By taking a quick look at the map of the Arab world “from the Ocean to the Gulf,” one can clearly see that the storm of change has not spared anyone, although it has taken different shapes and forms. On Saturday, the Egyptians were heading to the ballot boxes to participate in the referendum over the constitutional amendments, while the brigades of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi were heading to Benghazi's suburbs in a race against the international military action to stop the attacks on the civilians. In the meantime, the Yemenis were still fighting - to no avail - while the regional tensions in regard to Bahrain overshadowed the domestic developments. The popular action is rising in one location and dissipating in another, and the picture is not always the same everywhere – It thus converges at times and diverges at others, along with its endings. Still, all are in the eye of the storm. The picture is not the same, nor is the change which is materializing differently in each country. In Egypt, we are witnessing a democratic experience never before known by the people. They are voting on the constitutional amendments, which in the opinion of many do not rise to the level of changing the entire regime. Therefore, the march toward such a drastic change might extend over a long period of time. For its part, Tunisia is liquidating the remnants of the regime in all positions at a faster pace, in an attempt to sever all ties with the past – that of Ben Ali and Bourguiba – once and for all. Based on these two experiences, the train of change is progressing toward other locations. It has not stopped and may not do so, as there are countries in the Levant, the Maghreb and in between, which have hastened and are still hastening political, economic and social reforms. They seem to be engaged in a race against time to extinguish the fire beneath the ashes and block the doors and windows in the face of the storm, knowing that some of them have overcome the test of the caesarian operations, the torture and the victims. These reforms are presenting a different experience and a different picture regarding the possibility of inducing change at the least possible cost, although the situation on some other “streets” is still foggy and linked to certain circumstances and facts. Indeed, they are linked to power balances related to the capabilities of the official security bodies and the people, the unity of the social components and the network of foreign interests. The domestic action is no longer limited to the local population and internal factors, as the entire world has become engaged – under different forms – in the change process, its means and limits. Moreover, the balance of internal powers is no longer the decisive factor, considering that the conflict is no longer a local one. Hence, the results of this hurricane will not be the same and the endings will differ between one country and another. And because the map of change is redrafting the map of regional order, the sponsors of the international system immediately assumed their role under various shapes and forms, depending on the interests and the circumstances surrounding them. The Tunisian and Egyptian experiences allowed the preservation of the social fabric and its unity, by relying on a long history linked to the building of the state and its institutions - namely the military one – but also on a society which is still upholding the minimum level of partisan and unionist life and other civil society institutions. Moreover, they did not directly threaten regional and international interests, despite the fact that they have forced and are still forcing the concerned sides to reconsider their interests and relations, while the international community and especially the United States and the European Union are not distant from what is happening in Tunis and Cairo. But on the opposite side of these two pictures, there are other pictures which are much more complicated and painful. Indeed, there are different local, regional and international stands because the map of interests varies from one country to another. In Libya for example, the international community hesitated and different positions emerged and are still emerging in regard to the developments in the country, despite the recent consensus over UNSCR 1973. Therefore, during the last couple of days, Gaddafi has been hastening the annihilation of the last stronghold of those demanding change, in the hope of imposing a new fait accompli that might obstruct the implementation of the resolution. The regime in Tripoli is engaged in a confrontation with the population in the East, but also with an Arab and international “consensus” that severed the last ties with it. Consequently, it can no longer be spoken to or dealt with. But in light of this total divorce, how will the situation be handled if Gaddafi were to respect the ceasefire and settle for what was achieved on the ground? Will the states which recognized the opposition's National Council assume the task of annihilating his brigades militarily and enable the oppositionists to rise again in Tripoli and other cities in the West, the center and the South? What is feared is seeing the conflict ending with the consecration of the fait accompli, unless those who secured the issuance of resolution 1973 resort to powerful strikes against the regime until the achievement of the desired change, even if via foreign hands. This is due to the fact that any other solution will mean the prolongation of this situation without any settlement, thus leading to a temporary or permanent division with which Libya will join Sudan! In Yemen, the situation is different, and so is the Arab and international stand. So far, the regime in Sana'a has not proclaimed an organized war against its oppositionists – as Gaddafi has done – although some of its apparatuses exercised violence and killings. It is still showing obstinacy and racing with the angry crowds to the squares, at a time when it is engaged in dialogue with them and dubbing their victims who are falling under the bullets of its security bodies as being “martyrs!” It is fighting hard to remain in a game that is enhancing the move toward a tribal conflict whose repercussions will not be limited to the domestic arena, and might extend to some neighbors. This will happen unless the pressures manage to secure the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has not yet been asked to leave by the international community. Indeed, the latter is merely calling on him to stop the violence and listen to the demands of the protesters. Yemen's geographic location is very sensitive, and its dismantlement into mini-states and “sultanates” - as it used to be the case in its South following the exit of British colonialism – will subject the Arab Peninsula and the Horn of Africa to strong winds cannot be controlled or resisted. Such a development will also enhance the chances of Al-Qaeda and the other fundamentalist movements, and trigger the appetite of many neighbors to interfere and engage in an open regional conflict that will render the situation similar to a massive Somali one which might not spare South Sudan. At this point, who would be able to guarantee the safety of the oil passages from the Arabian Sea to Bab-el-Mandeb? Therefore, an agreement must be reached over the alternative in Sana'a before pushing toward a drastic change, although this also appears to be difficult in light of the tribal and regional balances. While some states in the Arab Peninsula tilted in the direction of the winds of change and responded through packages of political, economic and social reforms that varied from one country to another, this was not the case in Bahrain. And had some of the hardliners who are engaged in the conflict known how to round the corners and take into consideration the sensitivity of the sectarian factor and the already tense regional factor, the conflict on the domestic arena would not have taken a turn that is threatening national fabric, and the internal action would not have become a more dangerous regional one. Indeed, the domestic sectarian tensions are about to lead to a sectarian conflict, against which warnings have been issued in the Arab world ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the transfer of power from one component to another - which is trying to monopolize the rule by all means, including the use of the organized sectarian and confessional violence seen during the last few years. Reform is lost, or is almost lost, amid regional tensions that are not only limited to the GCC countries and Iran, but are also affecting Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and other locations. At this level, we do not know how Baghdad will host the deferred Arab summit, which may be the first victim of this high “sectarian tide.” The winds of change have not stopped and will not stop. What remains is for Kuwait to know how to achieve balance between its obligations as a GCC member state and the requirements to maintain its national unity, and for the two sides of the Palestinian conflict to know how to exit the regional and international alignment and respond to the wishes of the youth who are demanding an end to the division on the squares of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to avoid losing whatever is left from the cause. Moreover, the Lebanese must know the limits of the conflict over the international tribunal and the arms of the resistance, so that Lebanon does not fall in the trap of the prohibited sectarian conflict, while the Syrians must draw the lessons from the experiences in Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Finally, the Arab youth must learn how to maintain their countries' maps and not be hijacked by sectarian, confessional and regional infighting, so that they are able to play a decisive role in drawing up the new regional order and prevent it from being concocted by the superpowers in the East and the West and by the neighboring countries.
