Spain cannot send a more provocative to Morocco than that carried by the Spanish monarch, King Juan Carlos II, during his visit to the two occupied cities of Ceuta and Melilla two years ago. Thus, the visit by the leader of the right-wing Popular Party, Mariano Rajoy, to the same regions will not be more violent. The messages have begun to float on the surface of the Mediterranean, with the two sides never ceasing to invoke transitory diplomatic messages. Spain's Popular Party needed a few weeks to respond to the request by Morocco's prime minister, Abbas Fasi, to open a dialogue on the future of the two cities, in a way that ends up imposing Rabat's sovereignty and guarantees the strategic interests of Madrid. There was some coolness in the official response, which only involved statements by the Foreign Ministry, and the deputy prime minister. Perhaps the party preferred to hoist a red cape, and engage in some bullfighting in the heart of Melilla, forgetting that ever since general Tariq bin Ziad crossed toward Andalusia, the Moroccans are good at riding horses. The ships that drop anchor on the southern shore of the Mediterranean are no longer warships, but vessels used in illegal emigration. It is striking that the visit, which Moroccans see as another instance of provocation, coincides with the beginning of joint military maneuvers between Morocco and Spain on the Atlantic Coast, where the two occupied cities are located. Perhaps the message behind this is that the struggles of politicians do not apply to the military, and no armed escalation is expected; the path is clear for political maneuvers as well. No message provokes the sensitivities of the Spaniards more than fishing for trouble when it comes to relations with Morocco. Hard-line Spanish military types have promoted the idea that the threat to their country will come one day from the south, and specifically Morocco. The former Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Aznar, never wasted an opportunity to point this out, and he ordered his troops to invade the uninhabited islet of Leila a few years ago. However, today Aznar has turned toward the east and brandished his pen to defend Israel, so that it does not collapse. The Mediterranean coast maneuvers leave no room for doubt that what political positions ruin can be dealt with by military exercises, with the common objectives of confronting terror and illegal emigration, and the increasing upgrading of capacities. Despite their political disputes, the two countries have tried to come together as part of international peacekeeping efforts, from Kosovo to Haiti, and the camaraderie of military men does not resemble the friendship of civilian politicians. The Moroccans are aware that what links them to their neighbors on the Iberian Peninsula is greater than what divides them on coastal fishing, the Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla. However, they are aware that they have become a party to the heart of politics in Madrid, if not by having an advanced position in the relationship with the European Union, under Spain's presidency, then by generating serious sensitivities, of which the Rajoy visit appears to be an extension. After the Spaniards were reassured that the official reactions to Abbas Fasi's rhetoric would be contained, they were greeted by even more provocative reactions, from the Popular Party. There is no surprise here. Moroccan-Spanish relations have always moved toward improvement, recovery and understanding under the Socialists, which concluded a treaty of friendship and good neighbor relations at the beginning of the 1990s. However, they worsened, in the direction of more crises and loss of trust during the rule of the right-wing Popular Party. There are two possible implications: the Spanish right wants to resume the organizing of relations with Rabat, by exercising the utmost pressure, or it wants to give up all of the gains garnered during the Socialists' tenure in government. However, it will not find any desire to bargain on the part of the Moroccans. The Sahara issue cannot be linked to Ceuta and Melilla, whether in terms of the nature of the problem or the sides involved, or in terms of any type of confrontation. The problem is that some hard-line groups in Madrid continue to see that the solution to the Sahara conflict will whet Morocco's appetite to confront Spain over the two islands. But what kind of confrontation can take place between military forces conducting maneuvers with each other, away from the negatives of political stances?
