The only choice left for the Moroccan prime minister is to succumb to the conditions of his former opponent, the National Rally of Independents, to ensure a parliamentary majority guaranteeing his government's sustainment after it has become like a lame duck following the withdrawal of the Istiqlal Party ministers from it. This is due to the fact that other parties turned down his request to join his government, choosing to relax in the opposition seats and address messages to Abdelilah Benkirane, saying they do not wish to topple his government by using their influence and available cards, but rather to practice an opposition role that has become more in demand. It is likely that the opposition – which is aware of the end of the governmental spring produced by the momentum of the popular action which used to prevail - wants to grant it more time to empty all the bullets it holds. And after the Justice and Development Party used to deny any possibility of allying with right-wing parties which it perceived as being historical rivals subjected to red lines, it was forced halfway through its term to woo some of them without any embarrassment. But to the Islamic party's opponents, this move exposes the contradictions between the previous political rhetoric and the current one, which is tilting based on the requirements of the extremely heated situation in the country. More importantly at the level of this gravitation towards the Cabinet seat is that another party named the Authenticity and Modernity Party, which the Islamists never expected to sit alongside them at the negotiations table, also abstained from cooperating with the request to join Benkirane's government, reiterating that the prime minister got the wrong address. For its part, through its withdrawal from the government, the Istiqlal Party registered a precedent which will push Benkirane to rethink any decision before proceeding with it. This is due to the fact that the alliance with the Istiqlal was easier for the Islamists, considering that it shared their reference and moderation, while symbolically pointing to the Islamists' accession to the new generation of the nationalist movement's offshoots. But the local situation was not the only factor that affected the performance of the Islamic government, which included a coalition of other parties that supported it. Indeed, the regional developments that shifted attention towards the events in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, weakened the Moroccan Islamists' position. Although they do not owe loyalty to the same authority - for reasons linked to political Islam in North Africa, the prevalence of a preaching tendency and Sufism, and the influence of the scholars' advisory and guiding roles - the political dimensions of the possible establishment of an Islamic crescent revolving around the North African region made the concept of solidarity between the Islamic movements exceed reality. And it is no longer odd for some governments in the region to express reservations over what is happening in Egypt, fearing they might be taken by the current. Furthermore, the calls for the organization of demonstrations in favor of the return of deposed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi went against the climate on the Moroccan street. However, they were made out of religious loyalty rather than political commitment. Still, the disgruntlement towards Benkirane's government broke out before the Egyptian "Rebel" movement. And what is somewhat unusual at this level is that it was launched from inside the government house, when the Istiqlal Party made his opposing voice heard while still in the governmental coalition, to the point where its tone was fiercer than the opposition factions'. But the situation was characterized by the fact that this opposition stemmed from a direct monitoring of the way the files and cases were being handled, which eliminated any accusation of it being driven by political purposes. What the Istiqlal Party was demanding was a mere re-launching of a dialogue that would turn the clock backward and ensure the implementation of previous government commitments with unionist and social dimensions. Its justification at this level is that it reflects a continuation that cannot be disregarded by whichever government, although this was understood as being a defense of the government that was headed by the party's former leader Abbas El-Fassi. The partisan disputes and the escalating governmental crisis are some of the facets of the Moroccan case. This is due to the fact that instead of calling for the departure or toppling of the government, the opposition factions chose to support it until the end of its term or the occurrence of an event pushing towards irreversible severance. In addition, instead of seeing the ruling party practice selfishness and close the door on itself, it was forced to try to open up to parties with which amicable relations were missing. In parallel, the disputes between the executive and legislative powers escalated to the point where the opposition parliamentary blocs are boycotting the government, amid exchanged accusations between the parliamentary majority and some of the government's components over the management of parliamentary affairs, without this eliminating coexistence. What helped the Moroccans deal with these developments with the least amount of prejudice is that they have already tried street strife and its repercussions. They have also seen the extent to which some experiences undermined the foundations of the state to the point where the main concern was to secure the normal work of sectors affecting security, the protection of properties and exiting one's home without fear. Similarly to the Moroccan case – despite the different causes, results and outcomes – the Algerian case was affected by the bloody ten-year war that depleted the state and social structures. Hence, when the question was asked about the reasons behind the Algerian reservations to follow in the footsteps of the action that broke out against the backdrop of the so-called Arab spring, the Algerians were the only ones to hold the answer which stemmed from the depth of suffering. At this level, the most pessimistic among them started to believe that one coup against legitimacy was better than ten over the country's components and the principles of plurality, diversity, and freedom. It is odd that Algeria seems to be coexisting with vacuum without raising slogans calling for the authority's departure, while the Moroccans are giving their government a chance to catch its breath and choose its partners in coexistence, while also abstaining from asking it to leave.
