New York- There is increasing talk among US circles of the need for political bargains which the US Administration would strike with what has come to be known as the extremist movement, a movement which cannot be dispensed with in making peace in the Middle East. There has been an increase in articles and seminars that speak of “Remaking the Middle East” – as was the title on the cover of Foreign Affairs, a magazine concerned with foreign affairs and published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York. Most of such talk focuses on Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. There are also those who are asking new and different questions – questions such as: is it time for a “US-Iranian-Turkish alliance”? Or: has the time come to grant “legitimacy” to Israel's nuclear bombs? And then there are other kinds of novelties, such as openly speaking of the necessity for the US Administration to resort to the Security Council to prevent Israel from involving the region and the US in a regional war that would start from Lebanon, as well as the necessity for it to also resort to the Security Council to impose preemptive sanctions against Syria so that it may stop supplying Hezbollah and Palestinian factions with weapons. All of this intersects with two important developments which have taken place over the past few days, and which will have a tremendous, and perhaps frightening, impact over the coming months, namely: the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and Iraq after the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities, with more than 50 thousand US troops remaining in various military bases in numerous parts of Iraq. Indeed, both developments hold a dimension that falls under US relations with the forces of moderation and the forces of extremism. Iran plays a role in both developments, and in fact both have a direct impact on Iran and on its ambitions in Palestine, in Iraq and in the region as a whole. The Barack Obama Administration listens and sometimes understands, yet from the beginning this Administration set down a strategy that includes enticing the forces of extremism to cooperate and interact, with the aim of separating them from the forces of violent extremism, i.e. what the George W. Bush Administration called “terrorism”. Today, the leaders of the US Administration are undertaking a near systematic review of their accounts on the eve of President Barack Obama's speech before the United Nations General Assembly in the second half of next month – which is a speech that can be described as “the state of affairs of the United State on the international scene”. Such a “state of affairs” deserves a great deal of clarification, because Obama has never been “usual”, neither at the US nor at the global level. In fact, celebrating the fact that he was unusual yesterday has today turned into a feast of misunderstanding of his “strangeness” at the US level and of disappointment at his “big promises” at the global level. It is time for him to adopt a “non-arrogant” strategy to clarify what he has done, what he meant, what he has in mind and what his strategy is in case of the success or failure of the policy of embracing and enticing the forces of extremism, or in case of the outbreak of a civil war that would tear apart, fragment or divide Iraq. As long as the prevailing American mentality is that of rejecting wars in Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran for any reason, it seems that Barack Obama is forced to oscillate between popular sympathy and military logic regarding what is in the higher national interest of the United States of America. Thus the war in Afghanistan is a necessary war for the United States, because withdrawing from Afghanistan now would mean defeat and retreat before the forces of extremism and terrorism. Such retreat would come at a tremendous cost, not just in terms of the US's geopolitical and material interests in Afghanistan, but also in terms of encouraging the forces of extremism and violence to violate the US homeland once again in the ecstasy of victory. General David Petraeus, who led the war in Iraq to a new threshold, which contributed to enabling Barack Obama to fulfill his promise – and that of his predecessor – to withdraw combat troops from Iraqi cities, is the military commander in Afghanistan who understands the absolute necessity of not retreating or falling back. Withdrawing combat troops from Iraq may have something to do with reshaping military capabilities in the war in Afghanistan. Yet even in this war, the US Administration, and with it the military institution, seeks to distinguish between political extremism and violent extremism, and in fact seeks if possible to strike bargains. As for Iraq after the withdrawal of combat troops from its cities, it is perhaps in its most fragile phase, due to the reality of its sectarian divisions and to the absence of national leaderships able – or willing – to cling to its independence and to its higher national interest. Perhaps everyone is waiting for Iraq to be ready at the oil level, around 2014 or 2015, and is making technical preparations on the basis that the matter will not be settled now. Perhaps this popularity Iraq enjoys for businessmen and investments is based on the conviction that Iraq's wealth remains one that is likely to be made the utmost use of, regardless of whether Iraq is divided or united. Perhaps it would be best for those who are observing what is taking place in Iraq to remember the aspect of US troops remaining present in military bases for many years to come, and not just until 2011 or 2012 as some say, as well as the Iranian aspect. Indeed, Iraq represents one of the most important locations for understanding or confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fate of this relationship rests first on the extent to which Washington is willing to offer the regime in Tehran guarantees that it will support it and not support opposition or a coup against it; and second on how the two sides will participate in sharing influence in Iraq or on the perspectives of confrontation through it and in it. Indeed, in the “Grand Bargain”, Iraq holds a prominent position, as it does in the military confrontation, between the United States and Iran so far. And in spite of the pressure being exerted on Iran through the sanctions unanimously ratified by the major powers, including Russia and China, Washington is still offering Tehran the “Grand Bargain”, which includes guarantees for the Iranian regime and an understanding over Iraq – this alongside the nuclear element which is subject to different considerations, as well as the issue of Hezbollah in Lebanon, as it is out of the question for it to remain an Iranian military base at the border with Israel, neither in a bargain nor through a war. Bringing forward the date of the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq may be part of reassuring Iran. However, it is also possible for this withdrawal to be part of reminding Tehran that an outbreak of chaos, civil war or fragmentation in Iraq would in fact pose a threat to Iran's interest, because chaos at its border, while it is besieged by foreign sanctions and domestic opposition, would widen the circle of challenges for the regime in Tehran. The US Administration has reached an understanding with Syria over Iraq, but it seems less comfortable about Syria's relationship to Iran continuing to take the form of weapons supply – and storage, as is being said – for Hezbollah. Indeed, this, in Washington's opinion, threatens to undermine a highly sensitive and delicate formula within the broader US strategy. Thus, while old voices rise, calling for rapprochement with the forces of extremism, because the forces of moderation have so far not succeeded, the US Administration is moving forward in steps that have anticipated and gone beyond such calls. Indeed, this Administration has been a pioneer – rightly or wrongly – in dealing with the forces of extremism, enticing them to cooperate and bringing them out of their isolation, amid doubts over the soundness of its policies and warnings of the consequences of reinforcing extremism at the expense of moderation. Today, it is in a phase of systematically reviewing its accounts, to see whether the policy of enticement will succeed or whether there are other options in case of failure. With Iran, it is still too early to settle the issue of whether Barack Obama's policy will succeed or fail. What is clear so far is that the military option is not on the table at the moment, while awaiting what the policy of sanctions and of enticement towards a solution will lead to. Yet the kind of enticement the Americans have in mind, and in their bargain, no longer hints to the possibility of coexisting with a nuclear Iran, as it had over the past few months. The obscurity surrounding this aspect has not yet completely been lifted, especially as the responses to Iran's challenges are not characterized by panic and do not suggest military operations. Perhaps military preparedness is in a state of reorganization, knowing that members of the military are talking about a date for preparedness no earlier than the middle of next year, a date which coincides with expectations of Iran reaching advanced stages of nuclear weapons manufacture. The Obama Administration seems as if having set a timeframe for itself to succeed in its efforts aimed at peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and perhaps between the Syrians and the Israelis as well, within a year – in other words, at a date coinciding with that of military preparedness for all players in the region. So far, Washington and the other major powers have adopted the policy of restraining Israel militarily while trying to entice Iran to cooperate. Washington's wager is on Tehran realizing that he bargain holds guarantees for the regime while confrontation holds threats to it. Regarding Tehran's allies in Hezbollah or Hamas, Washington's concern today is not abiding by the calls of those who want it to engage in debates with extremists that only lead to further undermining moderation. Its primary concern is for Israel not to engage in preemptive military operations in Lebanon or in Palestine that would lead to ending the current state of “truce” with the alliance of extremism and set off a large-scale war in the region which Washington wants to avoid at the moment. Similarly regarding Hezbollah and Hamas, Washington fears that they may set off the spark of war, under suggestion from Iran, by getting implicated by Israel, or as a result of making the wrong decisions. The logic of dialogue is no stranger to Barack Obama's strategy, and yet the logic of causing the failure of dialogue and truce seems not unlikely for the forces of extremism, which include Israel and Iran.
