For the first time ever since the coup of the free officers in 1952, Egypt is heading toward pluralistic parliamentary and presidential elections without the hegemony of the emergency law and the one candidate presented by the ruling party. This new and unprecedented situation in around six decades certainly features a key positive facet, i.e. the ability of the voters to freely choose their representatives in parliament and the head of the state. At the same time, it is possible that this might not be seen in the next elections, not due to the inability of the Egyptians to practice their newly-found political freedoms and democracy, but due to what the next elections might carry in terms of alliances that will define the future, although the revolution youth are insisting on boycotting all the practices instated during the past decades. Still, the successful toppling of the former regime and its practices, the prosecution of its symbols and the peaceful move toward democracy would not have been possible had it not been for the convergence of the interests of the main powers in Egypt, especially the military institution and the Islamic movement. Indeed, this convergence, which constitutes the biggest and strongest force in the country, secured the smooth transition of power and the constitutional amendments. It also neutralized the remnants of the former regime, as well as the young forces that constituted the nerve of the action and the protests and the modern forces seeking a civilian state with all the meaning of the word. At the same time, this convergence earned exceptional American backing and Washington might have worked to instate it based on President Barack Obama's theory saying that stability is guaranteed by the centrist Islamic forces with the support of the military institution. This was clearly prevalent in the American administration before President Hosni Mubarak's resignation, but especially after it. This administration is using its historical relation – which was described as being strategic with the military institution – and is reconciling with the Islamic movement to ensure the continuation of this relation. This happened in Egypt and in Tunisia as well. This was also seen in Washington's justification of its inability to impact the events in Libya and Syria, as there is no military institution in the first and it enjoys no relations with the military institution in the second. In the meantime, Obama did not conceal his admiration for the Turkish, Indonesian and maybe even Algerian archetypes that are conveying a successful implementation of his theory. This places the Egyptian revolution youth and the modern forces in the country in opposition not only with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that is currently ruling Egypt and practically overseeing the implementation of the American theory, but also with Washington's strategy at this level. When the American theory points to the Turkish and Indonesian archetypes in particular, it is not only disregarding this failed experience in Pakistan, but also the great discrepancy between the progress affecting the two aforementioned archetypes and the Egyptian one. This may be the biggest challenge facing the Arab spring, which is trying to change the bleak reality of authoritarian regimes but is sliding toward a confrontation with key powers that are relying on the encouragement and support of the United States. This is happening at a time when the latter is more interested in guaranteeing the stability of its interests and goals than in dealing with the suffering of the Arab people who are yearning to free themselves from political oppression and to instate civil democracies and the state of the law.
