Amidst the uproar caused by the results of the presidential elections in Iran, which divided the country between the “celebration” of the Leader Ali Khamenei and the “mourning” of Mir Hussein Mousavi, the number one opponent of the President who remained a President thanks to the great victory, and far from Mir's green flag, the enthusiasm displayed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy in his condemnations of “rigged” elections highlights the new differences between Paris's and Washington's approach to the Iranian issue. What is more important about this issue, in which fear from the nuclear program and an atomic Iran got mixed with the issue of freedom and integrity for the younger generations in a big country that sits on a whole bank of the Gulf, is the enthusiastic tendency among some factions in the Arab region to imagine that there will be a white coup in the Islamic Republic, or that Mousavi's “civilian” armies will topple the fortress of the “Revolutionary Guards.” This Arab drive is almost as fast as the ballistic missiles tested by Tehran to warn its foreign “enemies” against underestimating it. While it is customary for Iran to raise the sword of resisting the “conspiracy” woven by those “enemies,” who are exploiting the “weak of spirit” inside Iran, the target this time is Mir Hussein Mousavi who mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in the street, yet is viewed by the regime as an easy morsel for the “conspiracy.” The regime is not in any danger, nor will it overlook those who cast doubts over the integrity of Ahmadinejad's re-election at the head of the executive authority protected by the “Wilayat Al-Faqih.” Khamenei is certain of the stability of the regime thanks to the testimony of American President Barack Obama who saw no difference between Ahmadinejad's ideology and that of Mousavi to present him as a worthy figure in the dialogue to come between Washington and Tehran. While all the previous experiences in the Islamic Republic make it likely that the storm of “mourning,” caused by the number one enemy of the Iranian president against Khamenei's “celebration” of Ahmadinejad's victory, will be contained, this should not belittle Mousavi's courage in challenging the Leader, as no one else has dared to since 1979. All this does not deny the truth that the regime keeps reproducing a single methodology. It constantly questions the credibility of anyone who contests the ruler's credibility and integrity, or those who call for protecting the freedoms and the right of the young generations to determine their own fate through elections. All of those who dare to do this are accused of treason or voluntary and involuntary complicity with the foreign “conspirators.” Wasn't the Revolutionary Guard the first to warn of a “velvet revolution” planned by Mousavi as a pre-emptive strike to besiege him? The fact of the matter is that the Guardian Council will most likely recount the votes in some of the electoral precincts or in some ballot boxes which means that Mousavi's fight will not change the final result. In other words, Ahmadinejad will enjoy his second presidential term even if more people fall as “martyrs” for Mousavi to extend the period of “mourning.” Mousavi will discover, maybe belatedly, that the support that he is receiving from the head of the Expediency Council former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who became Ahmadinejad's archenemy after the latter tarnished his reputation in electoral campaigns, will disappear so long as the final word is in the hands of the Leader. The street is not ready for a Khomeini style revolution. The main reason is that the protectors of the “celebration” are playing their winning cards: mobilizing all the wings of the regime and its tools in the street against the scarecrow of the “conspiracy” and the “enemies” waiting for a chance to assault the project of the “greater Iran” armed with the atom and with “Wilayat Al-Faqih.” The bomb or the nuclear program + “Wilayat Al-Faqih” are confronting an internal “conspiracy” + foreign “enemies.” This is the simple equation that governed a path that shook Iran, but not its regime. When Obama and his oratory skills failed to note the difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi when the main issue at stake is the nuclear program, then the American President inadvertently reminded everyone that the nuclear program gained momentum under reformist President Khatami whose main aide Abtahi was arrested by the authorities. The Iranians agree on the issue of the atom, but disagree about freedom. They agree on the issue of the Great Iran, but disagree about the tools of the regime and its heavy hand. They are united in confronting the world and divided by the freedom of saying “no” at home. The “mourning” is still at its beginning. So is the “celebration.” The Revolutionary Guards are ready. As for the noise coming from abroad and the foreign protests, they are merely echoes of the foreign refusal to countenance a nuclear Iran after El-Baradei justified its nuclear ambitions by pointing to its desire for regional influence. As for his great fall, when he warned it of meeting Saddam's fate, who would not have met his end “if he had possessed a bomb,” then this a message with a single meaning.
