Dr. N. Janardhan A recent article on Gulf-India ties by a distinguished academic from the region, following the Asian Security Conference in New Delhi, stated: “It was disappointing to see the Gulf-India relationship reduced to mere economics...the view of the region among Delhi's strategic elites is a copy-paste of the Western approach.” The main concerns were the “ambiguity” of the “future power's” role in Gulf security; and India's “obsession” with oil, which has discouraged “a non-oil paradigm to Gulf realities.” The following is a counter-narrative to these and other deductions. India is a country of contradictions. Despite its recent economic growth, it is still a ‘super poor' country that either aspires to or is expected to play the role of a ‘superpower'. In reality, neither the aspiration nor the expectation can be realized in a short span. The churn that India, the Gulf and the world are undergoing requires long-term planning, not quick-fix and knee-jerk action. Several global factors helped Asia and Gulf ‘rediscover' their ties during the last decade, which resulted in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) adopting a ‘Look East' policy where India is a significant partner. Similarly, India also emphasized the benefits of viewing the Gulf region as part of its “natural economic hinterland.” Yes, the GCC countries are currently the fulcrum of India's energy security and the bloc is India's number one trade partner. But India is also willing to showcase its power and influence in the region. Following decades of inactivity after independence, India is now in an advanced stage of foreign-security policy change that emphasises greater strategic realism. This is driven by necessity, ambition and opportunity, and resulted in expansion of its military power. A key role in this ‘power projection' is that of the Indian Navy. A ring of national security involving the Indian Ocean littoral and the Gulf, the need to play a prominent role in the region, and a readiness to deploy resources for such tasks are a part of the Indian thinking. India, therefore, launched the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2007 to develop “cooperative, consultative and inclusive” mechanisms to address threats to Indian Ocean security. It signed a defense agreement with Qatar in 2008, which combines an energy-security link and a commitment to protect Qatar's assets and interests from external threats. These and other specifics of the ‘non-intrusive' deal serve as a template for future GCC-India security cooperation. Similarly, India and Saudi Arabia signed the Riyadh Declaration in 2010, which expanded bilateral cooperation to cover ‘strategic' and security issues. If these fall short of expectations, the GCC countries also have not elaborated on their decade-long pronouncements about looking beyond the US-centric security scenario. This has left the contours of any alternative security architecture to the realm of speculation. The academic's other criticisms about India-Iran and India-Israel ties emanate from a subjective assessment of India's non-flamboyant foreign policy amid hyperactive, but non-constructive, diplomacy. Any objective clarification leads us to the core of India's foreign policy — equity in the conduct of international relations and addressing its national and security interests. Since Pakistan denies India access to Afghanistan, Iran is the window to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further, despite reduction in oil supply owing to sanctions, Iran is still among the biggest suppliers. India's opposition to Western sanctions arises from its belief that they hurt the common people, not the government, especially since they add to UN sanctions. But, realizing that Iran's nuclear program could destabilize the region, the Riyadh Declaration urged Iran to “remove doubts about its nuclear weapons program.” India also endorsed the Arab call for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Finally, it is ironic that India-Israel ties are questioned in the context of Gulf-India ties, while the US-Israel bonhomie and its impact on the Palestinians are underplayed in the context of Gulf-US ties. If the reason for this is strategic, so is India's position. Among other areas of cooperation, Israel is India's second largest arms supplier after Russia. Yet, India has always backed the Palestinian demand for a sovereign, independent, viable and united Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, as endorsed in the Arab Peace Initiative. Further, the fact that President Mahmoud Abbas inaugurated the new embassy premises — built with Indian aid — in New Delhi in September 2012, indicates that Palestine will remain a part of India's consciousness. The bottom line is that as much as Gulf-India ties have to look beyond oil, trade and expatriates — which is already a part the Track II agenda and even witnessing movement on the ground — there has been no significant ‘breakthrough' in the security arena because both realize that the situation is yet to reach critical mass. The evolving security scenario in the region is bound to demand alternative arrangements during the next few decades. At that point, India will have to take a stand — at least to protect its own interests. Such a role is unlikely to be a solo effort; it is more likely to be part of a distinct ‘collective' security approach. The fact that it would naturally coincide with the region's security requirements will yield a win-win formula. Till then, however, the name of the game will be ‘wait and watch' or ‘better safe than sorry', which is not a “copy-paste of the Western approach” and which will not undermine age-old Gulf-India ties in any way. — Dr N. Janardhan is a UAE-based political analyst. He can be reached at [email protected]
