Obviously, there is a major schism in Egypt between the supporters of President Mohamed Morsi and his opponents. However, the potential solutions to this crisis are unclear, knowing that this crisis constitutes the most difficult challenge facing the Egyptian revolution two and a half years following Hosni Mubarak's ousting. The reason for this haziness is that there is no clear way to resolve the crisis and to avoid the civil war that the army so candidly (and rightfully) warned against. The opposition's demand for the president to step down and to conduct early presidential elections will not be met by Morsi and his supporters. On the other hand, Morsi's call for holding a dialogue and his (very late) acknowledgment of the mistakes that he made will not be accepted by the opposition group. Indeed, the latter group has set a high ceiling for its demands; and revoking them at this stage will only come at a hefty political cost. The leaders of the Egyptian opposition group have mobilized millions of people to gather in the streets of Cairo and several other Egyptian cities in the framework of a campaign to correct the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) behavior. Indeed, the MB is using religion to defend its practices, even accusing its opponents of being infidels. However, the opposition must be aware that this campaign principally lacks constitutional legitimacy to support the demand of toppling an elected president just one year following his election. Otherwise, it would have been natural for people to stage street protests in many of the democratic regimes where rulers lose a great deal of their popularity a few months or years following their election. At the beginning, there was fear that the Islamists would hinder the democratic rotation of power, should they accede to power. Therefore, it wouldn't seem good for the Egyptian opposition today to disregard the rulings and indications of the constitutional legitimacy including the respect of the constitutional deadlines for the rulers' terms. This is of special importance because the access of these rulers to power was achieved through a legal process whose integrity and soundness was not questioned, even by the majority of the opposition figures. This is the main point that Morsi made during his interview with the British Guardian yesterday when he said: "If we changed someone in office who [was elected] according to constitutional legitimacy – well, there will be people opposing the new president too, and a week or a month later they will ask him to step down." For this reason, the opposition must be cautious about its present actions that are almost turning violent through the attacks that some opposition members are staging against the headquarters of the MB. By giving the impression that the MB is the victim of a coup, according to Esam al-Aryan, the opposition is actually doing the MB a huge favor it never dreamed of. This will also cause the opposition to lose the legal and constitutional immunity it once enjoyed, especially during the confrontations with the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Furthermore, appearing as victims will help the MB in any subsequent elections, including the presidential or parliamentary elections. Many of the MB's supporters and perhaps also independent people will rally against what they will consider to be the first toppling of an elected civil president in Egypt under the pressure of the Street after failing to topple him via the voting ballots. I am not defending the Egyptian president, and I have previously criticized many of his decisions on several instances. However, I am defending the values of the Egyptian revolution, including mainly the respect for the constitutional mechanisms and the acceptance of the political foes. Anything short of this would mean that being a thug is an acceptable practice on the part of the MB and its opponents. Morsi admitted that he made mistakes and promised to revisit the controversial constitutional clauses. He also called on the opposition to take part in the parliamentary elections that will decide on the real weight of the different political blocs and their right to take part in power. This is perhaps a good start for reproducing the Egyptian revolution based on the right foundations before it falls into the unknown.
