The hurricane affecting the Arab world has not stopped and its endings will vary from one Arab country to another, depending on the circumstances in each, but also on domestic and external conditions related to the social structure, the extent of its cohesion with history and the geographic location, and the network of relations and interests extending beyond the local level. And while Tunisia and Egypt have crossed or are still crossing the finish line with the least possible losses, what is being witnessed in Libya and maybe even in Yemen does not herald imminent endings, but rather additional bloodshed. Indeed, the Jamahiriya is bordering on a regional and tribal war between its East and its West, while Yemen might turn into another Somalia but in a worse version if the people do not contain the situation, namely the Sana'a population. As for Bahrain, it is growing closer to a different ending than the one we have seen and are still seeing from Tunisia to Yemen, if the moderate ones in the open confrontation are able to lead dialogue toward the desired results and are capable of isolating the hardliners and offering mutual concessions. In other words, they should be able to reach a settlement that would firstly uphold the constant principles – from the constitution to the national pact and the identity of the country – and would secondly ensure drastic political, economic and developmental reforms to achieve justice and equality between the different components of society. This ought to lead the country out of the regional and international struggle whose sides were mobilized toward the situation in Bahrain in a way that was not seen toward the situation in Libya or even in Yemen! Indeed, Iran immediately expressed its position toward the developments in the country, and mobilized its media to compensate for the absence of Al-Jazeera which was not absent during the events in Egypt and in Tunisia before that. As for the foreign ministers of the GCC member states, they instantly headed to Manama to corroborate their solidarity with it, express their concerns over its security and stability and convey the willingness to defend it. The country is part of a regional organization whose members are linked by a number of joint institutions and a wide network of security, military, financial and economic agreements, with the final goal of paving the way before the emergence of a union similar to the European Union. This organization has proved to be cohesive on more than one critical occasion, considering that any change affecting one member in it will carry repercussions on the other members. This was seen when the latter did not hesitate to defend Kuwait when it was invaded by Saddam Hussein. This Gulf support may have encouraged Manama to exercise stringency and violence to disperse the action on Pearl Square. The same was seen following the support it earned from its sisters when it was facing the turmoil that hit it in the mid-1990s, thus paving the way before the Islamic Republic – as is the case today – to express its real position toward its small neighbor which has always constituted the barometer of the relations that went up and down between the Islamic Republic and the GCC countries. This is not the first time that a protest movement in Bahrain turns into an occasion for the eruption of a clash between the Islamic Republic and its Gulf neighbors. Indeed, the problems that erupted on the island in the mid-1990s increased the concerns of the Gulf countries vis-à-vis their Eastern neighbor which has never stopped trying to “export the revolution” and recall – from time to time – what it refers to as being its “historical rights” in Bahrain. In this context, and during their summit in Doha around two years ago, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called on the GCC leaders to relinquish their security agreements with the Western states and turn toward Tehran. Moreover, Iran did not conceal its threats to the Gulf populations when it assured that they will not be spared in any war with the United States or Israel. True, the crisis in Bahrain is dominated by internal reasons, but the Iranian factor must be taken into consideration as many confrontations have taken place between the revolutionary state and its neighbors, the most prominent and public of which being the one with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the wars of the Houthis and especially the sixth war. Today, there is no need to recall Bahrain's vital dimension for Saudi security in particular and for Gulf security in general. The Iranian nuclear file has been and still is haunting the people of the Arabian Peninsula more than it is haunting the West. And while the Security Council faced Tehran with sanctions, the Gulf States decided to establish a nuclear energy structure and entered an unprecedented armament race to respond to the challenge. Moreover, the Pentagon decided to deploy “missile shields” in the region, in addition to the shields deployed by NATO a few months ago to face any missile threats targeting its countries, namely by the Islamic Republic. There is no doubt that the fears of the Gulf populations increased following the recent Egyptian revolution, as its people are now focusing on their domestic situation rather than on the drafting of a new foreign policy. Consequently, Riyadh and its sisters which relied on the relations with Egypt and Syria to provide some sort of balance and strength to the security of the Gulf – despite the limited character of this factor in comparison with the extent of the American military deployment in the region – are now feeling more exposed in light of the Iranian-Syrian alliance, Iraq's fall within the circle of Tehran's influence and the similar fate seen in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. As for Yemen, its fragmentation will threaten the entire Peninsula if it were to detonate, while the storm has already reached Bahrain that is at the heart of the Gulf home! In other words, the crises are now surrounding the Peninsula from all four sides. In light of the political and security disintegration of the Arab regime, the quasi-lack of a Gulf diplomatic presence in Baghdad and the quasi-absence of any coordination or attempt to engage in Iraq on the political, economic and security levels to render it more independent from Tehran, the Gulf populations are losing yet another bead from their organization's necklace unless they adopt the necessary measures. It would thus be beneficial for them to confirm their frank and public support in a clear message saying to the Islamic Republic they will not allow it to enter their organization through the domestic demands of a wide faction of Bahraini people. On the other hand, it would also be useful for them to support the dialogue that was launched by Crown Prince Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad al-Khalifa to meet the demands that can be achieved and ensure further freedoms, social justice and equality at the level of the rights and obligations. The angry crowds did not raise the slogan of regime change as it was seen in Tunisia and Egypt. The ceiling of their demands was rather limited to the changing of the government, the formation of an elected one, the rotation of power and the transition toward a constitutional monarchy, at a time when their leaders confirmed their loyalty to Bahrain. It would be too early to learn the extent of the official response to this ceiling. Still, it remains linked to the negotiations and the mutual concessions after the authority pulled its troops out from the street and allowed the crowds to return to Pearl Square to stage peaceful demonstrations. In this context, the formation of a government featuring wider partnership and sectarian and regional representation does not seem impossible, provided that the hardliners from both sides are excluded, along with the foreign factors and influences. Anything else will keep the country in the eye of the storm and will open up the future to civil wars which will quickly turn into regional and international wars to settle scores. True, the Gulf was and still is part of Arab national security. But what is also true is that ever since the announcement of the Carter Doctrine in 1979, it has become part of the United States' national security and strategic interests, as this announcement was made in response to the progress of the Soviet armies toward the warm waters following their invasion of Afghanistan, but also in response to the revolution of Imam Al-Khomeini. Today, the country is part of international security and the major industrial states. This is the origin of Washington's clear interest in what is happening in Bahrain - which is hosting a base for the Fifth Fleet and a few thousand American troops - and was translated in a call made to Manama to reach understandings, engage in dialogue, relinquish the use of force and implement drastic reforms. This interest exceeded that which was shown toward the developments in Libya and equaled the one shown toward Yemen, considering that this is where the oil seas and passageways are located, from the Hormuz Strait to Bab al-Mandab and the Canal of Suez. Certainly, the US will not support a drastic change in this area the way it supported it in Egypt, because such as change would move Bahrain from one bank to the other.
