The ongoing investigations into the two blood-spattered bombings that recently targeted the city of Tripoli in North Lebanon have revealed what all Lebanese already knew about the fact that Syrian intelligence services still have much influence in this country, in addition to supporters and agents to carry out their wishes, even if these were to result in civil strife. Indeed, being an agent for them represents a sectarian and political choice, before being mercenary work. Most of the Lebanese consider, and rightly so, that the situation in their own country is connected, to the point of stifling association, to the situation in Syria. They also consider that their suffering from the nature of the regime in Damascus did not begin when the Syrian army marched into Lebanon in the mid-1970s nor end with its withdrawal from the country a few years ago, after decades of hegemony and direct supervision of Lebanon's affairs, great and small – including its Civil War, which the Syrian regime managed successfully for fifteen years, and in which its interests met with those of the Americans and Israelis. They are convinced that if Assad comes close to losing the war against his own people, he will take revenge on Lebanon; if he wins, he will take revenge on Lebanon; if the situation remains suspended, Lebanon will pay the price in its stability; if he is driven to leave, Lebanon will bear the burden of his clinging to power; and if the odds favor his remaining in place, Lebanon will pay the bill for the international settlement to keep him there. The Lebanese today, much more so than their counterparts in other countries neighboring Syria, are feeling the impact of the growing humanitarian crisis in that country, and are suffering from its repercussions at every level. But what worries them is the political backdrop that governs the arrival of Syrian refugees in large numbers, despite complaints by the Lebanese state, in a non-politicized assessment, regarding the inability of its institutions to meet the needs of caring for them. Indeed, both the regime and most of the opposition in Syria equally base themselves on the assumption that Lebanon "belongs to us", "is our concern" and "can bear the burden of our civil war" because that is "its duty". They thus do nothing that could reduce the human influx that exceeds its capacities, nor do they acknowledge its right to take any measures to stem the flood of migration, as Turkey and Jordan have in order to preserve their interests. For the Lebanese, regime change in Damascus would not necessarily mean spearing them the excess "brotherliness", which could overwhelm them this time in a process of settling accounts that finds its justification in Hezbollah's crude interference in the Syrian infighting. It is as if the smaller neighbor was fated to remain exposed to the ebb and flow of the Syrian tide, without anyone taking into account its independence and its sovereignty, which have never been truly achieved ever since they were verbally declared seventy years ago. Adding to the absurdity of this situation is the fact that the Lebanese, with their various sects, political parties, regions and families, are divided about everything, especially when it comes to relations with Syria. This prevents them from agreeing even on basic national principles recognized in any country, and leaves the door wide open to foreign interference and discretion, without any possibility of deliverance in the near future. It is a kind of forced "pairing" with which there is no use for internationally recognized borders, laws, or treaties. It will remain in effect until the notion of Lebanon's neutrality triumphs among the Lebanese first, before the Syrians become "convinced" of it later – and as long as there are among the officials and the citizens of these two countries those who still consider Lebanon's independence to represent a "colonial legacy", as well as those who believe in the slogan "Syria first" and work towards it.
