Much of what is happening in the region calls for pessimism. There have been bombings and the targeting of Christians in Iraq and Egypt; the South looks set to secede from the North in Sudan; suicide attacks are continuing in Iraq; Yemen is mired in a political crisis that began with amending the Constitution and will continue to see developments in the South, and in the bloody tribal-political confrontation with the Houthis and al-Qaida. There is also movement toward democracy in Tunisia, and the growth of extremist trends. Meanwhile, the peace process on the Palestinian track is stalled, and there are growing dangers of a new large-scale Israeli military action against the Gaza Strip. Last but not least, there are fears of civil strife in Lebanon as a result of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its impending indictment. Examining these developments closely boosts the belief that ruling regimes and their institutions in many Arab countries, and the short-term approaches to the crises faced by the Arab world, require modernization and democracy. Also, a part of this world is becoming more backward and regressing, as the Arabs increasingly lack the ability to influence matters on the world stage; they are subject to the influence of Western states in dealing with their internal crises, instead of isolating these crises from foreign influence, which is cemented by these leaders – since many of them rely on this influence to protect their interests. This picture can only confirm the pessimistic view that the Arab world is headed toward disintegration and weightlessness, which has been expected by the elite and public opinion leaders for a few decades now, because they have given up on the ruling class in a number of states being mired in corruption, as something natural. However, these crises, or at least some of them, indicate that we are witnessing the birth process of what could lead to some awareness of the need for change. If the balance of power in some of these crises has not changed to permit the hope that a solution may come, there have been certain signals, or attempts to pose the question: is it possible to save what is left, or try to turn this pessimistic picture around, even if it takes a while? In Egypt, there has been horrific violence that targeted the Copts, and the resulting frustration and fear over national unity. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore the positives, and the aspects of civil and popular, and even official, resistance, along with the resistance of intellectuals and clergymen, to the sectarian struggle that has heated up. These aspects serve as a deterrent to the emotions that have been let loose, as well as an incentive for the authorities to take practical political steps that enshrine national unity based on a Muslim-Coptic rejection of civil strife. If this was what Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abul-Gheit meant when he said that the authorities alone are responsible for protecting the Copts, then in this case he is right. Protection does not only involve security, but politics as well. In Iraq, where an agreement on forming a government has taken a long time, with all political forces suffering attrition in the process, it has been proven that settlements are possible despite the defects they have and their inability to treat many problems. A deal was reached between the Sunnis and Shiites, and between them and the Kurds, and between the Americans and Iranians and other regional powers. This is certainly better than the language of fire and steel and threats of doom and gloom. These political settlements and solutions extend to Sudan, where the leaders of the North have given in to the likely peaceful secession of the South in the interest of coexisting with this movement, whose economic, social, ethnic and security problems are no less important than the national unity-related problems that have exhausted Sudan for decades. Lebanon might not be outside the logic of domestic settlements and their external extensions. The country is on the brink of a decisive month of urgent regional efforts, particularly Saudi-Syrian ones. The acceptance by Lebanese domestic groups of the victory of this policy, in isolation from the foreign efforts and in complementing them, at the same time, might give this policy some momentum. This depends on the degree to which the Lebanese realize that there is an actual place for the culture of reaching settlements vis-à-vis Arab crises, and that they must accommodate themselves to these agreements and not fight against them. Isn't it commonly believed that United States policy is the source of all of these crises, while another belief is that this policy is on the retreat in the entire Middle East? Isn't this a chance for those supporting this theory to replace the tactics of confrontation with this policy with new ones, as it retreats in favor of new policies? The logic of resorting to a domestic settlement might not help in the confrontation with Israel's ignoring the rights of Palestinians; however, it might enable them to achieve a domestic deal that allows the enhancing of their positions in the ongoing confrontation with the Jewish state. It might make it easier for each Arab state, and all of them combined, to at least catch their breaths for a new round of history, waiting to see what will happen.
