All parties in the Middle East are openly unanimous about avoiding an imminent war. They all declare that they do not want such a war, and in fact each of them explains such talk of war within the framework of political pressures being exerted by the enemy. And they all, at the same time, unanimously declare their own readiness to wage such a war if it were to take place. And indeed, the region, from Israel to Iran, is witnessing intensified military maneuvers that mimic the coming war, and every side is training according to what they imagine the developments of such a war to be. Israel is training its troops in different kinds of land, sea and air operations, from South Lebanon, through Syria and up to Iran. It is also preparing its inhabitants for the possibilities of coming under attack with missiles and non-conventional weapons. In fact, Israel considers waging such a war to be a vital matter, since it considers the direct security threat to come from its Northern front, represented by Hezbollah fighters and perhaps Syrian troops, while the strategic threat comes from Iran, which it accuses of seeking to acquire a nuclear bomb. For its part, Iran – and with it Hezbollah – considers military confrontation to be inevitable, in view of the lack of recognition of it as a major power and of the rights and interests such a position entails. The battle front from its perspective will stretch across the sources of danger for itself, whether from Western troops stationed in the Gulf region or from Israeli troops that might take part in the confrontation. This means that Israel's Northern front, i.e. Lebanon and particularly South Lebanon, will certainly be the arena of the confrontation if it were to take place. One should here note that Lebanon remains, by virtue of UN Resolution 1701, under cessation of acts of warfare between Israel and Hezbollah, not under ceasefire. This means that this front has relatively calmed down by virtue of the presence of reinforced UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) troops, not by virtue of the absence of reasons to fight, reasons which will increase with growing tension on the Iranian front. Within such a framework, so-called incidents are taking place between UNIFIL patrols and “local inhabitants” in South Lebanon. The justifications put forth in Lebanon to explain those incidents do not seem convincing. They suggest that the “local inhabitants” hold against UN troops their non-compliance with Resolution 1701, which defines their mission, and that they suspect these troops of seeking to change the rules of engagement, within the framework of a plan facilitating an offensive against Lebanon. In fact, those “local inhabitants” are most probably acting under instructions from Hezbollah, which controls the South – that is if its members are not at the forefront of the inhabitants protesting. Such incidents therefore fall within the framework of preparations and maneuvers, in anticipation of war, especially as the main task of these troops is to prevent the presence of armed forces other than official Lebanese troops, and do not occur by virtue of what is considered to be transgressions against the inhabitants of villages or of UN troops departing from their mission. The United Nations has for some time felt the danger of such incidents, of which UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams said that “some were organized”, in a polite hint at Hezbollah. Similarly, the quarterly report of the UN Secretary-General also pointed to the fact that “any miscalculation from any party could result in renewed warfare operations, with what this could mean in terms of destructive effects for Lebanon and the region”. Here one would raise a fundamental question about the Lebanese state, with all of its institutions, joining in defense of the theory that the UNIFIL is responsible for these incidents, to such an extent that some officials have denounced UN troops. The Lebanese state might be forced to justify everything Hezbollah does, by virtue of the de facto situation and of its submission to local political considerations regarding growing regional influence, especially that of Iran and Syria, on the background of the internal imbalance of power in favor of Hezbollah. However, UN troops are not concerned with such considerations, and thus find themselves becoming instruments in a major struggle, while the UNIFIL was formed and deployed by virtue of a UN Resolution and unanimous Lebanese agreement in order to put an end to Israel's July 2006 offensive and to contain its repercussions. The question also concerns what interest Lebanon, which is a member of the Security Council, has in tension increasing with UN troops which were in the first place sent to protect Lebanese soil and to strengthen the state's sovereignty over it, as well as what interest it has in a political confrontation with the countries participating in the UNIFIL, which see their soldiers being exposed to constant threats, with what could result from this in terms of repercussions that will certainly not serve the implementation of Resolution 1701. Furthermore, the question concerns Lebanon's stance on this resolution and whether it is still able to demand that all its provisions be implemented, or whether the ambiguity that surrounds previous UN Resolutions regarding Lebanon now applies to Resolution 1701. Does the Lebanese state still recognize this resolution?
