The ongoing confrontation over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon almost summarizes the greater confrontation with all its branches and arenas throughout the “Great Middle East.” It is almost overshadowing the war on terrorism or the war of terrorism which has surfaced with a new and more dangerous wave in Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen, and via the booby-trapped packages in Europe. Not one regional or international side, from Washington to Paris, going through New York, Leidschendam (Holland), Damascus and Tehran abstained from participating in the fueling of this confrontation. It is as though the explosion from which they are warning in Lebanon or the civil war which they are cautioning about have become imminent and have entered in a race with the expected indictment. On the Lebanese arena, Hezbollah and its allies have escalated the security and political threats in heated attempts to undermine the tribunal. The pace of the terrorization from an imminent “coup” on the field led by the party before the issuance of the indictment also increased, in the hope that its repercussions might prompt those concerned by the indictment to consider postponing it, after it turned out that all the actions which were launched since the tripartite summit in Beirut and all the moves toward Paris and other capitals failed to distance this “cup” from the Lebanese people. In fact, the war on the tribunal triggered several fronts, both regionally and internationally. It especially allowed the United States to go back to this file and annex it to its other “weapons” in the confrontation with Iran in particular, but also in its confrontation with Syria in what seemed to be the turning of the page of the policy of communication and rapprochement and the return to the policy of collision and pressures. Hezbollah does not need a coup to confirm its military superiority, at a time when the rules of engagement are non-existent with its opponents. It does not need to confirm its hegemony and excess power and more importantly, does not need security clashes such as the ones that were seen in Burj Abu Haidar, resulting in the scarring of its image. Furthermore, it does not need to offer another weapon to its local, regional and international opponents, to be added to the impact of the expected indictment on its image, the meaning of its armament and the goals behind these arms. The party's secretary general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah announced the content of the indictment on more than one occasion, and revealed what was being planned for the party. But what can be added following the official issuance of the indictment? The party intensified the campaign against the tribunal while exerting pressures on the government of Saad al-Hariri to make the latter undermine the tribunal. However, it knows that this tribunal will proceed even if the “Avenger of Blood” were to succumb to the party's demands, as it knows that the Security Council will not recant its formation decision, even if it were to be forced to choose between it and stability in Lebanon. This is the first case in which a special international tribunal is formed to look into a “terrorist” crime, at a time when the international community is waging war on terrorism which has returned during the last few days to register a new qualitative escalation. For its part, the United States sent a clear message confirming its insistence on the tribunal, as it offered financial aid to this tribunal alongside its harsh political stands against Syria and Iran. This means that Lebanon's relinquishing of its funding of the tribunal could prompt contributions from other countries. As for France, Britain and Russia, they did not hesitate to corroborate their insistence on the tribunal, as it was also done by the secretary general of the United Nations and the Security Council in parallel to the media campaign that was by the head of the tribunal and the public prosecutor. … After all that, would Hezbollah undertake an action that might worsen the campaign being launched against it? It is worth mentioning that this campaign does not only target the party, but also Syria and Iran, and has become part of the general conflict that is prevailing on more than one front. This is why the confrontation over the tribunal has reached such a wide scale, at a time when the party is expanding the friction lines by announcing that Resolution 1701 was made by Israel, as though it was introducing a new weapon to the confrontation. This is an attempt to elude yet another international commitment. It started with the international tribunal and has now reached the international resolution, thus conveying a clear message saying that the Southern front was still open and could be opened at any moment, knowing that resolution 1701 stopped all military activities in 2006 and did not provide for a “ceasefire” between Israel and the resistance. In reality, the regional and international positions – especially the American one – in regard to the tribunal were quite harsh and were accompanied by regional positions and actions affecting several files, from Lebanon to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. These steps point to efforts to redirect the situation in another direction, in preparation for diplomatic or maybe even military steps that would reshuffle the cards. This is what is happening in Baghdad with the formation of the new government and the security situation which seems to be heading backwards. This is also what is happening at the level of the relations between Washington and Damascus, at a time when the efforts to reactivate the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis have not stopped and when Tehran has not yet given a clear answer in regard to the date of the resumption of the negotiations with the P5+1 over its nuclear program. The renewed American campaign on Syria and Iran looks similar to the campaign which was launched against them last spring in regard to Hezbollah's armament. The latter campaign was accompanied by the reemergence of the pending problem between Damascus and the International Atomic Energy Agency and the beginning of the preparations for the round of indirect talks between Tel Aviv and the Palestinian authority. In this context, it is likely that among the targets of the current campaign is the exertion of pressures on Syria in regard to the Palestinian issue. For his part, Chief Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat said that the Palestinian side will give Washington “a few more weeks” after the end of the deadline that was set for it by the Arab League to convince Netanyahu to stop the settlement activities in order to resume the direct negotiations with the Palestinians. This is happening at a time when the Israeli prime minister has started his visit to the American capital where he will be followed tomorrow by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit and Intelligence Chief Minister Omar Suleiman. The American campaign against Syria in particular, aims at holding it responsible – in advance – for what might happen in Lebanon. Through its policy of rapprochement with Damascus, Washington was hoping that Syria would differentiate itself from Iran and would exert pressures to contain the influence of the Islamic Republic, whether in Lebanon, Iraq or Palestine. It expected Damascus to distance itself from the attack against the tribunal, not to contribute to it or issue arrest warrants against 33 figures, including close aides to Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri. However, it discovered that the ties between Syria and the Islamic Republic – and consequently between Syria and the party – could not be undermined with positions such as the ones launched by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman who believed that “Syria will not be able to restore the Golan Heights except by mending its relations with Washington,” accusing “Syria's friends of undermining Lebanon's stability.” Damascus' response was brutal. Throughout the last couple of years, Feltman's administration proved incapable of exerting any pressures on Netanyahu's government. So how will it be able to do so now following the defeat of the Democrats in the congressional midterm elections? The response was brutal because Damascus did not succumb to the American threats or demands when the American troops were on its Eastern border following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 – although it looked concerned about this presence during a certain stage. Today, it does not have to take into account or consideration the statements of the American officials, as it is watching the American retreat everywhere, from Afghanistan to Lebanon, going through Iraq of course. Moreover, this is not the first time that Feltman attacks Syria, considering that a few months ago he stated that President Bashar al-Assad “adopts decisions which might lead the region toward war. He is listening to Hezbollah's secretary general and to the Iranian president, but he should also listen to us.” In any case, Feltman's position does not aim at restoring the lost friendship with Damascus which accused him of being among those who called for holding it responsible for Al-Hariri's assassination back when he was the ambassador in Beirut. His position rather conveys the positions of some circles in Washington who believe that the policy of rapprochement with Syria did not succeed, just like the policy of truce and dialogue with Iran. These circles consider that a minimum level of pressures and threats must be exerted, whether directly or through Israel among other sides, and that Washington has no other choice in the face of Iran's expansion via Hezbollah but to pressure Damascus. Anything else would constitute a submission to Lebanon's transfer to the front lines of the “Peoples Resistance Front” which was launched by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his visit to South Lebanon. Washington has no other choice but to support the Lebanese government and confirm its insistence on the tribunal through political and financial aid. This is also what France is trying to do through the dispatch of its Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Beirut, and what London expressed by conveying its surprise vis-à-vis the position of Saad al-Hariri who – in his famous statement - exonerated Syria from the assassination crime which targeted his father. It thus wondered about the motives behind this step, and undoubtedly heard the answer to its questions during his last visit to it. Will the international campaign succeed in protecting Lebanon's stability, and will the American policy of pressures toward Syria achieve what the policy of rapprochement failed to accomplish? Moreover, will Damascus give up its ability to control the situation in Lebanon in exchange for the reinstatement of regional and international legitimacy to its influence in this country?
