Nothing resembles the mistake made by the Shah of Iran when he appointed Shahbanu Farah Diba as Regent to the throne like the mistake made by former Tunisian President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali the day he appointed his wife as regent to his wealth and power. Evidently, what the Cassette Revolution did in Iran, when the only way to inflame the zeal of the street was through Imam Khomeini's speeches, needed a longer period of time, in which modern communication media have overcome all limits. Yet President Zine El-Abidine's passion for computers made him design a virtual world, one which lacked any interaction with reality. Farah Diba's practices, or those of Leila Trabelsi, nearly sum up a large part of the blunders of rulers, as they do not concern themselves with what is happening in their nearest surroundings, while they should be taking a good look in the mirror. Indeed, the elites which the Shah of Iran imagined, in his eclectic wager on modernization, would be loyal to him are the same ones who invaded the streets of Tehran, waiting for Khomeini's return. And the Shah never understood at all how the women he had promised freedom and equality to were content after he left to cover themselves in chadors. It does not seem as perplexing for Zine El-Abidine to realize how Tunisia's educated elites turned against him, with their women, men and young people. Indeed, unemployment exists everywhere in the world, yet in the case of Tunisia it turned into a matchstick that set the Carthage Palace on fire. And just as the Shah did not pay heed to the fact that the Imam secluded in France could shake the earth beneath his feet, Zine El-Abidine did not think for a moment that an obscure young man who set himself on fire could mark the beginning of the end of his regime. The source of the problem in the Tunisian experience is that the vacuum on the political scene and at the level of state institutions, which Ben Ali thought could keep him out of danger's grasp, is what has given shape to a popular uprising of a spontaneous nature. And inasmuch as such an uprising needed the presence of centralized leadership, it was able to break out of the usual mold and to create such an unprecedented event – and that is because its strength continued to reside in the spontaneity that brought together large segments of a society that had grown tired of waiting. Even more bitter than the way in which he toppled his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, when he became afflicted with old age, was the way Ben Ali had to leave. Perhaps the difference is that the first time he was the Minister of Defense confronting a dying regime, while he left the Carthage Palace before he could even move the tanks that lined the sides of the inflamed street. It does not matter what scenarios were laid out to bring him out or what deal drove him to face the facts, what matters is that a new phase has begun in the life of Tunisia, one that contradicts all that had been predicted. The characteristic of “President for life” is no longer viable, just as the one hundred percent referendums that tend to sanctify rulers remain deceiving and false, as one finds oneself faced with the anger of the same people who were celebrating one's name and chanting hymns of praise in one's presence. All of this is mere trickery, covered with makeup that quickly fades away with a whiff of wind that moves the street. Tunisia without Ben Ali is better than Tunisia with Ben Ali. The angry street repeated this many times. The President alone, submerged in his seclusion, was not listening to the momentum of the events, as he would only take notice of the street once when seeking to renew his mandate. Then it would be alright for him to have a competitor, like the mechanical rabbit of dog races, to suggest some form of conflict. Yet conflict is at its core never complete without a real opposing voice. The distinctive feature of democracy does not reside only in the methodology of peaceful alternation of power. Rather, it takes a pyramidal shape made up of the formula of opposition and loyalists, while its base represents widened participation in decision-making. This means nothing more than consecrating the principle of oversight that protects public funds, gives life to the state of institutions, and achieves a kind of political satiation which makes the street endure the fruits of democracy, having become its own master and that of its own decision-making. The problem with Ben Ali's regime, and with some other regimes, is that it hates opposition, because it imagines it to contradict its own existence and its own power. And when opposition voices committed to legitimate work are silenced, this gives way to an opposition that is much more fierce and destructive. It is the opposition of the people of Tunisia, which has come out to face the dictator with bravery that has toppled the regime, while awaiting the start of a new chapter of sought-after constructive change.
