What interest does the expansion of internationalization serve, with it not only outflanking the issues of the Arab region, but also penetrating the fabric of the Arab societies and the decisions of countries, as well as their management of their interests and protection of their citizens, whether they hit or miss? Countries are driven by humanitarian motives when they call on the United Nations to establish a "safe passageway" that enables the civilians in Sa'dah to flee the fighting between the Yemeni Army and the Houthis. However, this certainly does not drive away the suspicion that they seek to add the character of internationalization to the conflict in Yemen with the insurgents, who wish to forcefully make it succumb to their willpower. In Lebanon, after the July war 2006, Israel succeeded in imposing internationalization on the South's security, up to the Litani River. In Yemen, Iran is concerned with empowering the Houthis who possess enough weapons that would tempt them to threaten Sana'a with "heavy surprises." While Tehran acquits itself from the "domestic situation" of Yemen, which has become on the list of the Arab states that have "suddenly" become threatened with a chronic disease that is nurtured by "ghosts", it finds no choice but to advice Sana'a to seek a political solution with the rebels. Who is thus the beneficiary from fueling the conflicts that pave the way for internationalization projects? Could Sana'a give the "Revolutionary Guard" a piece of advice to lift the sword of threat off the heads of the reformists who are interested in the project of the "velvet revolution?" The Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa might have convincing justifications to defend his call for a collective Arab dialogue with Tehran. This reminds us of a similar call, the pioneer of which was Mohammad al-Baradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Iranian nuclear dossier and the security-political dossier of the region with all its conflicts (Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen), justify Al-Baradei's fear from the Iranian intentions, although he is convinced that the nuclear threat is "exaggerated". These two dossiers also justify the Arab concern over the [Iranian] control of the destiny of the region, in the bazaar of major deals. These deals employ the weapon of internationalizing the conflicts, as a safe passage to fulfill regional aspirations. When the Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa reveals that certain Arab countries resist the trend to hold a collective dialogue with Iran, he does not need to further explain their concerns. We do not need to delve into the credibility of the available evidence on the Islamic Republic's involvement in inciting Arab groups against Arab governments – whether under the guise of Iran's reference of the Shiite in the world, or the precedence of the religious identity over the "national" or pan-Arab identity. The least of these concerns is to place the interests of the Arab countries on one hand, and the Iranian interests on the other. In this case, the dialogue turns into negotiations, in which the identity of he who makes concessions and he who gains becomes clear, as long as the winner arms himself with nuclear capacity, and with groups from inside the Arab world that are able to confuse it, or dismantle it with "ambiguous" aspirations. It is the second face of the negotiations which Iran wants with the "superpowers", with it being driven, as it announced, by its apprehension over the absence of justice in the world, and stability in the region. Once again, some Arabs wonder, though they have the answer, about who assigns a state, any state, as a “custodian” on all of them. On the sidelines of a language that lacks some diplomacy, the networks of internationalization expand, and this time with the crimes of bombing in Baghdad. In whose interest is it to force the Iraqis to ask for the mediation of the international judiciary, so as to portray them as impotent people who will run a "failed" state after the American pullout? Moussa's ability to describe the seriousness of the situation that spreads gloominess in the region, under the dust of explosions and body parts of the victims, is not questioned. He realizes the "secrets" behind the abstention of some Arabs from running after a dialogue with Iran, as though they were defeated, or as though they violated Iran's rights, or incited against a "soft war" or a "velvet revolution", or conspired against a republic that resists the pressured applied by the "arrogant powers", so the region is filled with new tragedies and mobile wars…Ahmadinejad stands surprised because the motive is to target the "Zionist regime" not the "brothers"! In light of the blackmail practiced by the weapons of internationalization, the alternative is a dialogue with the "superpowers" in the West, one that does not exclude any of the people's rights in order to "restore" them. For their part, the Arabs should hope that President Barack Obama and President Nicolas Sarkozy would respond to Tehran's dream to establish a stable and just world, [one that is consistent] with its goals.
