difficult options, and the security confrontation led by the regime is facing a crucial test. Therefore, the next few days will be decisive for the future of the situation and the course of events in the country. So far, the protesters have not been deterred by the tanks which entered Daraa, thus taking to the streets from other cities and towns on the “Friday of Defiance” while determined to proceed with their action. In the meantime, the tanks headed to another city, i.e. to Baniyas. As for the United States and Europe, they accompanied these confrontations with additional pressures and sanctions, amid a wave of reciprocal criticisms and disputes over the actual position that should be adopted toward Damascus. The next few days will reveal the direction of the conflict. Will the protesters be able to proceed with their action if the tanks are able to subdue the different cities one by one? Will the regime adopt the security solution until the end, regardless of the price, the victims and the destruction? Will the international community settle for these positions or sanctions? Or will the military institution which is closely watched by Western circles commit the prohibited and turn the equation upside down? So far, many positions converge over President Bashar al-Assad. The first is that of the oppositionists who are communicating via the page of the “Syrian Revolution” on Facebook. The latter have thus been proposing to the president solutions to exit the crisis, and have been calling on him – for weeks now – to personally intervene and introduce the reforms. In other words, they still believe he is capable of doing that, are giving additional time to secure a settlement or are aware of the impossibility of achieving what was done by the Egyptians and the Tunisians due to the internal and external complications surrounding their action. The second position is conveyed by this ongoing controversy between the members of the American Congress and President Barack Obama's administration, which is refusing their calls to pull the American ambassador from Damascus or oust the Syrian ambassador from the US. For their part, members in the Foreign Affairs Committee in parliament accused the administration of adopting more lenient positions toward Damascus than the ones it adopted toward Egypt and Libya, while Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Tamara Cofman Wittes assured that the American government did not call for the changing of the regime in Damascus. As for the third position, it was expressed by the European sanctions which excluded President Al-Assad and his defense minister, knowing that some European countries have been and are still pushing toward more stringency with the head of the regime. In this context, European leaders are blamed for not having dealt with Al-Assad the way they dealt with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The fourth position on the other hand is the absence of any signs pointing to an Arab action similar to the one which accompanied the legal cover provided for the issuance of Security Council Resolution 1973 related to the protection of the Libyan civilians. Indeed, there are Arab attempts deployed to convince Damascus to adopt the path of reform, a thing which Turkey is doing as well. Moreover, there is no sign pointing to a possible consensus within the Security Council over the adoption of special measures against the regime in Damascus, as it was the case against the one in Tripoli. The conclusion at this level is that there is a quasi-agreement over the necessity of giving President Al-Assad more time to recant the confrontation of the protests with force and violence, as some believe that the international community does not have a specific substitute with whom it could deal to move toward a harsher stage in the confrontation with the current regime. In addition, many still perceive Syria as being a pivotal actor in the region, and fear that any miscalculated turmoil could affect the entire Arab Levant and drown it in dangerous chaos whose negative repercussions on regional stability – from the Ocean to the Gulf – would be difficult to contain. Consequently, they prefer - until now - to watch the regime after it has weakened, considering that even if it were to smother this action, it would come out exhausted and unable to return to the regional arena while disregarding the positions of the “post-revolution Egypt” or those of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This in turn is increasing Iran's confusion and concerns. However, all these external positions toward the developments in Syria will also be facing a difficult test in the next few days, as there is nothing on the horizon revealing that President Al-Assad is about to change his current choice. Had this not been the case, he would not have postponed the hastening of numerous reforms since day one. Many believe there is exaggeration in saying that economic and security power centers are opposed to reform and are impacting the decision-making process to allow the prevalence of their position, considering that the president assumed his position while supported by these powers. In other words, they constitute the basis of his legitimacy and have paved the way – during the first years of his rule – for a popular legitimacy which placed high hopes in him after he made his promises. It would thus be logical and realistic to say that he is in the same boat as these powers, and that consequently, any real reform will weaken their position as well as his own, if not completely annul them. As for the sanctions policy, it is unlikely that it will lead to the desired results. Syria was practically subjected to a blockade for many years, and endured a long period of sanctions. This never changed its policies or weakened the regime. Therefore, the new American and European sanctions might not have a major impact at the level of the course of events in the country, considering that the blockade to which the regime was subjected following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was much harsher and wider, but had no consequences on its behavior or policies. Actually, France, then the United States, were forced to lift the blockade and reengage in the policy of dialogue with Damascus. Hence, it would be useless to rely on the current sanctions to twist the regime's arm and get it to discontinue its violent handling of its oppositionists. Certainly, Turkey seems to be the most influential in Syria, which would explain its anger and disgruntlement toward the deaf ear with which it is met. Indeed, it tried to extend a bridge of dialogue between the regime and a team from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, but was faced with rejection under the pretext that a secular regime did not engage in dialogue with a religious party! It also tried to push the regime toward a national dialogue with symbols from the opposition, but to no avail, as the regime which – throughout the last forty years – eliminated political life in the country, attributed its rejection to the absence of any “institutional” side with whom it could talk. In the meantime, it is still casting accusations against the protesters and demonstrators, ranging between “gangs” and “Salafis” among others. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been and still is urging President Bashar al-Assad to introduce reforms while warning against “another Hama.” The man is fearful about the effects of the chaos which might reach his country and the entire region if the situation in Syria were to grow out of control. However, what the Turkish leader is aware of is that any real structural reforms – related for example to partisan plurality, the freedom of the press, free and democratic elections – would be enough to put an end to a regime that has confined itself and its people throughout forty years. As for the reform experience of the Turkish regime, it is completely different and there are no grounds, circumstances or realities allowing their emulation in Syria. Still, Erdoğan is entitled to be angry and concerned, as Syria seems to be the only one swimming against the current. The Americans and Europeans are adopting a policy of engagement with the Islamic parties that rushed to catch up with the youth on the Arab squares of “peaceful” change, thus addressing a strong blow to the policy of violence in the face of the oppression of the regimes, as well as to the ideology and offshoots of Al-Qaeda, even before the death of its leader Bin Laden. Today, they are trying to follow in the footsteps of the Turkish Islamists, their experience and model. Erdoğan is entitled to be angry and concerned. Is it possible for Syria to become a fort whose doors to the Arab world are locked after all the efforts deployed by Ankara during the last few years and the major transformation in its diplomacy toward what once used to be part of its empire? The next few days will define the course of events in Syria. And regardless of the outcome of the security campaign against the towns and villages, the regime will not come out safe and sound as though nothing has happened, unless the prohibited occurs. Moreover, the steadfastness of the protesters might change the stands and the policies, both internally and externally. And while Hamas's position points to what has happened on the Syrian arena so far, the disputes inside the regime in Tehran also point to what has happened at the level of the “rejectionism front” in terms of turmoil and confusion, which will not help both regimes in the face of the “Arab Spring.”
