Some regimes use the threat posed by Al Qaeda to make the world afraid of change, and remind everyone of the necessity of their presence, and also of the roles they can play. They have succeeded at this game for the past years. America and the Western countries have ignored some of these regimes' practices in exchange for the services they used to perform in the framework of what was known as the “war on terror”. With the start of the “Arab Spring”, the context and calculations have changed. It can be said that Al Qaeda is not at its top condition today. The broad and costly hunt against it has reduced its ability to strike resounding blows. Moreover, the Arab Spring events have uncovered its isolation and the fact that it does not represent the feelings of the crowds. Indeed, Al Qaeda was not an inspiration for the protesters in Tunisia or the Tahrir Square in Egypt. The pictures of its leaders were not raised in Benghazi or Sana'a. Al Qaeda was not mentioned in the slogans of protesters in Syria, and it received yet another blow, as the killing of Osama bin Laden was no simple event. It is true that killing him does not imply the end of the organization, but it is also true that the man represented a symbol, based on his person, his position, his allegiance, and his fame following the September 11 attacks. The pluralism, transparency, elections, and transfer of power demanded by young Arabs in the squares of change are in contradiction with Al Qaeda's principles. Al Qaeda loses when the battle of change is decided through national will, without the explosion of the internal structure and the fragmentation of the security institutions, and without a foreign, and more specifically Western, role in determining the battle's outcome. Indeed, Al Qaeda finds its opportunity in the great collapse of the State and its institutions and the participation of external and international parties in the determination of the struggle's outcome and in the ignition of sectarian sentiments. On the other hand, it loses when the Islamic trend forces taking part in the battle for change announce their preference for the establishment of a civil state that encompasses all of society's constituents. I write about Al Qaeda after the news yesterday that Al Qaeda and hardliner Islamists took over the Yemeni city of Zinjibar. The presence of Al Qaeda in Yemen is not new, and neither are its attempts to entrench itself in the Yemeni natural landscape, as well as the Yemeni demographic structure and its conflicts. This event is aggravated by the incidents taking place in Sana'a itself, and points to the possibility of the explosion of the Yemeni structure and the sliding into a civil war, along with the erosion of what remains from the presence of the State and its security institutions. It is obvious that the “Afghanization” of Yemen in part or in whole implies wars, interventions, and the export of terrorism. Collapse is Al Qaeda's ally, and political and security vacuum allows it to swim in the waters of crises. News of uprisings and protests obscure news from Iraq. However, what is taking place in Iraq is dangerous too: terrorist attacks are on the rise again; there are attempts to reignite sectarian tension; the already flaming sentiments are stirred up in Kirkuk; the Sadri trend's muscle-flexing in the streets is back under the guise of protesting against the extension of the US forces' stay. It is obvious that such a return of the trend and its militia actions will renew the fears of the Sunnis, some of whom whisper that the current State is the State of others. The picture is further darkened by the appearance of the Iraqi democracy as a sick experience, since prime minister Nuri al-Maliki has been unable for almost a year to appoint ministers for the security portfolios in his government. There is no doubt that the return of the crisis of the constituents will represent an opportunity for Al Qaeda to find again waters where it can stay and swim. The same fears can be expressed regarding Libya, not to mention the gravity of the current governmental vacuum in Lebanon, at a time when Syria is going through a wave of protests and clashes that heralds a lengthy crisis. The violation of the remaining foundations of the Lebanese State is worrisome. The essence of the governmental crisis is a relations crisis amongst the constituents, particularly Sunnis and Shias, despite the attempts to conceal it. Nothing until now points to a serious presence of Al Qaeda in Lebanon. However, sectarian tension and vacuum represent an opportunity for such groups. Certainly, there is a difference between the actual presence of Al Qaeda and an invented presence in order to be exploited. The most dangerous thing we can witness in the coming phase is the simultaneous presence of the earthquakes, i.e. the uprisings and protests, the explosion of some countries, the announcement of the failure of others, the export and import of fire. In such climates, Al Qaeda and other similar groups find opportunities to return to entrenchment here and there.
