New York- Clearly the political environment – at the international, regional and local levels – has changed and transformed compared to what it was when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established through a resolution by the UN Security Council in 2007, beginning its work in March 2009 in The Hague to punish those implicated in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his companions in February 2005. Perhaps there are trade-off deals, as is being said, and perhaps there are understandings, the headlines of which are the interests of great powers and guarantees for regional regimes, in addition to the sacrifice of individuals who were implicated in the assassinations, and compromise over implicating factions and organizations which are believed to have had a complementary executive role in carrying out the assassinations, while the upper level of people implicated and decision-makers is being protected. And perhaps, on the other hand, it might not to be easy to keep matters in check in a UN investigation which has involved hundreds of investigators and in which the evidence was preserved in safe places. Perhaps some judges will not agree to the wishes of politicians to “restrain” the Special Tribunal and abort the principles of putting an end to impunity. Perhaps the matter will at a certain point in time be contingent on the decision made by General Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare, who has to power to act, has the story of what happened, and knows if he has sufficient irrefutable evidence to allow him to request the issuing of formal accusations or not. Yet at the end of the day, all of those who were implicated in issuing instructions or suggesting the necessity of the assassination, and all of those who played a certain role in the assassination of Hariri and his 21 companions, and in what followed it in terms of political assassinations that included journalists and members of the military, know what happened and know the truth. They may wager on deals to abort justice, but they are not safe from themselves, because the evidence is held somewhere by others who are unknown, and because the kinds of trade-offs which are claimed and said to be struck in the name of stability and higher interests may bring surprises and may condemn and prosecute even without a tribunal. In spite of this, it would be useful to closely examine the terms used, the assumptions made and the development that took place this week when Hezbollah accused Israel of being implicated in the Hariri assassination. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah held yet another press conference earlier this week, in which he presented images, which he said Hezbollah had intercepted while they were being filmed by Israeli spy planes, of the route taken by Hariri's motorcade before his assassination. Nasrallah considered that “filming from different angles, from different locations and at different times is evidence of preparation” for the assassination. He said that such “data” represents “indications” about Israel's involvement in the criminal act. General Prosecutor Judge Daniel Bellemare has requested Lebanese authorities to provide him with all the “information” held by Hezbollah's Secretary-General, as well as video of his press conference and “any other material that would be of assistance [for the General Prosecutor's office] in unveiling the truth”, quoting a statement issued by Bellemare's office. The statement asserted that the General Prosecutor “has sole responsibility for the investigation”, blocking the path to what Hezbollah sough after in terms of trying to force the Lebanese government to hold an investigation parallel to that of the UN and to establish an alternative tribunal to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. By asking Lebanese authorities to “provide” him with all of the information held by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah and by inviting the latter to “use his authority to facilitate the investigation”, Daniel Bellemare has placed Hezbollah in a more difficult position. Indeed, he has made it clear that he is willing to examine any information, materials and evidence relating to the assassination, including those which Hezbollah claims to prove Israel's implication. He has also restricted official responsibility to Lebanese state authorities, because he specifically asked them to provide him with what Hezbollah has, and did not ask this of the party's Secretary-General. He has thus placed Hezbollah and its leadership in a position of responsibility and of one demanded to provide whatever information it possesses to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. All of the Lebanese, and perhaps all of the Arabs, wish for Israel to be behind the Hariri assassination and all the other political assassinations in Lebanon. Indeed, this would be the safety valve that would protect Lebanon and the region from sectarian “strife”, especially between the Sunnis and Shiites, as is being said, on the basis of Hezbollah being condemned merely through a formal accusation being issued by the Special Tribunal, which might lead Hezbollah to repeat the events of May 7, 2008, when it marched on Beirut and Mount Lebanon and turned its weapons against the Lebanese. All of the Lebanese – and perhaps all of the Arabs – wish for Hezbollah to have indications and irrefutable evidence about Israel's role in the assassinations and for it to deliver them to the Special Tribunal. Then the tables would be turned on various assumptions, and the Tribunal and the General Prosecutor would have the responsibility of ensuring putting an end to impunity. And because the Secretary-General of Hezbollah has presented images and holds documents and “indications” about Israel's involvement, perhaps it is time for him to surprise us by cooperating with the Special Tribunal and accepting Bellemare's invitation, thus placing Israel in a position of concern. Today, uncommonly for Hezbollah, its leadership seems concerned, angry, fragmented and mistaken on both the tactical and strategic levels. Perhaps it has good reason, especially as it has suddenly found itself alone to “face the storm”, after Syria showed tremendous skill, at the political, penal and judiciary levels, in addressing the issue of political assassinations in Lebanon. Nevertheless, it is not in Hezbollah's interest to anticipate matters with a form of hysteria, regardless of how much it is angry or reproachful, innocent or implicated. It is not in its interest to attack the Special Tribunal, especially if it has evidence and indications of Israel's implication. On the contrary, the Israeli aspect should represent a gateway for Hezbollah to cooperate with the Tribunal, even if Hezbollah considers the Tribunal to be “politicized”. Indeed, politicization, if the tribunal really is politicized, does not reside in the judicial or penal aspect of this tribunal, and no country or party has control over the kind of evidence held by the investigation. Some governments have the ability to conceal some evidence or deny cooperation with the investigators and the General Prosecutor. Yet they do not have the ability to manipulate the material held by the investigation, the investigative teams and the General Prosecution, nor can they affect what their judicial conscience might dictate to the judges. Politicization may reside in the extent to which countries may be driving towards or enthusiastic about the issue of the Tribunal, especially France, which had been enthusiastic and had driven towards establishing the Tribunal under Jacques Chirac, then had retreated a little and relaxed very much under Nicolas Sarkozy, who adopted openness to Syria as a cornerstone of his policy. Politicization may lie in US President Barack Obama's desire to avoid justice if it is to lead to military confrontations he does not want. And yes, the Obama Administration has placed stability above justice in many places, including Lebanon, perhaps, overthrowing its past promises. Yet there is no politicization in the work of the Tribunal, because it has not yet started working. It is true that Daniel Bellemare is ill and in need of treatment, and it is true that he is not above criticism, especially as he has sometimes behaved from a position of weakness, unsure of himself and of his qualifications. Yet it is clear that certain parties, among them Hezbollah, hold information indicating that Daniel Bellemare is now ready to present, most probably in October, the Pre-Trial Judge with documents and evidence that will convince the latter to issue formal accusations against eight individuals affiliated with Hezbollah. There are numerous scenarios of deals being struck, and they include claims of a deal with Hezbollah similar to the Lockerbie deals, where individuals would stand before the court, be tried and imprisoned then released, because international courts do not prosecute and do not imprison forever... This would take place in exchange for de facto clearing the “regime” and through a highly accurate formula, because Hezbollah is not a government and because it has its particularities. There are different, radical scenarios in terms of placing responsibility, knowing that the Lebanese government is responsible for handing over any individuals whom the Special Tribunal might summon in formal accusations, even if they are Hezbollah members. Furthermore, it will be the one “facing the storm” and losing credibility if it refuses to arrest those whom the Special Tribunal requests or if it fails to cooperate with this tribunal. In fact, Lebanon as a state will be the one paying the highest price, regardless of the current or future government. Of course the Tribunal has the ability, by law and by virtue of its own regulations, to hold a trial in absentia for any suspect and for all those against whom formal accusations would be issued. There are those who are wagering on the Tribunal ending merely by failing to hold trials with individuals which might bring the investigation to the next stage, because prosecution in absentia does not provide the opportunity to build the case one brick at a time in order to reach the next group of people against whom the General Prosecution would seek to issue formal accusations. Moreover, the latter group would not necessarily be involved in the executive or “contractual” aspect of the assassination, but rather, theoretically, in that of “decision-making”, specifically in Syria. There are however, on the other hand, those who remind that such talk of “clearing” did not come from the Tribunal, and that starting with Hezbollah members does not mean sparing or clearing Syrian elements on whom the investigation has focused for years. Much confusion and many wagers accompany the progress of the Special Tribunal at this juncture. Perhaps the wager on aborting justice will emerge the winner, yet this does not abort the truth, which is known best to those responsible for planning and carrying out political assassinations in Lebanon. What we do not know is what the General Prosecution holds in terms of present and future formal accusations. We do not know the extent of Daniel Bellemare's qualification in terms of investigation or of general prosecution. We do not know what the investigation has come to hold over the years and various investigators from many places. Indeed, it is not at all easy to contain individuals and evidence in a structure of this kind. We do not know if the judges will submit to political deals or whether they are willing to do away with the principle of ending impunity. We know that “political realism” produces more from a political aspect in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – and that it might succeed and win against justice in the name of interests or of stability. But we will not know whether such a “victory” would represent the key to containing assassinations in order to ensure stability, or the trigger of another wave of political assassinations with impunity. And one would be mistaken to assume that the matter has been settled one way or the other.
