The crisis of the Lebanese cabinet formation revealed that the right to obstruct has become consolidated in the internal equation, when the parliamentary balance of powers is in favor of the current majority, regardless of the demands and details related to the formation. I hereby mean that when the crisis of the political regime is raised, the current majority cannot rule, and the country faces an open crisis…one that cannot be solved unless this majority abandons its right to rule and gives it to the majority. It can definitely be said that this crisis would not exist if the current minority had won the recent elections. There are two aspects to the crisis: A political and a constitutional one. As for the political part, the prime minister who was designated for the second time and who is still grappling with the parliamentary blocs, both the opponents and the allies, announced that he seeks to form a lineup that reflects the national unity, i.e. a commitment to the so-called constants regarding the issues of resistance, naturalization, and the inter-Arab relations. But all this was not enough to grant him the government's trust. The implicit factor behind all the contradictions and complications is still the Special Tribunal that will try the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri, the father of the prime minister-designate, and of other assassinations affiliated to this crime. Sa'd al-Hariri cannot accept the reservations put on the tribunal, and the way of dealing with its progress, knowing that this issue triggered the previous crisis and made the current minority boycott the government of Fuad Siniora. As far as the constitutional part is concerned, the prime minister-designate – regardless of his name – is unable to form a constitutional cabinet without a considerable Shiite representation, one that is monopolized by "Hezbollah" and the "Amal" Movement. As such, the right of obstruction has become a reality which no one can overlook, putting everyone before a constitutional dilemma and the Shiite representation. Indeed, the impasse is growing deeper, and the country might slip into security confrontations if a monochromatic government was formed from the majority alone. The President of the Republic will not sign the decree of such a government, although he did not sign the previous decree of a lineup put forth by Al-Hariri before his step-down, only because the minority rejected the distribution of the portfolios in this lineup, and in order to avoid an open regime crisis. Wagering on forming a cabinet headed by Al-Hariri is contingent on the ability to find a solution to this double predicament, and this is still unlikely. The 15-10-5 formula which was proposed to cover the blocking third and save the first designation was useless. The only thing left is a lineup to save the appearances, which the Lebanese political mantle believes or hopes to see, as a result of the regional developments and the progress of the Saudi-Syrian relations. Even if we overlooked the naivety of the belief that the Saudi-Syrian dialogue automatically influences the Lebanese cabinet formation, any new lineup will only be aimed at making lost time go by, before the results of the Syrian-American dialogue, the Iranian-Western dialogue, the Egyptian sponsorship of the Palestinian reconciliation, and the US efforts to launch the peace process appear. Thus, the solutions to the crisis in Lebanon fluctuate between a temporary lineup to make lost time go by, and between tensions and explosions. Each domestic party believes that the need to protect the international situation requires that the others abandon their policies and join and support its positions, i.e. they have to cancel themselves and the political diversity. Since this situation is impossible, it becomes difficult to protect the internal situation by an agreement among the domestic parties, and their hope remains hinged on foreign interference to soft-pedal the positions of their opponents. It is a dilemma that prolongs the crisis, as long as it rules out the comprehensive deal that touches on all the thorny regional issues, and as long as Lebanon is still the viable arena for exchanging messages among regional negotiators.
