When Ban-Ki Moon expressed his apprehension vis-à-vis the current tension between Morocco and the Polisario Front saying that the reason has to do with the position toward the moves of the activists, this alluded directly to the dangers threatening the future of the negotiations over the Sahara. This is not only because these repercussions influence the course of the anticipated solution, but also because they increase the obstacles that block the vision of the light at the end of the tunnel. The Secretary General of the United Nations might have wanted to generalize apprehension in order to make the sides in question feel that the choice of direct negotiations is the last available opportunity to end a long term conflict. It might also be a message that prompts quick actions to contain tension that might dramatically deteriorate, while the situation of the region does not withstand stagnancy that is threatened by chaos. But certainly, the attempts to get rid of the complex of negotiations are not a solution. All the facts that appeared through the direct and indirect negotiation rounds led to a key question: What are we negotiating over? Morocco does not want an alternative for the proposal of the broad autonomy with specifications secured by the international law. The Polisario Front puts forth the same proposal in the framework of other choices that do not rule out the independence of the province or its complete accession to Morocco. In addition to that, contradictory concepts on the principle of self-determination dominate the ongoing political and legal debate. Everything compelled the UN Security Council to adopt the "political solution" as a title for the efforts extends to end the conflict. It could have been able to determine the framework of negotiations in a way that involves more clarity and commitment, but it preferred the required solution to be agreed upon by all sides in question, a solution that includes the principles and work mechanisms secured by the Unite Nations. This methodology sought in the first place not to impose any solution that does not enjoy regional consensus in order to secure a minimum level of commitment so as to free the entire region from the complex of the Sahara. The role of the international mediators who successively managed the file did not go beyond bringing the divergent points of views closer, and removing doubts over the feasibility of the solution proposals that were put on the table at any time for implementation without squandering the legitimate rights. Perhaps only US mediator James Baker breached the rule and put forth open alternatives, of which nothing remained but the suggestion of autonomy. Baker crystallized the first features of this proposal before he ran out of patience and resigned. But what helps his US successor Christopher Ross is that he proposes alternatives that have a nominal aspect, rather than an essential one, in order to implement a temporary goal under the umbrella or resuming negotiations and not more, as long as the mere convention of new sessions will reveal for him the controversial issues. Just as he was able to group the sides in limited and unofficial talks in Vienna, new obstacles appeared in his way and this requires from him to over come them. While Ban Ki-Moon realized that the new tenure of the Minurso [UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara] is drifting away without any progress, he was aware of the fact that the current predicament lies in the field and not on the table of negotiations. Perhaps he is hereby reiterating that negotiations should be most importantly accompanied by good intentions and should lack preconditions. There are many hidden facts between the content of these conditions in summer 2007 – when the Manhattan negotiations kicked off and whose ceiling was restrained to adopting the political solution as a settlement accepted by all sides – and between the details of some temporary conditions for the mere return to the table of negotiations. The first of these facts is that the negotiations are not a goal by themselves, and they should not be depicted as exercises in public relations to end avoid blame. In the event that the parties were unable to reach an agreement over going to negotiations, it will be very difficult for the United Nations to achieve what others failed to, even though it gave them every opportunity to make difficult decisions without any pressures. In exchange of the idea of canceling any preconditions, the United Nations prevented itself from exercising any foreign pressures, out of conviction that the agreement over a solution that takes into account the interests of the region's countries and leads their relations to greater horizons in abiding by international legitimacy is better than resorting to ready-made solutions.
