Since the Muslim Brotherhood has chosen to keep moving on the path it has chosen for itself until the very end, it is only natural for it to seek to thwart the efforts of the interim government in Egypt. In fact, it is expected for its members and supporters to persist in their methods in order to thwart the efforts of any government that might come in the future, as long as they remain outside the political scene, where they had once been the main player. On the other hand, it should be evident for the government of Doctor Hazem Al-Beblawi to work to achieve the greatest possible extent of success in the issues it has been entrusted with. This is not just regarding the implementation of the clauses of the political roadmap, from ratifying the constitution to holding parliamentary and presidential elections, in the best way possible and with the utmost transparency and integrity. It is also in terms of managing the country's affairs, dealing with people's daily life issues, and laying the foundations for solutions to the problems the people suffer from – problems that have only increased as a result of the Revolution, which was supposed to have erupted in protest against problems of all different kinds and the impact they were having – rather than working to make them worse and to increase their burden on people. Although different positions have been taken, the situation in Egypt has made some things seem similar between complete opposites, making one reach the conclusion that the Revolution had exposed the true qualities of some, or that it had gauged the Egyptian political elite across the spectrum in a non-political manner, being instead connected to issues of ability, skill, and capability. When one asks what the connection is between the Muslim Brotherhood's rule of Egypt and Doctor Beblawi's government, a close observer of the situation in Egypt discovers that the most important result of the experience of the Brotherhood in power has been to show that the activity and practices, and perhaps even the pain and suffering, of opposition work is one thing, and the ability to manage the affairs of power is quite another. Some of the ministers in Beblawi's government are from among the stars of both the revolutions of January 25 and June 30, who had fought and opposed Mubarak's rule, engaged in clashes with the Military Council, and then confronted the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilized the street. Yet they underwent a transformation when they became ministers, and began to work within the state's administrative framework and exercise government functions, as if they had become different people. Thus, having become mere wheels in the machinery of Egyptian bureaucracy, people's impressions of them have changed and the mental image people have of them has turned from one of militants to one of government employees. It is the same theory football enthusiasts talk about when they make the distinction between local and international football players – as illustrated when a football player displays some talent and distinguishes himself in local championships, but then, after joining his country's national team and participating in international competitions of high-level football, proves to have limited abilities and mediocre talent... Of course, the issue follows different standards for the Muslim Brotherhood, as its members believe that the support of the Guidance Bureau and the mobilization of the group's capabilities behind the President or a certain official are sure to compensate for the latter's weakness, limited skill, or inadequacy for the post. Such a theory has as a matter of fact proven to be a complete failure during the year of Muslim Brotherhood rule over Egypt. But it must not be the same with Beblawi's government, not just because it is non-ideological and because its members have pledged loyalty to no one but the people, neither a President nor a Supreme Guide, but also because government positions after two revolutions should not at all continue to represent opportunities to satisfy certain sides, contain certain political parties, or reward certain people for supporting the Revolution! Yes, circumstances can interfere and influence results, but what matters is for people in executive positions to be qualified to occupy such positions in the first place. Indeed, those who have gained celebrity from performing well at demonstrations and protests are not always qualified to draw up plans and strategies and find mechanisms to implement them. They may not even have the ability to deal with administrative or executive work. Of course, there are those who gauge the performance of Beblawi's government by the Prime Minister's political stance. Thus, if they are opposed to the Islamist movement, they consider it too lenient in confronting the Muslim Brotherhood. If, on the other hand, they are more westernized or have missed the train of joining the government, they then call it an exclusionist government that is making use of excessive violence against that same Brotherhood. And while there is no question that the circumstances under which Beblawi and the members of his cabinet are working are difficult, they have all made the task even more difficult for themselves by having formed the government according to the shares held by political forces opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than according to the capabilities of its members and their adequacy for the tasks they are supposed to assume. After revolutions, countries need qualifications, not trivialities.
