The Iranian presidential elections were meant to be a celebration, as described by the Supreme Leader. Khamenei meant that the Iranian voters must be overjoyed at renewing the popular mandate of the Islamic regime, which he heads and leads, through the second term in office offered to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the leader the most closely attached to the regime and the solid nucleus that surrounds it. The “celebration” description was based on past presidential and parliamentary elections, where the sieve of candidates was enough to disqualify any opposition candidate or critic of the regime who could have spoiled the celebrations. Thus all contests were restricted and fine-tuned which prohibited any violation of this unanimity imposed by the regime on the country. This fine-tuning would not have been possible were it not for the inflated internal security forces linked to the “Revolutionary Guards” and its branches and the oppressed freedoms. But most importantly, it was regulated in the constitution. All the decision making authorities are either appointed or elected indirectly, while the institutions elected directly by the people do not enjoy any real power. This applies to the presidency as well as to other institutions, be they of civilian, military, economic, social or media nature. In this sense, the elections become practically a plebiscite on the decisions taken by the Leader and his surrounding security-military establishment. Herein lies the root of the current crisis in Iran. The Supreme Leader decided to renew Ahmadinejad's term, so that his re-election would serve as a comprehensive popular plebiscite, as show the announced results of the elections. The competition with the other “sons of the revolution” would prove the seriousness of the plebiscite, not the opposite. If the expected objections arise, then they would be confronted by the “Faqih” who can impose his absolute mandate on everyone, as per the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This constitution was tailored to the measure of Imam Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, amidst a strong internal balance of power, comprehensive alliances, and specific economic and social conditions that followed the toppling of the Shah. This is not to mention the Iraq-Iran war, the cold war and the fight against the soviets in Afghanistan. The Leader wagered that changing internal and foreign circumstances would not affect the Islamic Republic, that the “Wilayat Al-Faqih,” as a political regime and governing system, would counter all the changes, and that his constitutional right to “incriminate” any form of objection would dispel any threat. Interestingly, despite the scenes in the streets, Iran's official media still depict as the “sons of the revolution” and founders of the Islamic regime Ahmadinejad's rivals, who contest the results of the presidential elections. In this sense, they are not allowed to object to or secede from the “Al-Faqih.” As for those who are causing the disturbances, they are gangs engaged in the foreign conspiracy. The slogan of the popular movements, i.e. “where is my vote,” regardless of the numbers of these votes, raises an essential issue for the regime: popular vote must reflect on the decision-making institutions. This paves the way for discussing the constitution of the “Wilayat Al-Faqih” as it suppresses popular elections and deals with elections as a plebiscite to be held every once in a while. The proof is that no one heeded the Guide's recommendation to celebrate this electoral day. The Iranian street boiled even more, despite the security measures, media blackout, oppression and arrests. The Iranian regime might suppress the current opposition for a long or short period of time. It might impose security in the street and in politics. But the current rift, which is the widest and most radical since the triumph of the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, has exposed the crisis and flaws of the Iranian constitution under circumstances different than the ones that accompanied the rise of the Islamic Republic. The most prominent has to do with the meaning of the elections between the “Wilayat Al-Faqih” and democracy as an expression of popular desire, even if as a décor.
