New York - The United States has a pre-emptive strategy in place aimed at containing any future Arab military nuclear ambitions, regardless of what will happen to the Iranian military nuclear capabilities or the Israeli nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran also has a pre-emptive strategy in place targeting more than one Arab county, and through which Iran seeks to pass a message to Washington that its measures will be costly in terms of both its interests and its allies, even if these measures are to be sanctions, and not a military strike. While Barack Obama's administration assumes a relaxed self-confident posture in its bids to contain Arab ambitions or thwart the ambitions of Iran, it is perhaps concealing a deep sense of nervousness. In parallel, the Iranian leadership in both its ‘civilian' and ‘revolutionary guard' wings, are behaving in a notably tense manner, where the Iranian wager on the decline of U.S might converges with a decline in the confidence that some Arab parties place in the United States, to ultimately give a boost of assurance in the Iranian veins. But this intricate dance is spreading terror in a number of Arab countries, in particular smaller nations as their future is teetering to the rhythm of a suspicious and most confusing dance. For instance, Kuwait fears that tension might rise further in the ranks of the Iranian leadership, in particular the Revolutionary Guard. In this regard, Kuwait's concerns regarding the spy network that it exposed is strong proof of its fears of the scenario where [the United States] is lured into carrying out a military strike, making way for the Iranian regional ambitions to be achieved Add to that the United Arab Emirates which indeed tasted the implicit and arrogant Iranian threat, after the Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed described the Iranian occupation of UAE islands as being tantamount to the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. In addition, Lebanon is now being referred to as the ‘weakest link' following the American-regional abandonment which rendered the country an open arena for bargains and conflicts. Then Iraq continues to be in limbo in what regards the formation of its cabinet, while its plans for the future remain chained to the larger bargaining that include the American-Iranian bargaining. Palestine is also part of the bargaining, while al-Qaeda and violent extremism – i.e. terrorism according to Obama's labelling – have climbed back up in the ladder of priorities, while being practically separate from the otherwise necessary treatment of other outstanding issues in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran. In truth, some of the key Arab countries like Saudi Arabia conducted a pre-emptive assessment of the American, Iranian and also the Israeli pre-emptive strategies. This in turn is intriguing, and prompts one to provide an in-depth reading of the intricacies of both the traditional and novel relationships. A veteran expert on U.S-Saudi-Iranian relations pointed out that Riyadh has experienced many instances in which it only came halfway on the path of the promises and partnerships with the United States where – as usual – a sudden American detour and abandonment of their common path took place. For this reason, Saudi diplomacy is extremely cautious at this juncture of U.S-Iranian-Israeli intricacies. This is because Saudi Arabia does not want to be the scapegoat of this triangle, no matter how hard the U.S or Israeli diplomacy try to claim that the Gulf nations led by Saudi Arabia fear the Iranian military nuclear capabilities, and want to stop such ambitions dead in their tracks at any price, including that of a military strike. In reality, such claims are essentially American and Israeli, and are mostly naive and untrue, as Iran's neighbouring countries do not want a military strike because any retaliation will mainly target these countries. However, these countries may seek security safeguards from the United States and may be forced to somewhat comply with the American requests. But as the veteran pundit notes, the Qatari example of rejecting U.S demands, despite the fact that the State of Qatar hosts the largest U.S military base in the region, sent an important message that it is truly possible to ignore America. But this also sent dangerous hints that might encourage or lead to miscalculations or excessive recklessness. However, even if there is a desire to cooperate, and not ignore, there is also a U.S track record that provides a cautionary tale against betting all the chips on America, given the fact that its history is full of instances where the United States abandoned old friends and allies, most notably Arab allies in the Middle East. For this reason, US policy makers in the Obama administration must exercise a lot of prudence and precision in their analysis, and must adopt in-depth assessments rather than automatically assuming that what they are planning will see Arab countries, or Iran, definitely on board or fall in line with its outlines. Since the senior figures of the Obama administration are drafting all policies on the basis of the timetable for the U.S withdrawal from Iraq and the requirements of ‘winning' their war in Afghanistan, and since they regard the Islamic Republic of Iran as one of the regional powers capable of thwarting the plans for Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S policy will remain a function of the fear from Iranian retaliation and will thus remain largely tied up. This is what many Arab leaders understand very well, and for this reason, they will neither gamble on behalf of the U.S weakness, nor voluntarily commit suicide. In other words, they are aware and conscious of the confusion surrounding the U.S policy toward Iran, and even towards its allies such as Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This in turn led to a kind of a turnaround in the policies of countries like Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis the Syrian leadership and Hezbollah in Lebanon, through which regional messages are passed on to the Iranian leadership. But in truth, these are reassurance messages. Nevertheless, questioning the competence of Barack Obama's administration in handling the Iranian and Palestinian issues and their repercussions may be misplaced. And this is precisely what makes the leadership in Tehran extremely nervous. It is a leadership that understands the good use of time and one that is extremely patient. However, the Revolutionary Guard is acting with much tension and disarray these days, which in turn fuels fears, in particular in the Gulf region, from possible repercussions of this tension inside Iran's neighbouring countries. Some of the reasons behind the rising tension in the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard are related to domestic calculations, while others are related to the intensity of the sanctions to be imposed by the Security Council – should Tehran continues to be intransigent vis-a-vis the international efforts led by Brazil and Turkey, to find a diplomatic way out in lieu of the sanctions. In truth, such sanctions are being formulated with the aim of striking a severe blow against the Revolutionary Guard, which will lead to reducing its influence not only within the country, but also outside of Iran especially in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. As a result, the Revolutionary Guard will be tied in its international relations, such as the ones it has with major oil industries in China and Russia, with an ensuing smaller role, and local, regional and international isolation. What the Revolutionary Guard fears, meanwhile, is the implicit deal being practically offered by the major countries, including the United States, consisting of guarantees of recognizing the de facto legitimacy of the regime and of not supporting the opposition against it. In return, the Revolutionary Guard would be pacified, and its capabilities and influence would be kept in check. Also, Iran would engage in negotiations regarding its nuclear program. Meanwhile, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's place in such deals and bargains is not as important as that of the Revolutionary Guard. Also, the latter is fully capable of thwarting such deals through sabotage in Iran's neighbouring Gulf nations or through Iraq and Lebanon, and it is already sending out pre-emptive cautionary messages in anticipation in this direction. For this reason, there is a growing concern that the Revolutionary Guard will practically invite a military strike against Iran, or an Israeli strike against Lebanon that would upset the equation and ruin chances for deals or bargains. In fact, several leaders from the GCC countries visiting Washington expressed their concerns regarding the ‘ballistic tension', as described by one of them, and its repercussions on Gulf nations and the Middle East at large. They thus urged the U.S administration to avert retaliating to the tension in kind. They also urged it not to provide any pretexts that the Revolutionary Guard may find opportune, but also urged it against misreading the situation within the ruling cast in Tehran. In other words, the officials visiting Washington conveyed their deep concern not only regarding the Iranian stances, but also regarding the ambiguity of American attitudes and stakes. In truth, the U.S administration sometimes seems confident of its moves, especially after ensuring Chinese and Russian support for a draft resolution in the Security Council whose details are still under deliberation. But at other times, this administration acts as though it is ‘certain' that it or other parties have no choice but to pretend that Iran will not acquire military nuclear capabilities. As for its pre-emptive strategy with the Arab countries, it suggests that the most important challenge today lies in containing Arab nuclear ambitions that might lead to a nuclear arms race, should Iran acquire nuclear weapons. But this pre-emptive strategy appears to be ‘suggestive', i.e. it is placing the ‘chariot' of the possibility that Iran's acquirement of nuclear weapons will lead to a regional arms race, before the ‘horse' of preventing Iran from acquiring this weapon. This aims at either suggesting that Iran will inevitably become a nuclear power or to suggest that an arms race will take place, or both. On the other hand, perhaps one of the objectives of the pre-emptive strategy with the Arab countries is to urge them to increase their reliance on U.S security guarantees, which also incur huge financial revenues and benefits for the U.S economy. This is not to mention encouraging Arab countries to purchase fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors from international parties, instead of enriching uranium locally (something that may enable them to convert reactors to suit military purposes). To be sure, the United States is not the only party that will benefit from the demand for nuclear energy, as France is the first nation to export nuclear technology, and is still seeking to profit from it. Also, Russia today is at the top of the list of the countries that are building reactors, and that are dealing in lucrative [nuclear] fuel exports as is South Korea and other nations. Perhaps the Arab countries have realized that the Arabs are absolutely prohibited from becoming a nuclear power under any circumstances. For this reason, they concluded that none of them has any possibility of pursuing such capabilities. For instance, Iraq was transformed from a pioneering Arab country in the field of nuclear technology, to a marginalized country in the aftermath of the war that meant to remove it from the military nuclear club. In addition, Libya was forced to cooperate and give up its nuclear ambitions. While Arabs may have no other choice but to comply with these pre-emptive strategies, they have the option of converting the Arab region into a powerful civilian force that awes those who believe that regional domination can only come through acquiring military nuclear capabilities. A wise strategy then is that which takes into account the insistence on prior guarantees regarding Israel and Iran, in return for complying with the pre-emptive strategy, while taking all necessary measures that render the Arabs a civilian force that can deter hegemony through nuclear arms.
