When National Security Advisor Susan Rice announces that the American administration cannot be consumed 24/7 by one region, i.e. the Middle East, she is reiterating the main headlines of the defense policy laid out by President Barack Obama at the beginning of last year. This policy had given priority to the military and security challenges in the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia in general, without it meaning a total relinquishing of or withdrawal from the Arab world and its surrounding. This position is much similar to that of President George Bush Jr. when he succeeded to his predecessor Bill Clinton, who failed to ensure a settlement for the Palestinian cause despite the ongoing efforts deployed by his administration. Back then, Bush announced his administration's disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a position that provoked concerns among his European partners over America's introversion. However, his inward tendency was soon dissipated by the "invasions" of Washington and New York and what followed it. The retreating interest of President Barack Obama's administration in the Middle East region, whose crises have multiplied, not only alarms the Arab allies, but also alarms and confuses the European partners. But this retreat should not come as a surprise, considering that the recent conclusions reached by officials at the Department of State and the National Security Council were a mere reviewing of the defense policy put forward by the president at the beginning of last year. Hence, saying that Obama does not wish to wage a new war in the region is not new, as he wants to remain faithful to the slogans which led him to the White House. He promised his voters to end the wars launched by his predecessor and liquidate the inheritance that exhausted Pentagon and the Treasury and caused the fall of thousands of soldiers. However, this American pullout from the region's crises is not only due to the wish of Obama's administration to tend to the domestic arena and the more urgent strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Indeed, there are circumstances and facts for which the people of the region – who facilitated this withdrawal – are partly to blame. Early on, and at the beginning of his first mandate, the American president expressed his inability to activate the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Today, he is re-launching the experience and has assigned his Secretary of State John Kerry to handle this task, at a time when there is nothing on the horizon revealing the accomplishment of the desired goals. This is due to the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu, who is already a hardliner, is restricted by his governmental structure which forces him to please his partners in the far-right and the ultra-religious parties at the level of any critical decision. It is also due to the fact that Mahmoud Abbas, who used to rely on an Arab position granting him the minimum level of cover and support, is now benefitting from a cover that is filled with holes and supporters who require support. This is not to mention the impossible reconciliation between the authority and Hamas, i.e. between the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, a lot could be said about the United States' disappointment with the Arab spring, as it was surprised by the winds that suddenly swept a number of Arab states. At first, it tried to get involved from afar, supported the wish to induce change, and tried to reconsider its network of relations and interests. For some time, it was seduced by the idea of a "Sunni-Muslim Brotherhood project" that would help it confront the "Shiite Crescent," but soon discovered the futility of any wager on the Islamists and the other forces of change. Indeed, the action could not fill the vacuum created by the fall of the former military regimes, while the division that affected this action's forces, sects, ethnicities, regional powers, and tribes made it impossible for them to agree over a governance project that could be dealt with. In this context, Libya is moving backward, i.e. prior to the establishment of unity between its three provinces mid last century. What is worse is that each of these provinces is almost being divided into quasi-independent units governed by an organization, a militia, or a tribe. For its part, Tunisia is struggling to avoid sliding towards the Egyptian experience, at a time when the extremist powers there are exercising mobile violence. Egypt on the other hand has a long way to go before reaching stability, and the Egyptians might discover – sooner or later – that they must reconcile and offer sacrifices and concessions, because it would be impossible to annul this or that side. In addition, the financial aid offered by the Gulf to Cairo will not constitute a permanent solution, and the national economic wheel should be activated as soon as possible. Yemen is heading down the same path as Iraq, with a reconciliation conference witnessing the conflicting interests of the Houthis and the Southern Hirak, which seem to be moving whenever there is an Iranian need to activate some cards! Syria is heading down the same path as Somalia, amid excessive hopes placed in the Geneva 2 conference, which – whether or not it is held and whether the transitional committee is formed with or without a role by President Bashar al-Assad – is unlikely to ensure the formation of a government or a rule capable of imposing its control over the country in the near future. What is happening on the ground eliminates the chances of seeing a political settlement, as the regime is trying hard to control Damascus prior to the Geneva conference, knowing it would be enough for it to link the capital to Aleppo and its Rif to secure the coastal strip. Moreover, it might not hesitate to clean the path leading towards the Lebanese Bekaa and North, and even conduct – if necessary – surgical operations targeting Lebanese Sunni blocs whose luck will not be better than that of Al-Qalamoun, Al-Qusayr and Homs, among others. As for the remaining parts of the country, they would be left to be pillaged by the forces of extremism, which are threatening the neighbors as much as they are threatening Damascus! There is no need to go over what Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are enduring to the beat of the Syrian crisis. For their part, the other Arab countries are aimlessly trying to mend the Arab structure that has lost its most important pillars, from Egypt to Syria and Iraq. And while it appeared for a while that a bloc including key Arab powers and Turkey is being formed to compensate for the momentum lost by the Arabs in the face of the winds of change and the aspirations – especially in the Levant – the hopes soon dissipated after the Egyptian army toppled the Muslim Brotherhood regime and its President Mohamed Morsi, causing Ankara to suffer from a dual setback. Hence, its openness policy in the region collapsed, along with the dreams of seeing the settlement of the Kurdish cause and the domestic reform action. Consequently, the Justice and Development party is now trying to mend some of its ties with Iraq and Iran, both of which also need such mending. At this level, there is no need to tackle the details of the problems endured by Iran's economy – which is trying to open a gap in the American blockade – and the fateful challenges faced by Nouri al-Maliki's government. This is the picture seen by President Obama's administration when it looks at the map of the Middle East, and it does not encourage it to become involved in building a new strategy for a volatile region, in which there is no constancy, no combining regional vision, and no Arab project that could be dealt with or capitalized on. Is this not a good enough reason for it to turn towards a more vital region for its strategic interests? In light of all the drastic changes witnessed in the Middle East – that is sick once again – it can abandon the region while reassured by the fact that the vacuum it will leave behind will be impossible to fill by whichever regional power. In addition to this map of complicated and shifting Middle Eastern transformations that toppled all the previous calculations and strategies, critical international developments saw the light in the last few years, from the ongoing Chinese progress on the international scene to President Vladimir Putin's return to Kremlin, thus contributing to the reconsideration of the strategic lines among the superpowers after it was said for two decades that they collapsed with the collapse of the Eastern bloc. In the new international map, Europe is no longer the arena which always constituted a heated friction line between the two giants and the theater prone to witness the first clash. It is enough that this Old Continent saw its bonds of unity tightened and that Russian economy became part of its economic space. Hence, the friction lines moved to other parts of the world. The Middle East remained the object of American interest, at least at the level of Israeli's security and oil security. However, it fell behind the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and even the Dark Continent where the competition between the major actors was at its fiercest. This was accompanied by Moscow's efforts to revive its past as a superpower, although it does not have the necessary requirements to compete with America or even with China as an equal. This happened at a time when the United States no longer wishes to lead the world alone or engage in additional wars as much as it wants to end the repercussions of President George Bush's wars, but also at a time when other regional powers have emerged and are trying to have a say in determining the framework of international order and in defusing its crises. Based on these international transformations, President Obama's administration is going back to old diplomacy, i.e. seeking understandings over the management of the crises and wars with the active or involved powers (the best example for that being the ongoing war in Syria). As in the days of the Cold War, the purpose of this approach is to contain the flames and avoid threatening international peace and stability firstly, and protecting national interests and the system of relations and alliances secondly, until the circumstances are ripe for a permanent settlement. This is why Washington rushed to meet Moscow halfway at the level of the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal, without any regard for the continuation of the war or the damages it caused at the level of its relations with its allies, from London to Paris, Istanbul and Riyadh, going through the Syrian opposition. Hence the reproaches which surrounded that step, considering that it could have negotiated more to earn further concessions from the Syrian regime. In light of this reality, do the Syrians expect a lot from Geneva 2? Does the opposition, which is coming under an Arab cover and with a new negotiations policy based on the non-relinquishing of the targets and the blood, expect real change in Washington's policy? It would be fine for it to deal with the position issued by Secretary of State John Kerry in London recently regarding the fate of President Al-Assad, which is yet another test for the seriousness of Obama's administration and the extent reached by its disengagement in the region. But what about the remaining players in Syria's decisive conflict that will determine the winners and the losers in drawing up the map of the new Middle East, as well as the side which will have the final say at the level of the region's affairs?
