It is likely that Hezbollah's command will not really give attention to the details of the sanctions featured in the European Union's decision to place its military wing on the terrorism list, as it is accurately aware of the major technical difficulties facing the separation between the party's military and political wings. In addition, it drew valuable lessons from the Iranian experience in this area. And even if these difficulties are overcome, it is acting as though it were unconcerned by everything coming out from the international community and its bodies in regard to the party, proving this after the international tribunal for Lebanon issued accusations against elements from the party in the case of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri's assassination. Hence, this classification is primarily a political message, while the announcement of the separation between the party's two wings – at a time when everyone knows that all its levels, committees and institutions combine both – is intentional. Indeed, it is a warning to the party and its command against the danger of taking over power in Lebanon, in light of the party's full immersion in the Syrian conflict and the transformation of the Land of the Cedars into an arena of conflict, also subjected to the balance of the military powers. This was also done in line of its obstruction of the formation of the upcoming Lebanese government, and the diffusion of a constitutional vacuum behind which the party is suspected of standing, in order to fill this vacuum when the time is right. These fears, expressed by members in the European Union, prompted warnings saying that the sanctions affecting the military wing will become sanctions against the party if it were to impose a new reality in a unilateral way, on both Lebanon and the authority in it. The party's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, might have been aware of the upcoming European decision, which is why he anticipated it by announcing the willingness to engage in dialogue with all the Lebanese parties. In other words, he responded in advance to the European fears and warnings, while pushing the embarrassed Lebanese state to defend the party, although it has resorted more than once to the use of military force on the domestic arena to amend the political balance of power in its favor, making the terrorism description apply to it to the letter. On the other hand, the European position – even if it was justified by the Bulgaria attack and the attempted attack in Cyprus – cannot be dissociated from an Arab-Gulf inclination featuring doubts surrounding the party, due to its role in the fighting in Syria and the role attributed to it in the context of networks affiliated with Iran in those countries. In other words, the European position became more attainable for those calling for sanctions against the party, after it lost its Arab safety net and is facing sanctions in the GCC states. And while the Gulf position against Hezbollah escalated ever since the exposure of its military role in the conflict in Syria, accusations were made against elements from the party in numerous countries in the United States, Latin America and Asia, of standing behind explosions, assassinations and all types of smuggling operations to fund activities classified as being terrorist ones. Hence, a combination of terrorism of all kinds and smuggling operations of all kinds was linked to the party, thus reflecting a mafia-political-sectarian image of it. It is likely that this image will be the most dangerous threat on the long run for what the party believes it represents. True, many are working hard to demonize the party for political and sectarian reasons, and trying to exploit any incident to confirm its mafia-political image. But what is also true is that the party's command did not do much to change that image, especially at the level of its practices and relations with the other sides, except for the seasonal promises that dissipate when they are no longer needed.
