It was the domestic pressures faced by the government of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, which drove Madrid to agree to a deal to release two Spanish hostages kidnapped by al-Qaida in the Arab Maghreb, particularly in the Sahel and the Sahara. Likewise, the repercussions of French military intervention in northern Mali, which was met with criticism by the Mauritanian opposition, might be behind the Mauritanian authorities' decision to turn over activist Omar ‘Al-Sahrawi' to Mali, even though the Mauritanian judiciary convicted him of involvement in terrorist acts. France and Spain belong to a single European judiciary, and are committed by their codes of conduct to refuse to negotiate with outlaw terrorist groups. However, the principle of the end justifying the means sometimes leads to an overlooking of such commitments, and a failure to adhere to them by the letter when the matter concerns freeing European hostages, for fear that the issue could be seen as a political failure in the run-up to elections. Between the option of force, and that of being unflinching in negotiations through the mediation of money and people, there have been different stances taken by Paris and Madrid, even though both are equally concerned with waging war against terror. Meanwhile, the principled commitment by all European Union countries to engage in the war on the growing terror in the Sahel and southern Saharan has not prevented Spain from choosing its own method of managing negotiations, with mediation by Mali. However, while Nouakchott has bowed to various types of pressure, a short time ago it entered a crisis with its neighbor Mali because of the latter's stance on the release of detainees accused of belonging to extremist organizations with terrorist leanings. It was unlikely that it would have agreed to turn over Omar ‘Al-Sahrawi' just because he held Malian citizenship, since his record in belonging to the Polisario Front would have required him to be handed over to this group, and also since a visit by a Saharan delegation to Nouakchott coincided with the issue gaining traction. It is likely that the Spanish, unlike the French, do not want the image of their country to be shaken, especially in light of the repercussions of the crisis with their neighbor Morocco, even if this dispute involves conditions in the occupied cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and not the Sahara. Likewise, the Spanish want to play a bigger role in dealing with this thorny issue, as part of precise regional power balances that the Spanish diplomacy hopes will be a welcomed initiative. If it is true that France, in turn, appears more interested in the deteriorating security conditions in the Sahel region, its actions have not been well calculated, at the least in terms of the failure to release the French hostage who was later killed. It is interesting that in the meantime, Algeria has let no opportunity pass without declaring its determination to submit a paper to the United Nations, banning the trading of hostages for the release of likely terrorists. Whether this stance resulted from Algeria's being excluded from a security conference to discuss conditions in the Sahel and southern Sahara regions, or its selection of an approach that differs from that of France and Spain, the growth of the terror phenomenon in the Sahel strip, known as the triangle of death (Mali, Niger and Mauritania), via supplies from the Greater Sahara, cannot be isolated from the repercussions of Algeria's inability, up to now, to end extremism in the region. It is in the interest of the Sahel and Sahara countries to receive real support from North African countries in their fight against terror. This support finds its natural extension in the stances of the EU and the United States, which during the Barack Obama presidency has paid more attention to Africa. However, the absence of a unified approach by North African countries will have a negative impact on the real battles. It appears that the French and the Spanish give more importance to public opinion in the absence of this unity, which is the missing part of regional accord, whether in terms of the war on terror, or the dealings with various types of crises and pressure.
