Every time a new wave of threats of war against Lebanon is launched, it coincides with a new wave of American movement to activate the peace process and resume negotiations on the Palestinian track. Israel thus heads off this new wave of American pressure, which has yet to take on practical and clear forms; at the least, the pressure has a political impact, since Washington and Tel Aviv are talking about the disputes between them. Naturally, we can label the recent wave of talk of war on Lebanon, as Lebanese officials have said, an Israeli effort to divert attention from the pressure on the Jewish state to freeze settlements, in order to begin peace negotiations, and in the direction of Hizbullah's arms. But what is the justification for the threats and the raising of the missiles issue, against Syria and Lebanon, and then a return to affirmations, by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, that his country has no intention of launching war against Syria and Lebanon? The justification is simply that Tel Aviv, every time, receives a confirmation from Washington that it will not support the war option because it continues to give priority to another, non-military policy in dealing with the crisis in the region, until further notice. This American policy is to secure a consensus, or near-consensus, in the region and the world for sanctions against Iran, while resuming peace negotiations on the Palestinian track. This is because if Washington appears to be striving to solve the Palestinian issue, and perhaps striving seriously to solve such a problem, due to its intractability and perhaps impossibility with the current Israeli political line-up, it will aid the cause of securing a consensus over sanctions on Iran. But there is another possibility in the recent wave of threats against Lebanon and Syria, and in America's cover for Israel in the talk about the missiles to Hizbullah and accusations that Damascus has supplied them: it is likely that Israel is exploiting the delay in the efforts to impose sanctions on Iran, by returning to the political-media attack. In this way, it can gauge whether there is a possibility of launching a military strike against Hizbullah, as the military arm of Iran and a negotiating card that it holds, as well as divert attention from the growing dispute between it and western countries over the continuation of settlement activity. In other words, the recent wave of talk about war, which then receded, was an attempt to take advantage of the lull in the current situation, based on fruitless negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue, and the attempt to impose sanctions on Iran. The priority of sanctions has been delayed, for objective reasons, as the work on drafting a resolution on the matter will extend for a few more months, for reasons that are diverse, ranging from essential matters to ones of form. Washington and western countries do not intend to put the draft to a vote before the Security Council during Lebanon's chairmanship of the body, beginning on 1 May. Although Lebanon, as the chair, will be forced to table any topic proposed by a member or members, it can decide on a number of procedural issues in order to delay this process. If the draft resolution's authors put the resolution to a vote, the chair is obliged to carry this out, but western countries and the United States will be uncomfortable to see the chair vote against sanctions on Iran, even if it obtains a majority of nine votes; the impact will be psychological, if not legal. Another reason for delaying the Security Council vote during May is that throughout the coming month, an international conference on reviewing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is taking place. Many countries have been campaigning for the holding of this conference since 1995, with Egypt among the leaders. During the event, Arab states will put forward the idea of making the Middle East, and especially Israel, a nuclear weapons-free zone, and this conference will be a forum in which Arab and Muslim fears about Israel's nuclear arsenal are raised. Likewise, it will also be a place in which negotiations can take place with Iran, whose President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has requested a US visa in order to attend the event, and try to renew negotiations once again with Tehran before serious work on sanctions takes place in June and July. There are other reasons for the delay in discussing sanctions, such as the fact that a joint draft has yet to be hammered out, and this requires negotiations among the Group of Six, namely Germany and the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are taking place with China and Russia. Also, negotiations are needed with the non-permanent members (Turkey, Brazil, Uganda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gabon, Mexico, Austria, Nigeria, Greece and Lebanon), in order to secure the approval of four of them, or five, if China abstains. Meanwhile, Turkey is undertaking mediation and Brazil is also readying for such a role, a process that was begun by its foreign minister and will be followed up by President Da Silva during his visit to Tehran on 15 May. During the month of May, the discussion will not be limited to Iran's nuclear program; it will also tackle Israel's nuclear weapons, also because of the delay in sanctions. Perhaps this will be sufficient to busy the world's attention by talking about war, while diverting it from the issue of settlements as well.
