If you take a look at the Arab World through its interrelations, you will find it much different than its relations with who are out of its Arabic sphere. The word "relations" might not be accurate in giving a picture about the particularity of the outstanding status between it and its neighbors in terms of the conflicting disputes and the formation of parties, or the provision of boarder areas proficiency, in which specific feudal patterns, or attempt to create feuds have all failed in finding secret or secure mobilization place except of the openness of Lebanon, and, to some extents, Yemen. However, contemplating the reality of the influence imposed by none Arabic forces inside more than one Arab country, we will be surprised about the location where there are foreign influences, or at least, the attempt to influence as though they are arenas of competition with the other - which is rare – after the fall down of Communism, or interventions, or attempt of interventions, as though existence in the "arena" is open opportunity for competition, and also as if there are social incursion channels that allow for such existence. Let is avoid Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Algeria as the vision of what is going on in each has become clear, and what is more is that the survival of some seems to be dependent on the existence multiple divisions. Let us talk about Egypt which forms a core interest on the Arab level, either in terms of the efficiency of its army against any Israeli offence in case waged against any other Arab country, and then in terms of its demographical power, not to mention its geographical location, and its Arabic and international presence in the Palestinian case which nobody can deny. Once the protests were started and then centralized in Tahrir Square, it was intended not to establish for local conflicts by brining feudal slogans by every party of the conflict, which did not happen. It was also clear that the dialogue between the parties – the opponents with some differences in their opinions, and the government with regard to what is demanded from it, and to what it promised to achieve – did not transform into an opportunity to escalate, and then violation, but it was represented in viewpoints heading towards important advantages, and maybe if there was a military coup just as in some Arab countries, such advantages may have not been available. Generally, what is happening in Egypt, either in terms of the new formation of the government, the protesters in Tahrir Square, or the other parties, did not target the security of the Egyptian community, and never renounced objectivity, neither it banned the opportunity of displaying opinions. And despite the fact that the army has a strong particularity, there is also a particularity of awareness that ran the dialogues and the conflict in a way that leads to a public objective interest. As for the outside, and in addition to the fact that the Egyptian inter-dialogue led to satisfactory, and even highly significant results, we find that the external intervention attempts seem to be very strange. Obama has pacified his tune in the last few days, and Hillary Clinton stopped focusing on democracy in the last couple of days. But add to this the attempt to figure out the relationship of Ayatollah Al Khomeini (and in Alazhar there are a lot of Islamic Ayatollahs when strangely delivering its speech, to be then recited by the Sheikh of Lebanon Hassan Nasrallah, and after than to be strangely embraced by Aljazeera to bring to our memories that strange presence in the acts of Alhouthein in Yemen. What an Arab World is this! Egypt did not smile to either party.