Lebanon is entering a period of big tests in the coming phase, in which the big international powers, along with regional powers enjoying a central role in the region, will be engaged in struggles and conflicts against each other. This involves their ability to influence Lebanon's internal conditions, stability and daily life, both directly and indirectly. Meanwhile, the region is being beset by a wave of escalation, fears about wars, and pressure, while another wave of negotiations and efforts to calm the situation is taking place. Every day, Lebanon will be in the heart of these successive waves, rocking the country and mobilizing its leaders, so that they calculate their positions in order to avoid the repercussions of these waves in the nation. There is consensus among the foreign powers concerned with Lebanon that the war option, which they have been promoting for the last few months, has receded, or at least, it has been delayed from this year to the next one. Nevertheless, some international leaders who acknowledge this conclusion remain anxious that the war remains a possibility. Thus, any unforeseen incident could launch the war machine in an unexpected manner. Nonetheless, realism requires that we say that in light of the firm decision to prevent a war, especially on the part of the United States, such a decision is sufficient to guarantee that any surprise incident will be contained and that Israeli will be prevented from launching a war, since the reasons for not launching a war are still in place. If the motivations for a war involve a strike against Hezbollah to weaken one of Iran's regional arms, in order to soften its negotiating position, restore consideration to the Israeli army after its failure in 2006, and send a strong blow to the Lebanese economy, whose recovery annoys the Jewish state, and to the country's infrastructure, etc., then there are also reasons that work against a war taking place. These involve Washington's giving priority to sanctions against Iran over the use of force, and its preference for a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, which would be destroyed by a war. Finally, there is no guarantee that a war would succeed in weakening Iran's arm, but would in fact strengthen it, after damaging the structures of the Lebanese state. In the meantime, it seems that Lebanese are doomed to coexisting with the contradictions of “hot” and major national issues, which govern their future. Lebanon is leaning toward the negotiation option, which was launched by the Brazilian-Turkish-Iranian agreement to exchange enriched uranium at a higher level on Turkish soil, as Lebanese President Michel Sleiman said, compared to the plan for sanctions that the G6 countries want to present to the United Nations Security Council. If the draft is accepted by the majority of council members, this position will pave the way for an abstention on the vote, while Iran and its allies in Lebanon want the country to use the chairman's forum to oppose the draft. They are trying to carry out a political attack on the relationship of Lebanese state institutions with the Americans, which opposes Lebanon's need for this relationship, and goes against the conceit by Iran and these allies that America is negotiating with them for “partnership in ruling the world.” In recent months, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri has sought to build trust with Syria and reject Israeli accusations against Syria and Lebanon with regard to Scud shipments to Hezbollah, when the campaign escalated against Damascus as a response to the summit there that brought together Syria, Iran and the secretary general of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Meanwhile, Syrian officials let their allies in Lebanon begin a whispering campaign against the prime minister for announcing his intention to visit Washington, as part of an effort to protect Lebanon. They did not settle the issue until they noticed that what Hariri was saying was a defense of Syria as much as Lebanon, at the end of the day. This method indicates that there are Syrian doubts about the actual positions of Lebanese officials, which goes against the strength that Syria currently feels toward the west and the United States, and about the Lebanese political stance after a wide segment of Lebanese have reconciled with their neighbor. Washington is preparing to understand Lebanon's stance on the Iranian nuclear program in the Security Council, and leaning toward a more hard-line stance vis-à-vis its position on the arming of Hezbollah, which contravenes Resolution 1701, to protect Israel. At the same time, Washington finds no embarrassment in declining to use any pressure on the Jewish state on the following items: moving from a state of hostility to a complete cease-fire, ending the tens of thousands of Israeli violations of Lebanese air space, transferring the Shebaa Farms to the jurisdiction of the UN, withdrawing from the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar, and turning over maps of land mines and cluster bombs, as stipulated by Resolution 1701, especially since such moves do not harm the security of Israel, to which Washington assigns priority.
