With much concern and frustration, the Middle East is bidding farewell to the first decade of the twenty-first century, while anticipating its second decade with a strange mixture of dreams and fears of a possible outbreak of regional and local wars, be they direct or proxy wars. Meanwhile, confidence in President Barack Obama's ability to make Palestinian-Israeli peace a reality is sliding, in conjunction with growing Israeli, Arab and Islamic extremism, and declining moderation. But at the same time, there are tangible results that are rather encouraging for moderation, which terrorizes the extremist camp with such notions as the ‘soft Intifada', or by empowering the Palestinian people to build the institutions of the Palestinian state and defeat the occupation. In fact, polls indicate that the Palestinians are less pessimistic about their future than the Lebanese, and the reasons for this are many. It is clear today that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei, has decided to thwart the efforts of pacification and possible regional deals regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon by proclaiming any decision by the latter to be ‘null and void'. This has put Hezbollah further in a tight spot, as it stated – in practical terms – that Lebanon is one of Iran's cards, while sending implicit signals in the direction of Syria and Saudi Arabia, and spreading panic among the majority of the Lebanese people. Even the Sudanese are less fearful than the Lebanese, despite their extremely deteriorated situation in light of their fears of an imminent division of Sudan, accompanied by bloody violence, and fears of the government that is threatening to impose stricter sharia rule because the secession of the south, in the opinion of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, would negate the argument for pluralism. And while pluralism was a slogan that was adopted by Iraq's politicians as they negotiated over power sharing and the benefits of power, it eluded them that women in Iraq are the ones who bore the brunt of tyranny, occupation, terrorism and religious and sectarian abuse – and women were neglected as a result. Iraqi leaders did not propose but one woman for the post of a cabinet minister, as they sniggered and congratulated one another, and forgot what Iraqi women did in wartime and even in the queues to vote in the elections. Meanwhile, women in the Arab Gulf region in general, are slowly moving towards securing a few of their legitimate and lawful rights, supported in this by a handful of enlightened men here and there. This is at a time when skyscrapers are rising in the desert, and governments, men and women in the private sector can take credit for their many achievements and for the realization of their dreams, albeit with obvious contradictions at many levels and in many aspects. Failure on the Arab arena, then, from human rights to combatting illiteracy to trimming sectarianism – is primarily an Arab failure. However, there are other players seeking to transform the Middle East in a way that is in line with their goals, and both have one essential thing in common, which is hatred and hostility toward everything Arab and moderate. These players are the extremist Israeli government and its racist leaders who want Israel to be an exclusively Jewish state, and the Islamic Republic in Iran which seeks to export the concept of Wilayat Al-Faqih [clerical rule]. The upcoming days, weeks and months are full of sparks that might trigger explosions and end stability. Here, Lebanon remains the most probable candidate for becoming a battleground for direct and proxy wars, since Hezbollah and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in Iran have clearly declared their rejection of the resolutions of the tribunal charged with prosecuting those involved in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the twenty-two people who died with him, and any other political assassinations that the investigation proves to be linked with the assassination of Hariri. Both have openly threatened to thwart stability in the event other Lebanese parties fail to comply with their orders to dodge the tribunal and its decisions. Reportedly, the pretrial Judge in the tribunal in The Hague will receive the request of Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare to consider issuing indictments against a number of individuals – perhaps eight – in the coming days or in the first two weeks of January. After that, the pretrial judge will examine the cases submitted to him. Then in light of the evidence provided by Bellemare, an indictment will be issued against all the individuals in question; otherwise the cases will be returned to Bellemare who would be requested to reexamine them if the judge concludes that one of the cases is incomplete or weak. The deadline date for issuing the indictments and revealing the names may be a few weeks ahead – perhaps six weeks after the case files are submitted if they are complete and ready, and without being returned to Bellemare, or more if they were otherwise. Some believe that Hezbollah will carry out its threat and undermine stability in Lebanon as soon as the prosecutor submits his case files to the pretrial judge. However, logically and realistically, the tribunal will not officially divulge the names of those it will indict until after the pretrial judge completes his examination of the case files. Only then the names shall be revealed. This, in theory, may take place in January but may also not take place until March. This time period is not necessarily a period of escalation and countdown to a military confrontation. Instead, it may be a period of repositioning and messages that tend towards readiness to negotiate the details of possible deals. Perhaps it is, on the other hand, a period of revealing cards and desisting from coordinated roles. In an exclusive interview with Al-Hayat last Friday, Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that that the general American inclination in the relationship with Iran is in the direction of “calm and not escalation and aggravation of the situation and the relations”. This, then, is the crux of the matter. But what several Lebanese parties chose to emphasize instead of this important statement was what Zebari said next: “This is what we feel regarding the nuclear issue, in what relates to the tribunal. Currently, there is a tendency to postpone the indictment as a result of some demands in this regard, with some perhaps even coming from Lebanese parties”. However, this postponement is not “indefinite. But instead of being issued this month, perhaps [the indictment] will be issued next month for example”. These Lebanese parties deliberately chose to promote Zebari's statements as they pleased, diverting attention away from the message of “conciliation” and desisting from escalation or “aggravating the situation and the relations”, and took his statement to be evidence of American “politicization” of the tribunal since the U.S. is apparently able to postpone the indictment. However, both assertions are fallacies, first of all because what Zebari said was that American conciliation with Iran is concerned with the nuclear issue and not the tribunal, and second, because he said that the inclination is to postpone the indictment because of demands “perhaps even coming from Lebanese parties”, from this month to next month – but this was essentially known and obvious and there is nothing new about this. Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who spoke with Al-Hayat in Manama perhaps in his last statement as minister before being sacked in an undiplomatic manner, said, “We believe that the path taken by the tribunal must remain far from political and partisan disputes and from the path that it took four years ago or more. Its path should be a purely judicial and legal one”. Mottaki also asserted, “We will not interfere in the details of Lebanese affairs. We believe that Lebanese leaders and factions, in the framework of dialogue, must themselves reach an agreement…” In the same newspaper issue of December 5, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also spoke to us in Manama and said, “The international tribunal must be seen exclusively as a legal issue that must not be politicized by either party. We hope that there will be a balance between justice and political stability in issues such as the international tribunal and the issue of false witnesses. These issues must be dealt with appropriately”. Davutoglu also stressed that “the Saudi-Syrian framework, as far as we know, provides the platform for such a balance in objectives” as it seeks to “pair justice with stability”. All this happened before the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued what can be called a Fatwa to Hezbollah to continue its war with the international tribunal, although he is fully aware that it is now impossible to thwart the tribunal. All this happened before the Supreme Leader openly declared that he wants to escalate and not to calm matters, that he wants to be a direct player and not a tertiary player that follows the Saudis and the Syrians, and that he wants to say that Lebanon is an Iranian card before being an arena of Saudi, Syrian or even Turkish influence. It is in this Lebanese arena that a silent dialogue is taking place between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel. The Supreme Leader thus wanted to send these important messages to all regional and international parties concerned, led by the United States. This took place after an important milestone towards the formation of the Iraqi cabinet was reached, after 9 months of labor with Tehran impeding then facilitating the agreements, and shortly before the indictment which Hezbollah says will implicate some of its members in the assassination of Hariri, although the tribunal has not yet said anything to this effect. In the midst of expectations regarding the success of some kind of a Saudi-Syrian formula for containing tensions and instating calm while avoiding the destabilization of Lebanon, the Supreme Leader's statement came to settle matters and say: We are here, Hezbollah and the weapons are ours, and they shall stay in the name of “resisting” Israel and against anyone who “resists” us. But Israel wants Hezbollah to control Lebanon, just like it wanted in the past for Hamas to control Gaza. In truth, one of the cables leaked by WikiLeaks from the U.S. Embassy in Israel quoted the head of the Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin, prior to the Hamas coup in Gaza in 2007, as saying that Hamas's control of Gaza would allow Israel to deal with the Gaza Strip as being an “enemy entity”. Israel has a similar outlook of Hezbollah controlling Lebanon. If this happens, Lebanon will become an “enemy entity” for Israel, and will be dealt with as a “militant faction” controlling a country rather than a “state”. Israel is in favor of having such a clear “enemy” as this, since that would give it the excuse to assault Lebanon with impunity should Hezbollah take control of Lebanon in the course of its war with the international tribunal and with justice. Israel does not fear military force and missiles as much as it fears a success by the moderates to induce change in the Arab arena. Israel fears the “soft Intifada”, or the name given to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's recourse to legal methods instead of military methods to bridge the gap left by the failure of the Obama administration in convincing Israel's government to freeze illegal settlements. Israel fears the institutions of the Palestinian state which are being established by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the ability of Palestinian Arabs in Israel to hold on to their land under all circumstances. Israel fears the inclination of countries all around the world to recognize the Palestinian state when it will be fully built within two years. There is panic in Israel as much as there is panic on the Arab side and most certainly on the Iranian side as well. Everyone is opening windows through which they can detect the scent of passing deals, and through which they can wave with both petulance and enticement.
