After the first wave of blood-spattered protests in Syria, men of power and officials came out to pledge that it would never happen again, either by recognizing the people's right to protests peacefully or the necessity to begin the political reforms demanded. The abundant talk from Syrian officials, ministers and MPs, was kept in check under the ceiling of fear – fear of saying something the regime would dislike. Thus their situation seemed closer to comedy theater, and the Sah Al-Nom comedy series, than to the dangerous situation the street was witnessing. It seemed for a while that the President's adviser Bouthaina Shaaban wanted to correct this comedic image, as she spoke of people killed, of violence and of the necessity for reform and for meeting popular demands. This means there is some acknowledgement of how dangerous the situation is, but more importantly, this confirms that the upper leadership knows what is happening on the ground, and that it wants to show that it knows. This was paving the way for the speech by President Bashar Al-Assad, who, regardless of what he said and promised, was supposed to prove that there was some awareness of the fact that the problem is connected to a social movement, and that not repeating the blood-spattered protests and making sure to avoid violence inevitably requires dealing with the core of the problem. Had it been so, the blood-spattered scene on Friday would not have been repeated and the protest movement would not have spread to new areas, despite the debate over the promises of demanded reform, and the extent to which the core and rhythm of such reform is being met. Thus the disappointment that was expressed after the speech becomes a source of concern regarding the possibility of continued violence. And this is not just because promises of reform and their quality do not meet with the concerns and demands of the protesters, but also because of the regression that has occurred in the official discourse after the first wave of violence. In fact, such regression might be an expression of the significance of the reform put forward – which would provoke more protesting and drive towards that vicious circle of action and reaction, reaching perhaps complete alienation. Under such regression fall those official and semi-official theories, as well as those leaked to media outlets close to Damascus, which were meant to defend the regime's story about violence taking place. Thus we have discovered, for example, that the protagonists of the “conspiracy” are not the Americans or the Israelis, who target Damascus's political direction, but armed men sent from Lebanon by the Future Movement. But those who produced this story paid no heed to how lightly the Syrian regime, known for controlling with an iron fist everything that happens in the country, would be taken when it wants to convince the world that a handful of armed men could have caused this much uproar in several cities at the same time. We have also discovered, for example, that the “plans for sectarian strife” in Syria originate from the political disputes in Lebanon between the forces of the March 14 and the March 8 coalitions, and the sectarian tensions they relate to, especially after Saad Hariri's government was forced to resign. What was not paid heed to here was the fact that reasons such as these, if they turn out to be true, incriminate all Syrians, including those in power, who assert the strength of internal social bonds, and that reasons such as these only affect an environment that is predisposed to it. As for talk of armed “groups” or “gangs” climbing to the rooftops of buildings, in several cities and at corresponding times, and firing at people and at security forces, it also puts the spotlight on the extent of the powerlessness of the Syrian apparatus, which stands unable to stop such a large number of armed men from wandering around as they please and killing people. Here too, a story that seeks to defend the regime's behavior turns into an incrimination of it. On the other hand, the violence in the streets of Syria that we can see on television screens, or that is being reported by press agencies, is all fabricated and fake, according to official and semi-official stories. Those who hold such stories want to convince Syrians, who are living through these blood-drenched days, that what they are seeing and experiencing is a fraud fabricated by the international press. The official and semi-official Syrian stories have failed to defend the regime. They have exerted so much effort accusing and denying that they have become a weapon turned against oneself.
