By selecting Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa to lead the interim period in his country, the Arab countries are trying to induce a coup against the Syrian regime from within the regime itself. In other terms, the president is to depart while the regime maintains its security, military, and political bases and has the opportunity to take part in the planning for the new presumed phase. This could be seen as the perfect solution from the point of view of any regime that feels it is about to collapse and whose interest is to rescue whatever can be rescued and to grab onto any chance to survive. But, does the regime of President Bashar al-Assad feel this way? Does it feel that there is a chance for it to survive away from the rule of the family, the name of which has been intrinsically connected to the state (Al-Assad's Syria) for more than four decades now? The Syrian regime's “conspiracy” theory does not allow for considering that the regime is about to see its last days or months. On the contrary, it feels that the “conspiracy” is the one that is going through its last phases. This was apparent through the words of the Syrian president at the Umayyad Square two weeks ago. Faced with such a situation, it is hard to convince the regime that maintaining a part is better than losing the entire thing. The regime still feels that it is capable of grasping the initiative after the defeat of the “conspirers.” This concerns one aspect. As for the organization of the interim phase as suggested by the League – i.e. the phase during which Al-Assad is to remain a figurehead while Farouq al-Sharaa will have “full prerogatives” according to the League's statement – this is an attempt at tricking the Syrian regime. The League is playing this trick but the regime will not swallow it easily due to several reasons. First, no alternative, whether it is Al-Sharaa or anyone else, can bear the cost of proceeding in this coup and agreeing on it. Second, because the obvious sectarian symbolism in suggesting the transfer of power in this manner threatens of a real civil war in Syria, one that stems from the current events that are currently taking place in the Syrian cities. In this case, the coup against Bashar al-Assad will not only take the aspect of an attempt at reform; the headline that will be brandished by the Syrian leadership against this coup will be a sectarian one. This leadership will divide Syria into clear vertical columns under this headline. It is hard to assume that the Arab ministers, who have suggested this kind of solution, were not aware of the immediate reaction that will face their suggestion from the part of the Damascus regime. Since Damascus was unable to reveal the real reasons for the rejection, as exposed above, it could do nothing but flaunt the pretext of “interference into the domestic affairs” in the face of the Arab decision. However, Damascus knows or should have known that this pretext had fell, first when Damascus itself agreed on the presence of Arab observers on its lands in order to monitor its behavior vis-à-vis its citizens; and also because Damascus had been an “interfering” party, in every sense of the word, in the affairs of its Lebanese neighbor for long years by appointing presidents, renewing their terms, and sacking them whenever it wants under the same Arab and international cover that it is currently complaining about. In addition, Syria has constantly interfered in the Palestinian affairs from the days of Yasser Arafat until today under the slogan of the nationalistic responsibility born by Syria in this cause, which almost reached the extent of questioning the loyalty of the Palestinian leaders and doubting their ability to lead their cause. But all this does not mean that the Arab coup against Al-Assad will have a better chance at succeeding than the other offers that tried to settle the Syrian crisis. Indeed, Damascus is relying on that the Arab decision lacks the necessary momentum to be implemented. As for the alternative for the international interference, this is still unknown as long as the necessary price has not been paid to the “reluctant ones” around the table of the Security Council.
