Washington DC-US President Barack Obama will have to return to foreign policy issues, particularly those of the Middle East, as soon as end the midterm elections, in which the Democratic Party is expected to lose its majority at the Senate or in Congress. Some of the issues that await him require strong resolve, such as the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the issue of Lebanon, while other issues require explaining or reconsidering, such as his policies towards Iraq and Sudan, and perhaps Afghanistan as well. The results of the elections may prove useful in teaching Obama lessons in governance. Indeed, he is a very intelligent man, and yet he has put in charge of some of the most important issues of foreign policy individuals whose reputations have been based on consistent failure under past administrations – arousing surprise and questions over Barack Obama's wisdom in making choices such as these. And because the President, as well as his administration, is going through a difficult test, it would be useful for him to reconsider policies he might have adopted hastily, and to be aware of policies he must adopt so as not to chase after events. In Iraq for example, Barack Obama has hastily withdrawn around a hundred thousand US troops at a surprising time, having come in the midst of a political battle of the utmost importance for the future of Iraq and the future of its relations with its neighbors, particularly Iran. Thus the US President seemed to be running away, leaving behind him a vacuum to be filled by Iran. He seemed too lenient as he struck silent deals with Iran and Syria, allowing Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, who had lost the recent elections, to remain in power. He seemed as if betraying his pledges to uphold the democratic process and its outcome, and the silent deals came as a slap in the face for the electoral process and for those who believed in it. Barack Obama did not lay out the strategy for withdrawal from Iraq. It was the administration of his predecessor George W. Bush that set the details of the strategy for gradual withdrawal from Iraq according to a timeframe which Barack Obama adopted when he came to the White House. But that is not the issue. The most puzzling issue resides in the strange decision taken by the Obama Administration of wanting to leave Iraq. Just like that, as if the United States had not invested hundreds of billions of dollars in Iraq, and as if Iraq did not hold the second largest oil reserve in the world, as well as the largest reconstruction project. Rushing out in such a way has shed doubt over the wisdom of Barack Obama's political leadership and over his strategic goals – or the short-sightedness of such goals. Some assumed that what Obama did in Iraq was “misleading”, because it would be impossible for the United States to leave behind the second largest oil reserve and the largest reconstruction project, washing its hands of Iraq and in fact handing it down to Iran. Some found it strange for any US President to renounce an important role in a region of such importance, especially after the United States had invested tremendous amounts of money. There were also those who shed doubt over the goals of the US “establishment”, which includes some of the largest companies, among them those involved in military industries, and assumed that those companies had benefited from the Iraq war at the expense of at least 77 thousand Iraqis who were killed, and today no longer care about Iraq. And then there are those who believe that Barack Obama has committed a grave mistake and that the Republican Party will not complete the hasty withdrawal when it returns to the White House, perhaps in two years. One of the Barack Obama Administration's problems is that it is terrible at explaining what it is doing. Those well-informed about the issue of Iraq say that it would be best for the US Administration to work behind the scenes and to adopt quiet diplomacy, so as not to seem as if interfering in Iraq's affairs. They say that the US successes in Iraq exceed those of Iran, in contrast to the prevailing impression. They list examples of the “failure” of Iranian influence, starting from having to renounce Tehran's favorite candidate, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, through the Nowruz attempt to form a government such as Tehran had wished, up to the Iranian government's doubts and uncertainty over what Syria is doing in Iraq. The leaders of the Obama Administration consider the mere fact of all parties, especially Shiite forces, reaching the conclusion that the next government must undoubtedly include Sunni forces is in itself a positive development of the utmost importance. In their view, the issue is not merely one of a Gulf obsession with opposing the current Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki remaining in power, but also an obsession with the necessity of the Al-Iraqiya candidate assuming the position of Prime Minister. Thus, when Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman headed to Riyadh, he conveyed a message signifying that the concern among Arabs, especially in the Gulf, that Nouri Al-Maliki is loyal to Iran reflects misplaced doubts. The message he brought signifies that the impression that Iran has succeeded in Iraq and has now taken hold of decision-making there is a false impression. The Obama Administration, according to its leaders, did not rush out of Iraq, as there are still 50 thousand American soldiers there. Thus, saying that there is a “vacuum” being filled by Iran is incorrect. In their opinion, what the Obama Administration is achieving is turning from a military partnership with Iraq to a civilian partnership with Iraq of considerable proportions. The US is thus not rushing out but rather working behind the scenes “with” the Iraqis, who are working on Iraqi solutions to Iraq's problems, unlike the Lebanese. According to their assessment, it is too early to judge the roles played by Syria towards Iraq, as I has been taking scattered steps, without much coherence, within the framework of what is being asked of it, by the US and by the Arabs, and perhaps by Iran as well. Iran understands the predicament in which it would find itself in Iraq if it were to escalate, detonate and give free rein to violence and terrorism. Indeed, Iraq is its own backyard and the withdrawal of US troops would make Iran fragile if it fails to pay heed to its need for a semi-stable Iraq. Iran also understands Barack Obama's “predicament” in Afghanistan, which is why it approaches its dialogue with Washington through the Afghan gateway, secretly and openly. The Islamic Republic of Iran is maneuvering and engaging in dialogue at the same time, having chosen Afghanistan as the gateway to dialogue, knowing the need of the United States for it there, while it insists on its stances on the nuclear issue as on the issues of regional hegemony, particularly in Iraq and in Lebanon. What the Barack Obama Administration should formulate in terms of strategy towards Iran is a strategy of complementary issues, not a tactic that separates issues, like that of isolating ambitions of regional hegemony from talk of reaching an understanding over Afghanistan. The Barack Obama Administration should pay heed to this successful Iranian maneuver, as it should stop falling into Iran's clutches, whether in Iraq or in Lebanon. What Barack Obama needs to do in Lebanon is give up the policy of putting out fires and stop merely distancing himself from the policy of the Bush Administration towards Lebanon, Syria and Iran. Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, is an intelligent man, and has what is perhaps the most profound and in-depth knowledge of the issues of the Middle East, among them that of Lebanon. He is well-known and the object of trust, yet it is time for the Obama Administration to realize how important and how dangerous what is happening in Lebanon is, and for Barack Obama to “concede” and address this issue, so that he may convey to all whom it may concern a clear message about US policy towards this country. Indeed, in Lebanon, the prestige of the United States has fallen many times throughout the past decades, and Lebanon is the starting point of a crisis of trust in the United States at the Arab level, not just at the level of Lebanon itself. Now and again, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton makes an appearance with a stance here and a statement there. That is not sufficient. The danger represented by the situation in Lebanon requires the President and his Secretary of State to roll up their sleeves and carefully examine the meaning of the policy of distancing themselves from the issue of Lebanon. Indeed, the détente which Saudi-Syrian understandings have led to this week is a temporary and fragile one, especially as policies are randomly scattered. It is true that the efforts exerted by Syria and Hezbollah, aimed at frightening Lebanon and the international community, have failed. Indeed, the threats to undermine stability unless the United Nations yields and annuls the Special Tribunal have been firmly confronted, by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as well as by the Security Council, which sent a message this week through the ambassadors of member-states, including Russia and Turkey, not just the United States. The US Administration has awoken to the necessity of taking action in the issue of Lebanon, and credit for this is due to the visit of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Lebanon. The leaders of the US Administration should have prepared a strategy in light of the escalation by Syria and Hezbollah against the Special Tribunal, but they did not. Today, there is serious concern within the US Administration and there is resolve to take action on several levels to thwart plans of subduing the Lebanese government, after efforts to annul the Special Tribunal have been thwarted. Indeed, the US Administration has taken the decision to stop its quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, as it intends to appear more and to do more – this because the situation has completely changed after Ahmadinejad's visit, which has in turn contributed to the reexamination of the meaning of the escalation that preceded and accompanied it on the part of Syria and Hezbollah. The US Administration is examining its options, and it will not limit its action to sending Feltman to deliver a message to the President of the Republic Michel Suleiman from the US President about the commitment of the United States to the Special Tribunal as well as to Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. US officials refuse to reveal what they have in mind, but they assert that the US Administration will not stand by watching, and that there are several options before the international community as a whole, not the United States alone. There is talk of “measures” being taken, as well as talk of “consequences”. What is meant here is not military action but rather dealing a blow where it hurts. Indeed, what the US Administration has decided is to not stand by watching and to make it clear to Hezbollah, Iran and Syria that they must think carefully and avoid making mistakes. Perhaps it would be useful for the Obama Administration to take precautions instead of indulging in its mistakes. However, this would necessarily require a strategy that would anticipate events, not one that deals with their outcomes. In Sudan, as in Lebanon, the Barack Obama Administration must put a stop to last minute strategy. Indeed, this administration should have given the meaning, limits and powers of the secession of Southern Sudan by way of referendum its full attention and insisted on clarifying, instead of awaking suddenly to the necessity of driving towards holding the referendum on its scheduled date next January. Regarding Palestine and negotiations with Israel, it is not enough for the Obama Administration to continue to insist on repeatedly trying to convince Israel to stop violating UN resolutions. The Obama Administration must anticipate these stances, which are expected in the first place, with strategies to resolve them, instead of chasing after events. Perhaps the Obama Administration's problem is laxity. The world is moving fast at the hands of forces rushing to cause change. Patience is a fine thing, yet in a strategy of anticipation lies necessary wisdom.
