legitimizes the possession of fissionable nuclear material by individuals and non-State actors if their intention is to cause damage or injury or carry out terrorist acts. The ambassador highlighted a number of concerns raised on some provisions of the draft convention. Akram said Pakistan shared some of these concerns and noted that article 4(2) of the Convention could be interpreted to imply that it was permissible for State(s) in certain cases to attack or subvert the nuclear facilities or installations of another State. In the light of these facts, he said: _We wished to include in the preamble of the Convention a reference to article 15 of the second protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces. We also suggested the addition of a new paragraph to clarify that 'Nothing in this convention shall justify undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility." Akram said Pakistan has decided not to press its proposals mainly because assurances received in response from the principal sponsors of the Convention that these concerns were clearly covered in the Convention, or in existing international law, and in order to facilitate adoption of this Convention by consensus and advance the campaign against terrorism. The ambassador underlined the need that the provisions of the Convention must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is fully compatible with the requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.
