In order for the Egyptian street revolution to overstep its first days, (whilst the dialogue and agreement on steps to overcome the rage), the mutual agreements between all parties should agree with the hopes of the young generation who led the revolution. The nature of the first phases implies that it is not easy to reach a census or national coalition to come out with an agreement upon which the decision of the level should be based. The risks come when every group or party thinks of taking over the victory to proceed on in the initiation of the agreement of the phase, as the public support to any of such organizations and measuring it in reality cannot be done without guaranteeing a legally and publically controlled election based on accurate precedents and calculations. In this revolution, it occurred that some front figures from the regime appeared to receive an agreement by the public opinion. After that, figures from the real regime came to make alternatives from unclear backgrounds. Then, the change cases in the state institutions and in others alternated including the restructure of the security and the military. This happened in Iran where arrests includes politicians and generals of which some contributed to the Shah regime and were involved in what was considered to be the crimes of the late regime. In Egypt, there are not interfaces. Even those who appear in the public scene are a mix of the government and the parties. The general impression is that they are all of elderly ages, and the process of integrating young men with them came as a response to the fact that they are the revolution makers. Therefore, there must be a new generation to take its position and role in the upcoming changes, especially that most of the Arabic systems are of old ages and thinking. This is evident is the fact the change is being slow, and if implemented, it won't reflect young traits as it would be brought by the second-in-line state people who have not decided their retirement by virtue of the age law. The differences in Egypt are not so big; the majority belongs to the rural bracket, state employees, companies, and a minority of capitalists. The case of the Muslim and Copts sects is not a phenomenon that would threaten security, but is, however, a case that belongs to an Arab reality that is politically bankrupt, and now is dragged to ideological and religious conflicts. Assessing Intentions and identifying objectives, including the lists of demands, were limited to the case of the constitutional vacuum by ending the rule of President Hosni Mubarak, whereas there are legal and human rights activists see the opposite because the authority was not literally committed to achieve that. This is the outstanding controversial issue between those who agree and those who disagree. Fears come from the fact that the system might benefit from this and prolong its age and renew it. Peoples rallying around in Tunisia and Egypt and in other places emphasizes their rejection to restricting nations thinkers, scientists, judges and its prominent figures in one individual, and most particularly those republics that jumped over the throne and inherited the political oppression and created packs of policemen and beneficiaries to act as the frame of the authority, and the alternation in place of the people. Nonetheless, resorting to people in the current times has not merely become an option, but is mandatory. And although Egypt's revolution rose without leadership figures, as we used to witness in its other revolutions, it is considered to be an unprecedented expression of presenting its young men to be the prominent figures that will outline their own plans and decide the future of their country based on freedom and democracy.
