The fact that Hezbollah's Secretary-General, according to a media outlet close to him, is convinced that the indictment in the case of the Rafic Hariri assassination “will inevitably be issued”, as well as the statement by Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Muallem that “nobody [would] oppose an indictment that is based on irrefutable evidence”, means that the campaign waged by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah over the past months to annul the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), or at least obstruct it through internal pressures, has failed. It also means that the focus from now on will on confronting the indictment with what Hezbollah officials have said to be “various options” that are “clear and decisive”, either by attempting to contain its repercussions and prevent the Lebanese state from complying with any demands the STL might put forward as a result of it, or by creating a new situation in which the STL and its accusations would become a “secondary” matter. Bringing about such a new situation has begun to be prepared in effect through a series of escalatory stances focusing on the role played by state institutions, especially past governments, and in particular the Fouad Siniora government, during the July War of 2006, and on the accusations that were leveled against it of having worked to prolong the Israeli offensive in hopes of weakening Hezbollah and imposing conditions upon it. And although it knows that refuting such accusations does not require much effort, especially as it ally Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri participated in negotiations during this period minute by minute, Hezbollah has insisted on making these accusations and has reiterated them. This reflects its desire to reinforce the idea among its public that it does not trust governments and their apparatus, and that participating in some of them as well as in the current cabinet has been dictated by momentary circumstances. This in fact is exactly what this public wants to hear and is enthusiastic about putting to practice, by virtue of its structure, its history and it conviction with the ideas of perpetual persecution and conspiracy. But how can the STL and its decisions become forgotten? Some expect Hezbollah to repeat what it did on the 7th of May 2008, but on a much wider scale, where it would “take control of the state” by forcibly seizing institutions and services, keeping the army neutral or disbanding it if does not cooperate, occupying ministries and utilities, shutting down a few media outlets and detaining a few political figures – in other words, by implementing a complete coup d'état at every level. Indeed, Hezbollah considers the clashes that took place in Beirut and part of Mount Lebanon then to have been “glorious”, and has lately been increasingly warning that it was “capable of responding in a much more painful way” if it was “stabbed in the back”. Nevertheless, such a “coup d'état” could drive it into a wide-ranging civil war, the outcome of which is not decisively in its favor even if it holds weapons, endanger its forces with exposure if they are to deploy in various hostile areas, and put the relations it takes great care to maintain with local and Arab circles to a difficult test. Furthermore, in addition to all of this, such a move could make it bear to weight of foreign interference in Lebanon while it seeks to keep the Lebanese arena under control. What could then cancel out all of these dangers? It is of course another war against Israel, one that would be the most violent yet in view of the preparations and the growing arsenals of both sides. People would then forget about the STL, its decisions and its investigators, and it would become “necessary” to defend “the back of the resistance which everyone has been conspiring against”, even in the days of Kissinger, before it had come into existence, and to prevent the government – any government – from repeating the experience of Siniora. As for Israel, its aggressiveness awaits any pretext, no matter how small!
