In their difficult moments, the Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iraqis send calls of distress from the injustice of their kinfolk or foreign enemies, howling "we were let down by the Arabs and Muslims." In addition, the denunciation of Arab inaction began to have writers, commentators, and poets, all contributing to an entire industry promoting the claim that the current Arab condition and regimes were responsible for the deterioration of the situation throughout the nation and its overpowering – along with its weak populations – by its enemies and tyrants. However, looking into these sayings with a little insight leads to conclusions which might be completely different, i.e. closer to calls for the generalization of the inaction that is the object of the complain, as being one of the best formulas for inter-Arab relationships. In reality, none of the "let down" populations carried out their uprisings, revolutions or civil wars to please the Arab and Muslim brothers. Indeed, each event witnessed in the region firstly had its domestic reasons and necessities, related to the interests of the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Yemenis, and others. And seeing the Arabs respond to the call to support the Syrian revolution for example, based on the conditions set by the opposition, is as unlikely as seeing rain in the Empty Quarter. This is due to the fact that the revolution represented - at its core – everything that is rejected by the Arab governments capable of offering the type of aid that is wanted by the Syrian opposition. This means an aid exceeding the provision of food and medicine and reaching the level of performing a political and military role in support of the revolution, provided that no interference is seen at the level of its course and that these governments retreat after offering their aid, as though it were some sort of political and military charitable work that has no other purpose. This insistence on urging the Arabs to offer the aforementioned type of aid is astonishing, considering that the conditions of this call are similar to the assistance offered by Abu Mu'tasim the Abbasid to a woman from Amorium during the ninth century. In other words, the intervention should be based on gallantry, magnanimity and chivalry – as mentioned by Abu Tammam in his poem – without any consideration for obvious interests and political and strategic revenue. As for the real Arab aid in modern history, it is closer to a disaster, from the wars of Mohammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, to Saddam Hussein's rescuing of the Kuwaiti population (as per the Baathist account of Saddam's occupation of the neighboring state), going through the intervention of the Egyptian troops in Yemen in the sixties and the Syrian presence in Lebanon throughout thirty years. This is not to mention the series of cold Arab wars and divisions into fighting axes. Hence, the condemnation of Arab inaction appears to be the product of fake awareness, based on the whimsical and fictive interpretation of inter-Arab relations in a way going against the simplest definitions of foreign policy, even for states that have not yet achieved their full national potential in terms of institutions, laws and constitutions, as is the case in our Arab countries. This whimsical vision features similarities with a wider and older practice, that of evading responsibility and blaming the imperialistic West and international Zionism for our tragedies, from civil wars to technical and educational backwardness, while refusing to recognize our failure to confront these problems. Consequently, the evasion of the urgent tasks (such as the unification of the Syrian opposition or the ending of Palestinian division) is blamed on Arab inaction, which one can say is far better than any Arab intervention in the affairs of the afflicted brothers throughout history. Although the blaming of others for our calamities is an old practice, and although this saying has spread and become prominent in the Arab cultural and media space, one must confirm that assuming national political responsibility is much more useful than seeking a Mu'tasim to achieve the "ultimate conquest" then return to Samarra satisfied.
