Egyptian authorities are dealing with the attempted assassination of the Interior Minister as the start of a new phase of confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood. The failed attempt may very well represent not just a motive for authorities to reinforce security measures and broaden the state of emergency that they imposed, in order to confront the terrorism that which begun to strike at the heart of the capital. It may also be a tempting reason to besiege the Brotherhood and its allies, reaching up to a decision to ban them from engaging in political activity. The authorities are in no need of security-based pretexts in this direction, after the violence witnessed during the MB's protests in many cities came accompanied by terrorism from armed groups in the Sinai. This is such that the link has become firmly established, at least in the Egyptian media, between the two phenomena, placing the Brotherhood, together with radical Islamist groups and armed terrorist groups in the same position. Such a link greatly facilitates, for the Egyptian authorities, their confrontation of the opposition to the interim government and the political roadmap it has laid out, staged by the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, after it has become impossible to demand the return of Mohamed Morsi to power. In Egypt, many of the new government supporters are trying their best to unmask the violent core of the Muslim Brotherhood and the other groups issued from it. This has been the case since the time it was founded, and through many experiences under both the monarchy and the republic, reaching up to the present situation. These point out that, throughout all of those phases, the Brotherhood has had a special unit to carry out acts of violence, aimed at those in power and political opponents. Also, there were no traces of conviction in the statements issued by the group's leadership, to deny any connection to violence and to groups that engage in it, and to assert its adherence to peaceful methods and religious preaching in its activity. Just as in every previous phase, it seems that there was no political impact at all from the denial, by Muslim Brotherhood leaders, of any connection to the attempted assassination of the Interior Minister, and the condemnation of the incident. As a matter of fact, the failed attempt and the subsequent denial have both provided the opportunity for a broad campaign against the Brotherhood, its history and its connection to groups or organizations that declare having adopted violence and terrorism as a method for political activity. The Brotherhood is thus currently facing one of the most difficult phases of its history, even exceeding, in its difficulty, the phase of confrontation with late President Gamal Abdel Nasser. When clashing the authorities in power in previous phases, The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood used to be confronted with the choice of either going to prison, or fleeing the country and seeking asylum abroad. In either case, it would not have had to radically reconsider its own ideology and activity. However, it is being confronted today with a fateful choice, which concerns its future as a political group integral to the national fabric of Egyptian society, or an organization that has chosen violence and the means of taking advantage of chaos at the security level and of the political predicament of those in power, in order to impose itself on the fabric of society. So far, it is clear that the current leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is still under the shock of having been expelled from power, and having had its political plans forcibly brought to an end. It thus seems unable to realize the significance of the broad popular opposition it faced when it was in power, as well as the significance of the Egyptian majority's desire to restore calm and return to a normal life. It also seems that this leadership is unable to fathom its own mistakes, and is in fact deepening the repercussions of these mistakes, by considering that the continuation of protests and opposition is the only way for it to return to power, or at the very least to participate in it. It thus sinks deeper and deeper into being associated with violence and terrorist activity, driving itself further away from the national political fabric and placing itself in the same category as radical and terrorist organizations. Of course, a situation such as this places Egypt before a very difficult future, and perhaps even a civil war, the signs of which are gathering in the Brotherhood's insistence on holding violent protests in the streets. Yet at the same time, it makes it nearly impossible to repeat the experience, in which a member of the Muslim Brotherhood reaches presidency through democratic elections. This predicament faced by the Muslim Brotherhood will persist, as long as its current leadership persists in its methods and in its understanding of the current phase, and as long as it does not take the step of reexamining the group's entire experience in all transparency, of reforming itself from within on democratic bases, of reconsidering its political plans on the basis of peaceful and overt activity, and of rejecting all forms of violence and coercion.
