Diplomatic efforts are underway to treat the Middle East Crisis, in parallel with the danger of war in the region. The drums of war are beating every month or two, and each time there are new pretexts for war. It has been striking to notice the common denominator with regard to the threats of war being talk about Lebanon and Hizbullah, and not Iran or Gaza. It has also been observed that countries concerned with stability in Lebanon are continuing to affirm their commitments to strengthening a minimum level of stability and preventing a deterioration of conditions. Meanwhile, the pretext for escalating the rhetoric of war, coming from Israel and buttressed by American warnings about Hizbullah's growing supplies of new weapons and large rockets, quickly dies down, after the Israelis rant on about threats to them, and make warnings about preparations for war. However, each time, the wave of threats dies down, leaving repercussions on the regional political situation, not to mention the situation in Lebanon, which is the country in the region most concerned with fears of this war, since it is the likely arena for it to take place, not elsewhere, whether Syria, Palestine or Iran. With the ebbing of each wave, we continue to remember that there is something dangerous in the current regional equation, requiring a rise in the “danger level” each time. If the clouds of war dissipate each time, this does not mean the possibility of such a war has disappeared. This is because there are few opportunities by which we can follow-up the efforts to avert tension, and become convinced that it has receded. A little more than two months ago, these circles concluded that the idea that effort to contain the tension had postponed a war, and not eliminated the possibility of one. Some of these circles talked about the need for more time, to test the Barack Obama administration's ability to impose sanctions on Iran, and test the effectiveness of these sanctions in forcing Iran in the direction of useful negotiations and their ability to cause a breakthrough in peace negotiations on the Palestinian track until the end of 2010. Thus, if war becomes the likely option, it will be pushed back to 2011. Any war in the foreseeable future, even if a limited one in Lebanon, will destroy the efforts underway to secure a consensus or semi-consensus on sanctions against Iran and restrict America's ability to begin Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, until further notice, irrespective of the consequences of this war. In the most recent wave of war threats, the high-pitched tone by Israel and western countries had aspects of self-restraint, when talking about the reports of Hizbullah's obtaining ballistic missiles, including Scuds, as well as aspects of a threat that the war would hit reach Syria, and not just Lebanon. There is really no justification for comparing Washington's statement that all options are on the table vis-à-vis Syria if the “possibility” that it has supplied the party with these missiles is proven, to the statements by American officials that there is no evidence that Syria has delivered these missiles. The only justification is an American desire to reverting to the war option. Some say that even if the White House had such evidence, it will not go public, if it wants to avoid a war in the region under these circumstances. Bringing the evidence out in to the open means the administration will be committing to behavior that is in line with the Syrian step, i.e. trying to strike at Hizbullah's military power, as a tool being used by both Syria and Iran. This is what the US administration wants to avoid for now. Moreover, diplomats concerned with following up the seriousness of Israel and the west are talking about disparities in the intelligence information. Sometimes it indicates that the party has transferred long-range missiles of unknown quality, or that Syria has provided the Hizbullah with these missiles but that these complex weapons have not been completely assembled, or that an officer from Hizbullah trained in how to use these missiles, either in Syria or Iran, without obtaining them. All of this renders the ongoing commotion about missiles less important than what official statements are saying about the matter. The movement toward downplaying the specter of war is not limited to Washington (and the west along with it), through statements by the assistant secretary of state, Jeffrey Feltman, in his response to criticisms by Republican congressmen of the Obama administration's policy of openness to Syria; he affirmed that “engagement with Syria is in order to change its relations with Hizbullah and Iran.” Bearing in mind the fiery statements by Iranian leaders, one cannot ignore the statements by Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmat Davatoglu, about his optimism about the possibility of a settlement with Iran, after it mediated with the Islamic Republic two days ago, over its nuclear program. If Syria was playing a game of brinksmanship in its relations with Iran and Hizbullah, the logic of this policy has demanded from the beginning that we do not fall into the abyss. This is what Damascus is trying to do in its openness to Washington and its progress in improving its Arab relations, which in coming days should witness a new step, in terms of reconciliation with Egypt.
