Riyadh-Those who today are monitoring developments in Iran, Yemen and the Arab-Israeli conflict would be well-advised not to turn a blind eye to China, first in terms of its clear presence on the issues of Yemen and Iran, as well as its deliberate absence on the political issue of the Middle East, and second in terms of its relations with the United States, Russia and India within the framework of its greater ambitions, based on the regression of US influence and presence in oil-rich regions and in strategic routes towards them. There is US-Chinese consensus in many cases and there is today no clear enmity in bilateral relations, despite “belt-tightening” in the covert battle over who will monopolize the position of world superpower in a decade or two, and over what the positions of the other great powers will be in the wake of the outcome that will determine whether the position of “superpower” will go to China or remain with the United States. There is nothing between the United States and China that resembles the Cold War that was waged between the two superpowers before the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is instead a new kind of positioning, the features of which sometimes change with events, but which at the end of the day retains its strategic goals and nature. The phase of sorting matters out is always important, not only in terms of the positioning of the countries directly concerned but also in terms of the necessity for other countries to position themselves within the framework of the competition over the position of superpower or that of the decline of the unipolar phase in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar era. And this concerns Arab countries, particularly Gulf countries, because the issues of Iran, Yemen and the Middle East at this stage represent a vital step on the path of sorting matters out, because Israel is several steps ahead in the positioning process and actively seeks to advance further. US President Barack Obama, on the first anniversary next week of his historical inauguration as President, is not the same man who entered the White House a year ago with optimism and faith in his ability to change others. The language of political realism has begun to dominate the idealism which he carried with him and which made him a target on one hand for the Neoconservatives and, on the other, for the parties he imagined would respond favorably to him, such as Iran on the nuclear issue and Israel on the issue of the Middle East. It is still too early to issue a final verdict on the eventual success of Obama's strategy, based on the dual process of enticement with dialogue, measures and incentives, and of preparing measures of sanctioning and embargo in case enticement were to fail. What is clear is that the return of terrorism to the US scene – despite it being thwarted – has forced Obama to redouble his resolve to combat “violent extremism” – as he refers to terrorism – in regions like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and others, in order to prevent terrorism from reaching American cities. Clearly the intransigence of the regime in Iran over the nuclear issue and in repressing the reformists has forced Barack Obama to head to waging the battle of reinforcing sanctions against Iran sooner than he had intended and hoped. And clearly the events in Yemen have forced the new US President to reconsider his entire political ideology and what his place is within a permanent strategic US policy based on interests and superiority, one defined by the American “establishment”, which does not disappear or regress because of the temperament or the desires of any US President. A mere four months ago, from the podium of the UN General Assembly, Barack Obama launched a new US ideology, relying on a US policy based exclusively on group work, dialogue and engagement as a starting point for resolving international issues. The conclusion of what he said is that he informed China, Russia and the rest of the world that the United States relinquishes its ambitions of holding the position of the world's sole superpower, announcing – effectively and as a de facto situation – the failure of unipolarism. Thus Obama turned against the “ideology of preemption” adopted by his predecessor George W. Bush to strengthen the position of the US in the world on the basis of preventing China from competing with it for the monopoly of greatness, and on the basis of racing against and beating China and others for the control of oil sites and of the sources of power of the great powers on the strategic long term. This column detailed the meaning of what Obama said on September 25, 2009. China, the United States, Russia and the major European countries have cooperated within the framework of the Security Council and the 5+1 formation, i.e. the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, on the issue of Iran. They all agreed on giving the “carrot” the utmost priority and on keeping the “stick” away as much as possible. Barack Obama has nearly excluded – even if he has not entirely ruled out – the military option in dealing with Iran, while Moscow has pressured Tehran not to make Russia's task impossible as it buys time for Iran before having to participate in imposing further sanctions. China has, as usual, given the driver's seat on the Iranian issue to Russia, but has – in coordination with Russia – appeared every once in a while to incapacitate any American or European desire to strengthen sanctions. Indeed, China traditionally opposes the notion of sanctions and prefers not to participate in voting on resolutions to impose sanctions, and its mere abstention from voting has come to be viewed as positive, on the basis that it has not resorted to the veto to prevent the Security Council from adopting the resolution in question. Traditionally and as a matter of principle, it is not desirable for the permanent members of the Security Council to abstain from voting, because they are especially responsible for the world's peace and security and thus have the right of veto, and should therefore either vote yes or no. China, however, has considered its interest to require it not to commit to the “no” because abstention serves its long-term strategic goals. It thus seeks a record free, as much as possible, of “no's”, because its ambitions and its strategy are set down on the basis of decades, not years, from now. This week, when the 5+1 countries meet to once again discuss reinforcing sanctions against Iran, the Iranian issue will not be the only one present at the meeting. Rather, Afghanistan and Yemen will be present in the mind of China as well as of the other countries at the meeting. Most probably, China – and with it Russia – will attempt to delay and procrastinate on the issue of sanctions against Iran, especially as China hates and opposes the use of UN sanctions to influence internal developments in any country. It will certainly try to play this card on the issue of Iran, but, considering the frailty of its situation towards human rights and freedom of expression, and after Google has taken the tremendous decision of pulling out of China because the Chinese government is using Google to persist in preventing freedom of expression and political participation, China might “swallow” the Iranian “pill” to drive pressures away from itself. And because China, like Iran, is skilled at the game of political chess, it cooperates with Russia, NATO and the US in Afghanistan to divert attention away from violent extremism and the possibilities of it being exported. Indeed, China today is in a near-alliance with Russia, and Russia is in dire need of preventing the extremists from being victorious in Afghanistan and from exporting such a victory to extremist movements in the Muslim republics of Central Asia in Russia's backyard. Yemen is a different matter. Of course, China does not want Al-Qaeda to be victorious in Yemen and does not wish for the extremists among the Houthis to succeed in breaching Saudi sovereignty or to provoke a coup d'état against the Yemeni government. Yet China, when it comes to the Gulf of Aden and its importance as a gateway to the region of the Indian Ocean, thinks in terms of the central importance of its military marine presence in these highly important waters, and in terms of US unilateralism reflecting in military presence in this vital region. The issue exceeds being able to surround Iran through US military presence in Yemen, as it flows into the massive international strategic benefits of the United States, which come as a result of its control over the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca. China's interpretation of such superiority comes through the strategies concerned with the Indian Ocean and marine routes, which are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy – which in turn will represent the main pillar of China's superiority and of the possibility of it occupying in the future the position of superpower. China is today trying to build a superior naval force because it seeks to challenge the US's blatant superiority in the marine balance of power. India is allied to the United States, especially in opposing widespread Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus if the United States manages to control maritime routes in the Indian Ocean, it will be a clear message to China, saying: Barack Obama has understood the strategic language of the American establishment, based on permanently maintaining the superiority of US greatness and on not allowing the United States to slip away from its strong position in Asia. Experts on Asia speak of a strategy by India to reconcile Washington and Sri Lanka and to reach a new US policy based on working directly with Myanmar to prevent China from monopolizing control of the military rulers of Myanmar or Burma. The aim of this is to prevent China from implementing its intentions of using these two countries for new routes for itself towards the Middle East, the Gulf and Africa. These experts say that the United States, which does not want China to reach the waters of the Gulf through the region of Central Asia, has begun to pressure Pakistan into making a clear strategic choice between the United States and China. Such a choice is not easy for Pakistan's elite, because of the complications of its relationship with India on the one hand, and of the clear priority given to India by the United States on the other. What is unknown for many countries is the “Obamist Presidency”, which still seems to some to be the opposite of the “Bushist Presidency”, while it seems for others to be an American presidency that has been forced, like its predecessors, to speak the language of the American “establishment”, which speaks the language of interests and political realism. Clearly the Indian Ocean is highly important for the United States, China and India, as well as for Israel, which enjoys a strong relationship with both the United States and India. Similarly, the Gulf region is important for these four players and others for numerous and varied reasons. As for the Middle East, it is not important in the calculations of India and China, except in terms of the links between either of them and Israel, while it remains a region more important for Russia since the Cold War. Yet it is a main region for the United States, not just because of Israel, but also for historical and strategic reasons. China does not get engaged in the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and is not a member of the Quartet that includes the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations – and this by choice. Sudan is much more important for China, and it is an issue that concerns it directly for oil-related reasons. Yemen is also important for China for strategic reasons. The Arab states of the Gulf must necessarily try to position themselves as is in their interest within the current positioning formula, especially the US-Chinese formula, the Chinese-Russian formula and the US-Indian-Israeli formula. Israel is positioning itself at the level of intelligence in Yemen, making use of the absence of the state and of the ease of its breaching by violent Islamic extremism. It does this for numerous reasons, among them the strategic importance of Yemen within the formula of sorting out the positions of greatness in the coming decades, most prominently the United States and China.
