It has become clear that the effects of Saudi-Syrian efforts to contain the tension in Lebanon will not become apparent until the indictment is issued, which might not be very long according to announcements made by officials of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and that marking time with regard to the situation in Lebanon and the alternation of strong-toned statements and of moderate and calming statements will continue until that which is destined to happen happens and the discussion over post-indictment arrangements begins. This is in spite of the categorical refusal shown by Hezbollah of what it considers to be a politicized international attempt to place it in the defendant's box, and in spite of the accusations it is directing and the pressures it is exerting in order to obtain a “not guilty” verdict in advance. Some have perhaps considered the statements made by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejecting the STL or any decisions it might issue to fall within the framework of such pressures, in order to hasten the joint efforts engaged in by Damascus and Riyadh. Yet Khamenei's statements in the presence of the Emir of Qatar, the main sponsor of the Doha Agreement, hold a single message, signifying that Iran will be the one negotiating over the STL and its decisions, and that the efforts exerted by Arabs to prevent a breakdown in Lebanon, and perhaps to redistribute shares in its system in order to ensure its stability for an extended period of time, cannot take place at the expense of the “front” held by Iran in South Lebanon, which it considers to be the main asset ensuring it an effective means of pressure in its relationship with the West in general and with the US in particular. In other words, Iran will not relinquish Hezbollah's weapons, which it seems efforts for a settlement are making sure to include in any agreement, because these weapons have a bigger role to play within the framework of the more all-encompassing deal Tehran aspires to, which it wishes to represent clear international recognition of its regional influence. It will thus not allow even the parties allies to it, as well as those that assert their concern for maintaining good relations with it, to deprive it of such an asset, even if the purpose is to avoid the worst for Lebanon. Khamenei had announced this stance during Saad Hariri's visit to Tehran last month, when he said that the resistance would remain as long as Israel does, yet this time he was much more direct in calling for the Resistance's weapons to remain outside the scope of any settlement, and for Hezbollah to remain an “entity” independent from the future “Third Republic” and any form it might take, or else Iran will do away with the suggested settlement in its every aspect. Khamenei's statements signify that Iran is no longer ashamed to announce frankly that it has inherited Syria's role in Lebanon after Damascus's troops withdrew from it, and that it has become the party which controls everything that regards its present and its future – that it is the one holding the strings, pulling and loosening them according to the requirements of its own interests, which it considers Hezbollah to be an integral part of and an active party in ensuring. Tehran knows that it can do nothing regarding the STL, neither annul it nor postpone its decisions, but it is saying to all those concerned with Lebanon's affairs, and with the broader situation in the region, that it is willing to pay the price for the role it seeks after, whether in the form of economic sanctions, embargo or even a military strike, that it is able to tighten the belts of its citizens (canceling subsidies) and to find regional alternatives for import and export (Turkey), that it has the ability to respond and to cause harm in case the military option is adopted against it, and that it will not hesitate to wage smaller confrontations in Lebanon, and perhaps Gaza, if it is forced to. And while waiting for the pull-and-tug to lead to tipping the scales in favor of one of the two sides, Iran or the West, Lebanon and the Lebanese pay the price out of their security, their livelihood and their future. Indeed, Hezbollah has proven that it could obstruct the government and state institutions, without even having to protest in Downtown Beirut this time.
