Egypt's new president Mohamed Morsi appears to have pulled off an accomplished political maneuver, which bodes well for his chances of introducing far-reaching economic and social changes to his country. He has fired General Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, for 20 years Mubarak's defense minister and until Morsi's election, the country's real ruler. He has also scrapped limitations that the military had imposed on the presidential role. When news of the president's coup broke, there was widespread concern, not simply among Morsi's supporters, that the military would strike back, plunging Egypt into dangerous political uncertainty. In the event, it seems clear that Morsi did not act without careful preparation and that the military perhaps have more political acumen than many credit them with. The president appears to have had direct and indirect talks with top commanders about what amounted, under the constitutional arrangements imposed by Tantawi, to a division of executive powers between the presidency and the military. Morsi's argument will have been that such a splitting of authority would be unworkable and lead to conflict and that it appeared too much as if the former military dominance of government was continuing which would not satisfy Egypt's international donors, not least the United States. Though they could keep the role of defense minister, the military had to get out of politics and Tantawi, as the symbol of past interference, had to go too. How much Tantawi knew about the talks which led to his replacement at the defense ministry by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, the former military intelligence chief, is a moot point. While it is possible his fellow generals tried successfully to keep him out of the loop, it seems more likely that Tantawi knew and perhaps even quietly approved of the changes, looking forward as he doubtless is, to a peaceful and well-heeled retirement. But the president has had to pay a price for his victory, as yet undisclosed, but almost certainly involving the maintenance of the military's privileges in society and their lucrative and wide-ranging business interests. The military-dominated National Defense Council, established two months ago by Tantawi, also stays. However, it is probable that when Egypt finally gains a properly-elected parliament, the role of the NDC will diminish significantly, if not disappear entirely. The president can now indeed, turn to the issue of parliament. He will doubtless be tempted to once more re-call the legislators who were elected between November and January, among whom his own party, the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as the strongest force. The Supreme Court however has ruled the elections unlawful because they were held under flawed legislation. Even if the judges' decision was inspired by Tantawi and the generals, it is imperative for the legitimacy of his own administration that President Morsi obeys the courts. Despite the risk that a second drawn-out election may see a reduction in the number of Muslim Brotherhood legislators, it must be held. Only with an unquestionable and solid, popular mandate for both parliament and the executive can Egypt be equipped to handle the substantial challenges that lies ahead.
