On June 14 Iranians are supposed to be electing their new president. The “supposed” is there because at two crucial stages in the process, they will be robbed of genuine choice. The first impediment to a real election with be the decision by the Guardian Council on who, among those putting their names forward to run for the presidency, are suitable candidates. Then, and most crucially, the actual vote is almost certain once again to be rigged as in June 2009 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected. The challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi even lost in constituencies seen as packed with his supporters. Widely condemned by international observers as fraudulent, the subsequent furious demonstrations and the murderous way in which they were repressed, constituted the first real major challenge to the theocratic regime. Caught off guard by the protests, the Guardian Council tried to buy time by saying it would recount a sample 10 percent of the votes. Its conclusion that there had been no irregularities only inflamed the protesters of the so-called Green Movement. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denounced the pro-Mousavi demonstrations as illegal and ordered widespread arrests, driving the protesters, who by some accounts ran into millions, from the streets. Although this time ballot stuffing is likely to be done in a more sophisticated manner, it cannot be doubted that it will take place. The real challenger this time will be former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose candidacy has been openly opposed by the Supreme Leader. It is still possible that the Guardian Council will refuse to have Rafsanjani's name on the ballot, but to block him carries considerable political risk. The most obvious is that it will undermine any chance the election will look remotely legitimate and so impact on Iran's international position in the continuing standoff over its “peaceful” nuclear program. However, that is probably less of a concern to Khamenei and his inner circle than the effect of Rafsanjani's exclusion on other, often younger members of the regime's leadership. There are many, including elements within the powerful Revolutionary Guards, who are deeply critical of the government's failures, most particularly on the economic front. Even discounting the tightening grip of international sanctions, Iran's economy is a mess. For these regime insiders, a mixture of corruption and sheer incompetence now jeopardizes the future of the rule of the mullahs. They may not much care for Rafsanjani personally, but they believe that he could set the country on a steadier and more economically literate course. They will also reason that since he is 79, Rafsanjani may not wish to run for a second four-year term. There is some resistance to the man many see as Khamenei's preferred choice, his close adviser, the former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati. There is, of course, much jockeying for power and influence. Nevertheless, the cadre of regime insiders, who see that only a change of economic tack and perhaps also international political direction can ensure the rule of the mullahs, believes that Rafsanjani is their best lever for change. Whether supporters of the Green Movement will take the same view is a moot point. Given the charade of the last presidential election, there may be a widespread boycott in the hope that this will undermine the legitimacy of the outcome. But then, of course, the turnout figures can be fixed just as easily as the result.
