The decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council to engage in negotiations with Jordan and Morocco in preparation for their entry into GCC is yet another step in the new policy adopted by the six Gulf countries following the expansion of the Arab action throughout the region. It is a natural step in a gradual course aiming at consecrating the protection and immunization of the Council against the strong winds sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, but also at consecrating the transfer of the “confrontation” of the changes outside the border of the Peninsula, i.e. outside the border of the organization. The first step was conveyed by the quick response to what the Council perceived as being a threat facing Bahrain, while the dispatch of the Peninsula Shield Force to Manama constituted a clear message to Iran among others, saying that the security of the island was part of the security of the Council and its states. The second step was seen in the various economic and social measures adopted by some GCC states to alleviate any domestic tensions, accompanied by a package of financial aid offered to Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman. As for the action that followed, it provided a legitimate Arab cover to Security Council Resolution 1973 to ensure the protection of the civilians in Libya, at a time when attempts were deployed to solve the Yemeni problem and engage in dialogue with the rule and the opposition to find an exit to the crisis whose escalation is heralding repercussions from which the neighboring countries will not be spared. For a long time now, Jordan has been seeking special relations with the GCC member states. It shares their same political views and has been insisting on the establishment of economic partnerships and exceptional dealings in all areas. But most importantly, it is located on the GCC's border and constitutes a natural geographic extension to it. It is also a buffer zone between the Peninsula and the Levant and represents a natural extension to the Gulf states in terms of its social and tribal composition and to some extent, its system of governance. Moreover, it enjoys a long history of cooperation with its southern neighbors - before and after the formation of the Council - a cooperation that was only blemished during the stage that followed Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait and that was soon overcome. Thanks to its military and security institutions, Jordan can constitute a qualitative addition to the Council's capabilities on the political and security levels. Through its accession, it could even compensate for the “loss” of Syria that is preoccupied with its domestic issues and its future, as well as for the “loss” of Iraq that has historically constituted a wall in the face of Iran's aspirations toward the western bank of the Gulf. Therefore, this step is primarily linked to political considerations. And it is based on these same considerations that the Council became inclined to introduce Morocco, thus jumping over geography and the other considerations related to the system of governance and the social composition. So did Morocco's invitation to join the GCC convey a concern not to keep one Arab monarchy outside this organization? Would Rabat have wondered about the reasons why this particular monarchy was kept out as long as the Council is gradually turning into an organization of monarchies? Yemen was supposed to step forward and request a membership in the Council, but the events reveal that this step is quite distant. One might even say that the previous inclination to include Yemen was not serious, or else it would not have been postponed all those years. Morocco's accession to GCC would also add to the Council's strength, thanks to its political and geographic position, its exceptional relations with Europe via the Spanish and French gateways and its impact on the African issues while overlooking the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, at a time when its neighbors, from Tunisia to Algeria and Libya, are preoccupied with their domestic problems. Moreover, this country was at the head of the states that supported Bahrain and deterred – for a long time – what it perceived as being an Iranian expansion in the Arab Maghreb. Prior to that, it had also supported Kuwait and its sisters following the Iraqi invasion two decades ago. Certainly, Jordan's and Morocco's accession will induce additional financial burdens on the member states. Nonetheless, these burdens cannot be compared to the ones which might result from the collapse of these two regimes if the action in them were to escalate in parallel to the increase of their social problems, and the impact that this might have on other monarchies. On the other hand, what is said about Jordan's added military and security value can be said about Morocco as well, and there is no doubt that the accession of these monarchies to the Council will grant it an additional political weight. Now the question is: Will this compensate for Egypt's preoccupation with the arrangement of its internal home, a thing that could take months if not years? Will it appease the fears of some Gulf countries over the policy of “engagement” or “containment” Cairo is nowadays adopting toward Iran, although the “post-revolution Egypt” confirmed its commitment to the security of the Gulf? Beyond that, the Gulf states feel they are more exposed on the security level in the Indian Ocean area and its Subcontinent, i.e. its key partner in the maritime and oil passageways. So, will the two monarchies' accession counterbalance the absence of Pakistan's weight and compensate for its preoccupation with its “Taliban” and that of Afghanistan after it used to support Gulf security, if not constitute part of this security? Therefore, the GCC member states are trying to barricade themselves in the face of the external winds through the establishment of advanced defense lines to protect their security and political systems, after having secured their domestic arenas. It is known in this context that the tour of the Iranian foreign minister to three member states a few days ago failed to alleviate the tensions between both sides. And while Iranian diplomacy tried to reassure the Gulf countries regarding its good intentions, these states reiterated – before the Iranian officials - their insistence on the solution they adopted in Bahrain. They went even further by stressing they were not only concerned about the monarchy in Bahrain, but also about that which exists in Morocco and Jordan. The policy of the GCC states was never as harmonious, as there were always complaints about Qatar's “monopoly,” Oman's “neutrality” and the Saudi “dictations.” However, the events sweeping the region are crucial and fateful and cannot tolerate luxuries, hobbies or tactics. Consequently, the discrepancies that characterized the foreign policies of some Gulf states started to melt in a gradual way, and Doha grew closer to its sisters after it used to be quite distant in the past. This could clearly be seen through its positions toward the events in Bahrain and the collective stands that these events prompted against what was dubbed “Iran's interference.” So, was this transformation dictated by the serious situation and the escalation of Tehran's threats, or by the embarrassment it felt toward the “brothers” in the Council? For its part, the Sultanate of Oman also looks more involved in the collective foreign policy of the GCC states, after its position vis-à-vis Iran was always – and maybe still is – different from that of the “brothers.” Indeed, there are long-standing relations between Muscat and Tehran since the days of the Shah, and the Omanis will never forget how the Iranians contributed to the defense of the regime and the unity of the country in the early seventies of last century, i.e. during the days of the Dhofar Rebellion. In that same context, when war erupted between Iraq and Iran in the early eighties, the Sultanate distanced itself from this war and when its sisters stood alongside Baghdad and provided it with all possible support, it insisted on its absolute neutrality. When Saddam Hussein urged the Sultanate to offer facilitations to his air force at its military airports, it categorically rejected the request, and when he threatened to use these airports by force, it responded with an equally harsh threat. The Sultanate adopted such position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic in the mid-nineties, after the diplomacy of the latter expressed its opposition of any type of relations or representation between Muscat and Tel Aviv. At the time, Muscat contested what it referred to as being “an Iranian interference” in its domestic affairs, thus forcing Tehran to publically recant its criticisms. Today, the Sultanate is adopting that same position at the level of the conflict between Iran and its opponents, without it meaning that it supports the position of the Republic. Quite the contrary, its diplomacy is urging Tehran to adopt a constructive policy and partner up with the international community to maintain security and stability in the Gulf and Arabian Sea region. It knows very well that only a few meters separate it from the Republic's border in the Hormuz Strait, which will be the first arena for the confrontation if it were to erupt. However, some protests witnessed in the Sultanate, the GCC states' offer to help and Iran's intensification of its threatening rhetoric to the point of claiming “ownership” of the region, pushed Muscat to grow closer to its sisters. The policy of economic solidarity between the GCC members and the attempts to bring the foreign policies of its states closer together, are steps imposed by the fateful circumstances and the transformations that have affected and are still affecting the general Arab system from the Levant to the Maghreb. So, will the attempts to introduce Jordan and Morocco enhance the Gulf states' security and stability, or do they convey a temporary inclination that will end up the same way as the “Damascus Declaration” following the liberation of Kuwait? Back then, the “Declaration” included – alongside the Gulf States – both Egypt and Syria, but it did not last long or have any impact worth mentioning, and almost turned into a burden to the six states. Therefore, will the need to expand the Council dissipate if the revolutions of the Arab republics and the “Iranian revolution” calm down?
