Competing on the Egyptian political scene are the predicament of the Brotherhood in power and the oddity of the forces supporting it; and in such competition transpire the roots of the problem. Indeed, the President was elected by the people and is supposed to be everyone's President, who is above everyone, listens to everyone and abides by the common grounds of interests and demands called for by everyone. Yet he has, in reality, quickly used up this popular representation entrusted him, and has returned to represent the group he is affiliated to, the Muslim Brotherhood, and to express the views of this particular faction, under the banner of its Supreme Guide and its Shura Council. And in addition to the same experience being repeated, ever since the presidential elections, such a reality once again transpires in the stance taken by the Brotherhood on dialogue with opposition forces and on clinging to a government that has failed at every level. In both cases, the Brotherhood assumes that any dialogue outside the scope of its own agenda would mean having to offer concessions to its power to other factions, and that any change in the cabinet would mean sacrificing some of the portfolios it holds, especially those assumed by Brotherhood members who have failed miserably at managing their ministries. In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood arbitrarily interpret popular suffrage in a manner that grants it the right to monopolize power in its entirety and to prevent others from taking part in it in any way, regardless of the extent to which they may enjoy popular representation, and regardless of how rightful their demands may be. This was reflected during the popular protests in which Brotherhood members considered themselves to be defending their organization in the street, with the violence on the field that accompanied this, to be added to the political violence which the group considers to be its foremost means for continuing to hold power alone. And it seems that members of the Brotherhood, in accordance with an old custom of theirs, consider the abundance of complaints and accusations against others to be sufficient to clear oneself and attract a public that sympathizes with the oppressed. Thus their media arms have proceeded to rain down accusations against the opposition and the protesters of making use of violence in order to change “the results of the ballot boxes". Here deception is coupled with oddity, even if with a bitter taste. Thus, the Brotherhood's Salafists come out in a demonstration supporting the President and opposing violence. Yet nature overcomes nurture, and they raise pictures of Omar Abdel Rahman, the prime promoter of violence in Egypt, who issued fatwas legitimizing killing, robbing and assaulting Copts, and who has been convicted in the United States on charges of terrorism; as well as pictures of Osama Bin Laden, who turned violence into a global institution on the basis of the fatwas issued by Abdel Rahman. Those Salafists perhaps sought to convince others that they reject violence and terrorism, and found only Abdel Rahman and Bin Laden as a frame of reference. And thus the Salafist protest against the violence of the Egyptian opposition, which is exercising its right to freely express its opinion after the Brotherhood monopolized the centers of decision-making and rejected any serious dialogue, turns into the promotion of the worst forms of violence experienced by our region in recent decades. Those Salafists could have gained a certain amount of credibility, whether in terms of their theoretical “frames of reference" or in terms of engaging in peaceful political activity and abandoning violence and terrorism, had they raised pictures of the Mahatma Gandhi or of Nelson Mandela. But returning to reference violence, through Abdel Rahman and Bin Laden, means that they justify for themselves the use of deadly violence while forbidding others from even peacefully expressing themselves. The Muslim Brotherhood might pretext that it is not responsible for the activity of the Salafists. Yet such a pretext would not stand, for historical reasons connected to ideological proximity between the original group and its branches, as well as for objective reasons connected to the decision made by the Brotherhood, through the President, to release Jihadists who had been serving prison sentences for acts of violence they are proud of having committed.
