The fate of the Iranian (Islamic) initiative to resolve the crisis of the regime in Damascus not be any better than that of its Syrian and Arab predecessors, and before them Turkish, Qatari and other unpublicized initiatives engaged in by friends of the Syrian regime. The inability of those initiatives to reach a solution in Syria is not connected to their content. Indeed, many of their ideas meet with what had previously been announced by the regime in Damascus, and could thus form, individually or collectively, a basis to begin working towards a solution. Yet they were all met with absolute rejection from the regime, at times with a certain amount of irritation and rudeness. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's initiative gives priority to stopping the violence, followed by Islamic sponsorship of dialogue headed by President Bashar Al-Assad in order to enact the reforms demanded by the protest movement. The initiative of former Syrian Information Minister Mohammad Salman, regardless of who stands behind it, calls for stopping the violence and starting a process of dialogue under the sponsorship of President Assad. As for the initiative of the League of Arab States, it holds many ideas, but essentially calls for stopping the violence and engaging in dialogue under the current regime. And all such calls had appeared repeatedly in other initiatives. And since all of these initiatives essentially continue to give the regime the right to sponsor stopping the violence and starting the dialogue, why then does the regime reject them so harshly, and risk causing tension with its allies (as took place with Turkey) and providing additional pretexts for those who oppose it? Most likely the motives for such rejection lie in the nature of the regime and in the way it views the people whom it governs. The regime has reached such an extent of personalization that state affairs have become personal matters – in the sense that the ruling class now considers itself to alone be concerned with resolving the situation. Offers to help, through initiatives from outside the circle of the regime whatever their origin, thus represent provocation, as they put into question its absolute right to manage the country's affairs as it sees fit. Such a self-image on the part of the ruling class in itself absolutely excludes both reform and dialogue, keeping only what is known as the security solution, i.e. the elimination of centers of protest through the use of brute force. And if the regime repeats on a daily basis that it is confronting “armed gangs”, the facts on the ground assert that a campaign of “punishment” and “revenge” is being waged against the areas where protests are taking place. This is indicative of the nature of the regime's view of the people. The people are not allowed to be restless, they are not allowed to enjoy a certain extent of decent living, and they are especially not allowed to demand it. Indeed, merely declaring to have such rights is tantamount to a declaration of revolt. What then when the issue concerns political and democratic rights, pluralism and alternation of power? Such a people entered the circle of “conspiracy” the moment they demanded democracy. Indeed, what greater “conspiracy” could there be against the regime than that which demands allowing for the alternation of power through free and fair elections? Thus the Syrian regime sees only “conspiracies” against it, whether through continued protest or through the initiatives that advise it to put a stop to its use of brute violence. It might be tempting for the Syrian regime to portray Western sanctions, and especially European and American sanctions, as pressures to drive it towards peace with Israel. But did the United States, Turkey and the European Union not act as mediators in similar efforts in the past? The fact of having accepted such mediations for peace with Israel in the past, under Damascus's declared strategy of peace, negates claims that its defiance is the reason behind Western pressures. What infuriates the Syrian regime in current Western stances is their talk of democracy, pluralism and human rights. Indeed, this would grant the Syrian people a right of adulthood they have not deserved, from the point of view of the regime. This is why violent repression comes coupled with the utmost insistence on clinging to the nature of the regime. Thus all initiatives fail to convince the decision-makers to put a stop to the military campaign. Indeed, any solution that does not end with the regime's crushing victory, through the broadest operation of punishment of the areas of protest, would mean the success of the “conspiracy” or of some of its goals.
