The situation in the region, especially in Lebanon and Iraq, appears to be on the brink of returning to square one. The wager on the compromises and half-solutions to act as an alternative for the explosion and the decisive settlement - or their postponement in a best case scenario - completely collapsed. Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah shot the first bullet at the international tribunal for Lebanon. He did not wait for the Council of Ministers and overlapped the ongoing debates surrounding the false witnesses file and the indictment expected to be issued by Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare. However, the response was quick through a series of condemning international positions, namely from Washington and New York, and a campaign targeting Iran and Syria and accusing them of undermining Lebanon's stability and trying to gain control over it. The tribunal thus became an advanced arena for the ongoing confrontation in the region, while all the attempts to distance it from this conflict failed. In this context, the “clinic incident” was a mere symbolic message pointing to the fact that what is worse is yet to come. Ever since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that the resistance in Lebanon was on the frontline of the “Peoples' Resistance Front” in the face of the “American-Israeli project” from Syria to Palestine, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, it was clear that he was granting its arms “regional legitimacy,” establishing a weight for them in the regional balance of power and lifting them off the table of discussion on the Lebanese domestic arena. Therefore, Hezbollah was expected to do nothing but shoot at the international tribunal, which it believes has exceeded its goals and has become a tool – among many - to disfigure the party's image, and eliminate its weapons that are being used to subdue its political rivals and impose its domestic control. In other words, the party has perceived and still perceives the indictment as being the first bullet in this regional and international political attack against its weapons. It is also not concealing its fear of seeing the indictment offering Israel justifications to restore the status of its army and what it lost during the July 2006 war. For their part, those concerned about Hezbollah's role and strategic positioning in the confrontation – as redefined by the Iranian president – did not hesitate to reaffirm their insistence on the tribunal. And as long as all the sides, including the party, are talking about the content of the indictment and the accusations it will carry, the indictment was transformed into a weapon in the hands of the opponents of the “Iranian axis.” On the other hand, what is noticeable in the current round of the conflict over the tribunal, is this renewed American “return” to Lebanon on the beat of the positions condemning Syria and Iran, similar to the campaign which accompanied the launching of the talks – the indirect and then the direct ones – between the Palestinians and the Israelis at the beginning of the year. So, does this “return” aim at exerting pressures in Lebanon to facilitate certain trade-offs in Iraq? Or did the requirements of the American electoral battle impose this temporary campaign which aims at pleasing the Israeli right-wing that is raising the banner of the “fateful confrontation” with Iran? In any case, the Lebanese people's division over the tribunal and the absence of any political exit, bring back to mind the climate which prevailed on the eve of May 7, 2008 and all the incidents to which it led. Hezbollah has closed the door before any middle-ground solutions in regard to the tribunal, and does not care about placing Lebanon amidst a confrontation with the United Nations and the international community. It is even refusing to address the tackling of its arms in the context of any trade-off or compromise… This means it will not hesitate to repeat the May 8 experience if it were to find itself without any other option, although the situation today is different from the way it was two years ago. Indeed, Syria has restored its previous relationships network with the Lebanese sides, including those who were hostile to it following the assassination of Prime Minister Al-Hariri. Moreover, President Bashar al-Assad expressed his wish to see the continuation of the government headed by Al-Hariri on more than one occasion, calling at the same time for an action that would eventually lead to the relinquishing of the tribunal. In light of this different situation, Syria cannot ignore what its silence toward the unleashing of the party's hands in Lebanon would mean on the American, international, Arab and Turkish levels. Also, it cannot ignore what it means for the party to become the primary reference in Beirut, unless Lebanon were to drown in an anarchy that would allow its unchallenged return to manage its affairs. Indeed, such a scenario would make it - once again - a destination for those seeking a solution to the future of the settlement in the region, but also the future of the resistance, unless the concern shown by President Al-Assad over Al-Hariri and his government merely aims at repudiating what the Lebanese could soon face in advance. In Iraq, we must await the responses to the calls made by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz on the Iraqi leaders to meet in Riyadh following the pilgrimage season, in order to find an exit to the political crisis under the auspices of the Arab League. This initiative was not launched to confirm what is known in regard to the failure of all the efforts which have so far been deployed to form the government, as it did not aim at blocking the way before the hopes that were placed in the initiatives of the Kurdistan Alliance which featured a lot of optimism and are now facing numerous obstacles, if they have not yet failed. It firstly came to confirm that Riyadh, along with most of its partners in the League, did not and will not recognize full Iranian hegemony over the administration in Baghdad. It is even willing to perform the role of a break or an inhibitor, as if the Arab role offered to Syria failed to establish some sort of a balance between the Arab and Iranian influences in Iraq. For its part, the Islamic Republic knows what it means to share more than one file with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from Lebanon to Pakistan and Afghanistan, going through Iraq and Palestine. It is thus taking this situation into consideration, along with the interests of the Kingdom in the region and especially in Iraq which is the main gateway of the Gulf States before being the “Eastern Gate” of the Arab world. It is also bearing in mind that Riyadh was not at ease when the Americans and the Iranians met in Baghdad a few years ago to discuss the future of the country, and knows that it never accepted Saddam's occupation of Kuwait and the flaws that this could have caused at the level of the balance of powers. It is aware of the fact that what the Kingdom rejected at the time to protect its vital political and economic oil-related interests cannot be tolerated today under whichever circumstances, i.e. that the Kingdom cannot recognize this Iranian belt extending from Iraq to Gaza, Lebanon and its southern border with Yemen. Moreover, the policy of reassuring phone calls adopted by President Ahmadinejad toward King Abdullah, is not dissipating the fears over what is being drawn up for Iraq and what is happening in Lebanon, Palestine and even in Kabul where the “aid” reached President Karzai himself! While the Kingdom considered – unlike Egypt for example – that the severance of relations with Syria harmed the interests and positions of both countries and while it humored Damascus at the level of its Lebanese waist, it could not accept the flaw currently affecting the regional balance of powers that it tilting in favor of Iran. This is due to the fact that the success of the Islamic Republic in tightening its grip over Iraq and Lebanon afterwards could easily allow it to control the entire Gulf region. Hence, Iran would become the regional superpower and the key player in the resolution of its crises, at the head of which is the Palestinian cause. Moreover, this hegemony could activate the repressed ambitions of the Shiite communities in most of the GCC states. Riyadh's “messages” in this regard are numerous, not the least of which being the joint Saudi-Syrian maneuvers and the major arms deal between Riyadh and Washington to elevate the Saudi military capabilities. In the end, the new image seen in Lebanon and Iraq is preceding the new American image expected to be drawn up by the results of the Congressional midterm elections. If the predictions are true - and they are likely so – a new partisan balance of power in Washington will have an impact on US foreign policy. This will cause the reshuffling of many cards and will prompt most of the players in the region to reconsider their calculations and readjust their positions and alignments. Therefore, it looks like the players in the region are rushing the settlement of what can no longer tolerate any delays, from Beirut to Baghdad. Moreover, both scenes are preceding the announcement of the imminent staging of the negotiations session - which might be crucial - between the Islamic Republic and the six world powers in mid-November to discuss the nuclear file, an issue which has also started requiring a settlement.
