Europeans have been made anxious about the growth in influence of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, not only out by concern over a loss of control over the security situation, but also by the possibility of foreign nationals being kidnapped and becoming hostages, with ransoms and punishment demanded by a more fanatic religious cause. As with the luring of Americans and Europeans to the quagmires of tension in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the objective of kidnapping is obvious – to force western states to intervene, whether directly or by establishing military bases, which reduce the distances involved in confrontation. It is nothing new for Spain, which heads the European Union, to demand that its American ally and European partners pay more attention to the security conditions that are spinning out of control on the sub-Saharan coast. The Americans preceded Spain in this, when they decided to form AFRICOM, for intervention in northwestern Africa. In exactly the same way, NATO has been busier in the region, through organizing military maneuvers and security forums, where countries are asked to get more heavily involved. However, Spain's wishes, backed by the French desire to see a more institutional European security achievement, go beyond the actions of governments vis-à-vis state commitments. An American-Spanish summit, which Madrid is hoping for during its presidency of the EU, will be a part of this policy. The time has passed when the US-Spain approach during the era of former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar collided with popular rejection of the US invasion of Iraq. The Spanish Socialists examined aspects of new challenges facing their aspirations in their southern part of European security, for which North Africa constitutes a strategic, natural extension and outlet. Moreover, US-Spanish and Franco-Spanish differences have disappeared thanks to elements of a new understanding among Madrid, Paris and Washington in terms of international transformations. This three-member front has become a political reality that is adapting to new developments, whether in terms of dealing with regional issues in the Arab Maghreb, or through the repercussions of security incidents whose dangers can no longer be ignored, and which can be summed up as the security chaos on the coast. The professional selection of the timing in hinting at possible dangers should certainly be credited to the Zapatero government in Spain. It has taken into consideration that Spanish voters want a bigger role for their country in the new system of relations. Zapatero also wants to prevent its rival, the Popular Party, from exploiting the global financial crisis and the alarming repercussions of illegal migration. But the government goes even further, by moving the domestic battle to external arenas, such as absorbing the shock of the kidnapping of Spanish nationals. Perhaps it wants to drum up international support for the Spanish policy of reaching out to its nearby African neighbors. Spain has opened up to Algeria, but retaining balance in its ties with Morocco has not gone by the wayside. However, the continuing crisis between Rabat and Algiers has not helped the Spaniards, the French, or even the Americans, in producing harmonious policies that make the war against terror in the sub-Saharan coast a priority, even though the neighboring countries agree about the dangers of the phenomenon and its political and security repercussions. To the extent that Rabat considers getting involved with the chaotic conditions in coastal countries a regional and international priority, Algiers prefers to stall when it comes to the threat of these problems and the involvement of foreign parties in the crisis. More importantly, the Europeans whose nationals have been affected by terror coming from the coastal region, cannot, along with the Americans, wait very long for a larger regional understanding to take shape in drafting the priorities of the current battle. There is an encouraging sign, however, which might become closer to absorbing the joint concerns. It lies in the gathering of coastal and Saharan countries who have made the coastal strip of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and others into place where their capacities can be gathered, even though the likely Libyan vision behind the birth of this African order is not completely in harmony with the aspirations of France, Spain and the US. However, the Maghreb Union remains the most prominent absentee in this initiative, as it has been unable to forge an influential regional presence. One of the ironies is that Algeria, as its Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci has said, supports a Maghreb Union based on economic considerations, while Morocco wants a union that has political dimensions, to remove the sources of tension in relations among the various parties. Amid these two visions, European and American policy options are pressing in the direction of seeing security considerations win out, although the essence of security is linked to stability, development and democracy. Meanwhile, these recommendations remain distant, as with the distant stances of the various sides.
