The meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo was not expected to take a hard-line pan-Arab stance on the humiliating Israeli conditions to re-start peace process negotiations, and Israel's continued measures – with full American indulgence – to Judaicize East Jerusalem, throw Palestinians out of their homes and escalate settlements, instead of agreeing to the US proposal to begin indirect Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, for four months. The humiliating American retreat from the commitment by President Barack Obama to halt the building of Israeli settlements, to his reservations about it, to their being frozen for a few months, was sufficient motivation for Israel to intensify settlement activity and create “new facts” on the ground that prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Such a state does not appear to be on the horizon in the near future, according to indications. This American retreat freed Israel's hands once again, in the political and security arenas, in the Palestinian territories and rendered US envoy George Mitchell's proposals about negotiations a tragic-comedic spectacle, and no more. It was portrayed as the most that the Obama administration could do vis-à-vis Israel and the Israeli lobby in Washington. If the question “what can Arab states at a foreign ministers' conference do about abandonment by the US and continual Israeli arrogance?” is being posed, then asking ordinary observers impossible questions is no excuse. Washington is asking Arab leaders to give political cover for indirect negotiations, which in turn give cover for the ongoing Judaicization policies and the siege of Gaza, and for sanctions on Iran, and the war on terror, etc. The question that is being posed along with this impossible one is the following: “Isn't it time for the Arabs to shake things up amid a growing regional and international crisis and ask for something in return when it comes to the Palestinian issue, as a price for the other problems for which Washington wants political cover? Isn't it time to go beyond the Arab Peace Initiative, by taking the initiative with Iran, in its sponsorship of the Palestinian resistance? In short, why doesn't a group of Arab countries follow a policy that brings them into the scope of international bargaining, instead of seeing them run in place, caught between their impotence and the political cover for most of what the west wants? What if they were to decide that they would flout the coming sanctions on Iran, in return for Washington's failure to meet the minimum level of Arab demands on Palestine?” It is an irony that the political cover by the Arab Peace Initiative Committee, a sub-committee of the Arab foreign ministers conference, for four months of indirect negotiations between Palestinians and Israel, might have a single positive aspect, namely that it helps extend the period of diplomatic negotiation, compared to the war option, which has been promoted by the Israelis for the last two weeks, or by the secretary general of Hizbullah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, or by the Damascus summit that brought together Nasrallah, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Syrian President Bashar Assad. It is a period that matches the one being talked about in high-level western circles, namely that the next six months will be a test for the effectiveness of the supposed sanctions on Iran; afterward, it will be decided whether the results will see a return to negotiations, or a move toward war. Most likely, Syria's reservations about Arab political cover for indirect Palestinian negotiations with Israel do not mean that Damascus will fight for this position. In the end, Syria will also benefit from these four months, to dispel the specter of a war that it does not want, since this conflict, even if it is limited to Lebanon and Hizbullah, will represent a big challenge. The destruction of Lebanon from this war will cause huge harm to Syria as well, compared to the limited damage that Iran would incur from a war that is distant from its borders. If the summit in Damascus on 25 February was seen as a response to attempts to split Syria from Iran, after the visit by US Assistant Secretary of State William Burns to Damascus, and if the two countries along with Nasrallah do not carefully contemplate the negative repercussions of war talk on the supporters of the resistance itself in Lebanon, and its fears about the consequences of this war, ordinary people's anxiety, and domestic political division, then the four-month period being proposed represents a challenge for Syria, as it is for Arab leaders. What happens when the period ends? Damascus is also going easy on Tehran since Washington is not offering enough, in terms of normalizing relations. Will the four-month period be enough for the Syrian leadership to participate with the rest of the Arab world's leaders in drafting a policy that allows them to take the initiative, with Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian coordination taking the place of the recent Damascus summit, and collective Arab negotiation with Washington replacing the race to have strong ties with it? If this takes place, it might chase away the specter of war, and save the Lebanese the trouble of discussing a defense strategy that they are unable to create.
